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WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY

1991



U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

THE USCR MANDATE

- *to defend the basic human rights of refugees, most fundamentally, the principle of* non-refoulement, *no forced return of a person with a well-founded fear of persecution to his or her homeland;*
- *to defend the rights of asylum seekers to a fair and impartial determination of their status for refugee protection;*
- *to defend the right to decent and humane treatment for all displaced persons, the uprooted victims of human conflict.*

For thirty-three years, this has been the task of the U.S. Committee for Refugees—the protection of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons.

The USCR mandate is pursued through a rigorous process of documentation and objective reporting of the conditions of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons worldwide regardless of ideology, nationality, race, religion, or social grouping.

Protecting refugees means on-site documentation. In the last year, USCR gathered unique, first-hand information about refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons in Angola, Burma, Canada, China (Tibet), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Ivory Coast, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Thailand.

Protecting refugees means presenting their cases to the governments involved. This year, USCR communicated its concerns directly to a host of governments, including Albania, Bahamas, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Greece, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, United States, USSR, and Yemen.

Protecting refugees means informing the public and policymakers. In the past year, USCR testified 14 times before congressional committees, briefed members of Congress, government officials, and international organizations, and spoke with civic and community groups, and the media. In addition to USCR's own reports, and its monthly publication, *Refugee Reports*, USCR articles and op-ed pieces appeared in major newspapers worldwide, and were cited in dozens more. USCR staff appeared on Nightline, the MacNeil Lehrer Newshour, CBS 60 Minutes, and the Today Show, as well as dozens of other U.S. and international television and radio programs.

We do all of this based on a belief that lies at the center of our work: once the consciences of men and women are aroused, great deeds can be accomplished. And, while some of the refugees of concern to us fled their homes long ago, the same beliefs apply to those who left only last week, or just this morning.

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COVER PHOTO: Kurdish refugees in flight from Iraq.
Photo Credit: Black Star

The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter

This boy, displaced by Sudan's civil war, studies with a precious pencil and paper. Betty Press

The year 1990 was one of lost innocence, shedded naivete. As 1989 closed, for many of us there was boundless hope—essentially, knowledge—that, with the demise of the Cold War, the world could look forward to a rosier future. There would be opportunity to focus on improving the quality of life for all, international cooperation that would make multilateralism work, usher in peace, and perhaps even give rise to peace dividends. We believed that "liberty and glasnost for all" had set in motion democratizing and peace-making trends that would never be reversed.

A year later, the world has engaged in a major war in the Persian Gulf that even before the outbreak of hostilities in 1991 had displaced more than a million people. In the aftermath of that war, the world has been forced to confront the hopelessness and helplessness of refugees and displaced people in new, high profile ways, with thousands dying in the process. In the Soviet Union, the architect of glasnost has in the Baltics countenanced the rise of violent militarism as an instrument of domestic policy, the Union itself appears to be rushing toward collapse, and perhaps millions are poised to leave at the first opportunity. Despite the apparent end of the Cold War, the world's refugees had increased to nearly seventeen million by the end of 1990 and were significantly higher immediately thereafter. The reality of war and conflict for much of humankind remains unchanged, the prospects for much more—in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the Middle East, India, Sudan, Burma—portend even higher numbers of refugees and displaced people. We remain in a well-weaponed world.

This spiritual and emotional rollercoaster has implications on the largest of scales. In the refugee field, they are all-defining. Geopolitics has consistently dominated the international refugee machinery. Many have conceived of refugees exclusively in Cold War terms. Although that should never have been the case, in truth, the Cold War, including the third world proxy battles it spawned, was the major producer of refugees in the post-World War II era. We perceived its passing to mean that fewer refugees would be created and that millions who lost their homes and homelands would be able to return.

The past year has produced several developments, revelations, and trends that, at minimum, muddy the clarity of

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our earlier prognostications. For one, we are now aware of the post-Cold War lag factor. It has been more than two years since the Soviets left Afghanistan, but there is no peace, and the refugees have not gone home. While small progress has been made in some other regional conflicts, such as Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, in almost all the dying and suffering go on. Only in Namibia and, less securely, in Nicaragua, is peace actually "on line." Extricating the world from passing conflicts is not at all simple or quick.

For another, the absence of the Cold War framework, perhaps properly, undermines the certitude with which too many of us approached the world. Robert J. Samuelson recently wrote that for the United States, "since the 1940s, communism has been the great simplifier . . . it made our foreign policy a great morality tale of good versus evil . . . now, [with] communism's collapse . . . we are less sure of our foreign interests." Freed from the Cold War framework, ethnic hatred, nationalism, and other forces raise their negative sides unbridled, without the discipline inherent in the old framework. While many share a feeling that there will be less (simplistic) clarity on why new populations of refugees and displaced people emerge, it is increasingly clear that the forces unleashed by the world's changes will in fact produce new displacement in significant numbers.

There is increasing evidence that the apparent demise of the Cold War and the fear of collapse in the Soviet Union have combined to cost most refugees and displaced people whatever strategic value they may once have had. Several observers have suggested with respect to refugees and displaced people that, because the conceptual structure that defined "our interests" has changed, so too has our will to respond. It is increasingly clear that for many in the best-off nations of the world the humanitarian needs of the poorest of the poor, those of least strategic importance, are fading from the even miniscule view they were formerly afforded. For most of us, the plight of Africa's victims, for example, is just not an issue, just as the gassing of the Kurds was not when it first came to world attention in 1988. If anything, too much attention continues to be focused on walling others out so that they don't impinge on us. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) respected Director of International Protection Michel Moussalli recently pointed out that "the budget of UNHCR for the 15 million refugees in the world amounted to roughly *500* million dollars in 1989. The financial resources devoted by the administrations of the Western countries handling their asylum procedures amounted for the same period to roughly *5 billion* dollars." With respect to UNHCR, the abrupt departure of High Commissioner Stoltenberg in October further unsettled the institution that has suffered immensely during the last few years. Bureaucratically, it may seem that the worst of UNHCR's budget crunch has passed. But that would be a shallow view indeed. It may be more comfortable in Geneva because the substantial deficit carried forward from 1989 to 1990 has been liquidated, and staff who were going to be let go are gone. But at what a price! Refugees worldwide—but especially in the less visible spots—have seen their actual level of care degraded, education of their children eliminated, their dependency deepened.

A Kurdish refugee and his daughter crossing into Turkey. AP

The tragedy of Kurdish and Shi'ite civilians in Iraq has shown for all to see the inadequacy of the world's current response to the internally displaced.

It is critically important for those interested in humanitarian concerns generally, and humanitarian concerns in the third and fourth worlds specifically, to fight back, to organize to ensure that whatever "new world order" emerges from today's confusion and change adequately responds to the vulnerable uprooted victims of human conflict.

In that regard, I suggest that a five-point common agenda be pursued during the next several years:

1. **Strengthen the multilateral humanitarian institutions.** The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international entities that deal with refugees and displaced people have emerged from the last few years in a weakened state. In terms of their mandates, capabilities, financial resources, and available diplomatic support, that trend needs immediate reversing. While it is important that the UN system generally works better now, with fewer East versus West blockages to its peacekeeping and conflict resolution capacities, it is also critically important that these particular UN and international agencies actually work well. They are the institutions charged with protecting and assisting those who are already victims.

2. **Advance and institutionalize international protection and assistance for internally displaced people.** States are legal entities that often have no inherent validation by the people who live within them. Glenn Frankel has written that most nation-states are "jury-rigged contraptions that owe their existence to the twentieth century collapse of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, British, and French empires. . . . More than 90 of the UN General Assembly's 159 member states were born after World War II." He quotes Francois Heisbourg, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "Will nation-states fade away? I don't think so. Will state sovereignty fade? My answer is yes."

One area in which sovereignty should fade is where a government's abuse of its own citizens is so onerous that it breaches some well-defined standard of international acceptability. We need a system that codifies an international interest in the people in such cases and legalizes an appropriate international protective response. To be politically feasible, such an approach would likely need to be limited to clearly aberrant or rogue governments and also limited in the responses that could be triggered. One example might be the provision of a legal umbrella for cross-border relief operations to civilians being starved out by their government in a civil war without that government's approval. Such victims would be of international concern and would be fed with international resources if they had been able to cross a border. Is it really logical to force them to do that to survive?

At the other end of the response continuum would be a mechanism that triggers UN Security Council consideration of a humanitarian disaster. When millions of a country's citizens are viciously abused by that country's government, Security Council consideration is justified and intervention may be warranted. Any "new world order" worth its salt would provide for this.

In any event, now is the time to move in the direction of institutionalizing improved international protection of internally displaced civilians; the tragedy of Kurdish and Shi'ite civilians in Iraq has shown for all to see the inadequacy of the world's current response to the internally displaced. The stage for improvement has been set. You can hear the possibilities in President Bush's own words:

> Some might argue that this decision [of April 16 to field military forces to protect internally displaced Kurds] is an intervention into the internal affairs of Iraq, but I think the humanitarian concern, the refugee concern is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of understanding about this.

3. **Promote successful repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people.** The combined numbers of refugees and displaced people uprooted by some conflicts, such as in Afghanistan and Mozambique, are so great that they could overwhelm such countries if and when they do achieve some semblance of peace. Because most repatriation is spontaneous, "repatriation emergencies" could occur as large numbers and internally displaced people surge towards home areas that are entirely devastated. There is a universal vested interest in assisting such countries to reconcile and develop in the hope that peace is sustained. Today, the international community is not addressing this need at all well.

4. **Ensure that victims of human conflict in the poorest, least strategically important countries of the world don't continue to be ignored.** All the signs are already in place that they will be ignored unless NGOs and religious institutions collaborate to change the trend. One recent report indicated that charitable contributions in some European countries for humanitarian programs in Africa are down by more than 90 percent, while contributions to meet needs in the Soviet Union related to problems of food distribution there are flooding in.

For many in the best-off nations of the world, the humanitarian needs of the poorest of the poor, those of least strategic importance, are fading from the even miniscule view they were formerly afforded.

There will always be such strategic priorities that get a response, and not undeservedly so. However, religious bodies and NGOs are the natural constituency of those that have no other constituents. Recent developments indicate that many people will die or be permanently blighted if we are not up to the task. In the Horn of Africa, forty percent of the entire population are refugees or internally displaced people.

5. **Fight the construction of Berlin Walls around the liberal, rich democracies of the West that attempt to cut themselves off from asylum seekers from the second and third world.** As the West European nations move toward "harmonization" of their asylum policies and free movement among themselves, there is immense pressure to create barriers to prevent "nonmembers" from penetrating the "clubhouse" they are creating. But all too often, the consequences are a shirking of their responsibility to examine asylum claims and to protect deserving refugees. Instead, the tendency is to "pass the buck" to the frontline first asylum states, where protection is precarious and the resources are badly strained.

* * *

On the ground in 1990, the largest new population of refugees and displaced people in *Africa* was that of *Liberians*. In a hellacious blood-letting, 1.2 million people were uprooted. In the critical period, when massive numbers of refugees first arrived in poor, remote locations in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and later Sierra Leone, the international community did not respond quickly or well to the refugees' needs. Without the generosity of local people, who opened their homes and shared their meagre resources with the refugees, there would certainly have been a major catastrophe. Months later, when the international community finally got its act together, those same local people found themselves frozen out of the assistance that arrived, even though they had depleted their own food reserves to assist the refugees.

Meanwhile, life remained horrific for those displaced inside Liberia. Some 125,000 people were trapped inside Monrovia, which turned into a battleground between government troops and various rebel and other armed forces. For months, there was no food or water. Killings and even massacres became commonplace. When a multi-national West African peace-keeping force restored some order, hundreds of thousands more displaced people flocked to the city in search of food and security. Once again, international response did not keep up with the explosion of need, and in December 1990, malnutrition and hunger were rife in the Liberian capital.

An uncannily similar scenario played out beginning in December in *Somalia's* capital, Mogadishu. There too government troops and rebels fought for control of the city. There too dead bodies

The Liberian civil war had many victims: 15,000 dead; 730,000 refugees; 500,000 internally displaced. Many, like this woman, suffered worse [illegible] /USCR/H. Ruiz

lay on the street, and terror and mayhem ruled. As 1990 ended, Somali refugees—as well as Ethiopian refugees who had been living in Somalia—were fleeing to neighboring countries. Hundreds of thousands became internally displaced. And with the country still in chaos, help was nowhere on the horizon.

Besides these new emergencies, during 1990 there was substantial deterioration in already existing refugee and internal displacement situations in Africa. Most dramatic among those was in *Sudan*, where relief experts were forecasting that hundreds of thousands could begin to starve to death beginning in spring 1991. The government of Sudan's long-term denial that a large-scale famine was developing, its hindering of relief efforts by international and private organizations, and its undermining of Operation Lifeline Sudan all contributed to the potential for large-scale starvation in 1991.

In *southern Africa*, an average of 6,000 *Mozambicans* per month continued to flee to *Malawi*, bringing the total number of refugees in that tiny country to more than 900,000. While the dismantling of many of the laws that shaped the apartheid system in *South Africa* kindled hope for a more equitable South African society and for the repatriation of more than 40,000 South African refugees, it did not help the 250,000 Mozambican refugees whom South African authorities still view as illegal migrants subject to deportation.

A small-scale repatriation program through which several thousand *Angolan* and *Zairean* refugees returned home in 1990 was suspended due the poor security situation in Angola, where war and drought have also put large numbers at risk and have thwarted relief efforts. Although peace talks in both the *Angolan* and *Mozambican* conflicts move forward, albeit slowly, repatriation of refugees from those countries is not imminent.

With the signing in June of the Schengen Supplementary Agreement by *France*, *Germany*, and the *Benelux* countries as well as the signing that same month by the EC states of the Dublin Convention on the state responsible for examining an asylum request, the European Community has moved significantly closer to a harmonized policy on asylum and entry as part of its overall plan to abolish internal customs and passport controls within the EC by the end of 1992. The effect of this on asylum seekers in Europe in 1990 was of diminished opportunity to register asylum claims and of a continuing downward trend in the number of asylum cases decided favorably. Harmonization, all too often, has meant that nations once more generous than their neighbors, now are introducing restrictive measures so that they may stand shoulder to shoulder with those European states that have sought to deter the entry of asylum seekers.

Western Europe's restrictive turn, while motivated in large part by the presence of asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Europe's own southeastern region, also reveals a concern about the prospect of a new, large wave of asylum seekers from the *Soviet Union*.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union picked up speed during 1990, as nearly all Soviet republics declared their sovereignty or independence. Outbreaks of ethnic or nationality-based violence during the past two years have caused more than half a million people to become displaced within the USSR, the majority of whom are Armenians. Azerbaijanis, Meskhtian Turks, Tatars, other Caucasian nationalities, and ethnic Russians living as minority groups in outlying republics have joined the ranks of the displaced as well. Many of the displaced are returning to areas from which they had been forcibly moved during the

Stalin era, as each of the nationality patches that comprise the Soviet quilt becomes more ethnically homogeneous.

A resurgence in anti-semitism and fears of political and ethnic violence compelled more than 200,000 Jews to exit the Soviet Union during 1990, most to *Israel* but thousands were generously received in the *United States* and *Germany* as well. This was the first year of direct resettlement processing of 50,000 Soviets to the United States, who were processed out of the American embassy in Moscow, instead of Vienna and Rome. The new system had glitches, particularly for hundreds of Christian Evangelical families who still had Israel listed as the country of destination on their passports, the well-understood ruse that had once enabled them to reach Vienna.

Despite the added security threats from the Gulf conflict, the migration of Soviet Jews to Israel continued at the highest rate in decades. Israel's housing and social services were severely strained by the admission of about 184,000 Soviet Jews in 1990, and double that number are expected in 1991.

While welcoming the largest influx of Jews in decades, Israel's housing and social services were severely strained by the admission of about 184,000 Soviet Jews during the year, and the prospect that this number could double in the year ahead. The influx of Soviet Jews was a cause of increasing wariness among Palestinians in the occupied territories, including more than 900,000 UNRWA-registered refugees.

The most dramatic event in the *Middle East* in 1990 occurred with the invasion of *Kuwait*. The invasion and subsequent occupation touched off an exodus of more than 300,000 Kuwaitis and caused more than a million nationals of other countries to vacate the area. This put a tremendous strain on *Jordan*, which—due to the presence of 929,000 Palestinian refugees—already had the highest ratio of refugees to native population of any country in the world before the conflict began.

New political and military developments in the region had little impact on the *Afghan* war and the more than six million Afghan refugees in *Pakistan* and *Iran*. Although Soviet troops have been out of Afghanistan for two years, a civil war chugs along delaying still longer the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the return of her people.

Important victories were won during the year on behalf of asylum seekers in the *United States*. After a decade of bickering, the Immigration and Naturalization Service published regulations to implement the asylum provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980. Under the new system, a specialized corps of asylum officers will hear asylum claims in a nonadversarial setting, supported by a documentation center, open to information from nongovernmental agencies. Those denied asylum will still be able to have their asylum claims heard by an immigration judge in the course of a deportation or exclusion hearing. Congress also filled a gap in the 1980 refugee law by creating a category of temporary protected status, and designated an 18-month safe haven period for Salvadorans. Finally, the settlement of a class-action suit in December allows for new adjudications of up to a half million *Guatemalan* and *Salvadoran* asylum claims.

The United States also admitted more refugees from overseas in 1990 than in any year since 1981. Fully 75 percent of the 122,325 refugees who were admitted represented two nationalities, Soviets and Vietnamese.

In South Asia, at least one million people were internally displaced in *Sri Lanka* as a long-running civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists flared violently in June 1990. By the end of the year, about 125,000 Tamils had fled across the Palk Strait to seek refuge in southern *India*. The government in New Delhi has so far resisted efforts by UNHCR to provide assistance to the Tamils. India has more than 400,000 refugees—from Tibet, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Burma, as well as Sri Lanka—most of whom receive no international aid or protection.

A new crackdown on Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns compelled several thousand to cross the high mountain passes into *Nepal* in search of asylum or transit to India. In the last five months of 1990, Nepal involuntarily repatriated 167 Tibetan asylum seekers, some of whom were imprisoned by Chinese authorities.

Despite persistent entreaties from the United States, UNHCR and USCR, *Malaysia* has pushed back more than 9,000 Vietnamese boat people since May 1989. Not a single arrival has been counted since July 1990, testament either to the success of the interdiction or the despair of the refugees.

As the civil war in *Cambodia* escalated in scope and violence, more than 30,000 refugees arrived in Thailand, some bringing horror stories of rampant disease and hunger in the Khmer Rouge "liberated zones." More than 150,000 people have been internally displaced by the fighting.

The number of refugees in *Thailand* swelled to nearly 460,000, including 325,000 *Cambodians*, 70,000 *Laotians*, and 16,000 *Vietnamese*. Persecution and civil war in *Burma* has forced more than 45,000 Burmese students and ethnic minority peoples to flee into Thailand. The ethnic groups, principally the Karen and Mon, have clustered in camps and villages along the border, while most of the students have sought refuge in Bangkok.

Throughout the year, the boat people population in *Indonesia* hovered near 20,000, prompting concern of a backlash. But despite repeated reports of mistreatment of Vietnamese by Indonesian authorities on Kuku Island, the government's commitment to asylum remained unchanged.

* * *

The world remains confronted with a myriad of humanitarian and refugee situations. It is unfortunately the case that no government can be trusted to do the humanitarian thing at any particular time or in any specific situation. Governments always act according to their perception of their interests.

The litany of refugee tragedies in 1990—newly created or dragging on—has already unfortunately proven to be only a prelude to 1991's refugee tragedies. And this is the way it will continue unless people East and West, North and South demand of their governments a new world order, with new, more humane priorities, thus making it in governments' individual and collective interests to function on a higher, more moral plane. Upholding human rights, seriously confronting poverty, discrimination, and violence, eliminating crushing debt on the poorest of the world's countries, promoting sustainable, environmentally respectful development—these are all goals common people can appreciate; they are all in "the peoples'" interests.

So, too, are protecting and caring for refugees and displaced people.

Mass Migration as a Global Security Problem

Gil Loescher

We are living in an era in which fundamental political and economic changes in the international system result in large-scale movements of people. It is also a time when mass migrations themselves affect political, economic, and strategic developments worldwide. Indeed, it was the outpouring of refugees from East to West Germany in late 1989 that brought down the Berlin Wall and generated the most significant transformation in international relations since World War II.

Mass Migration and National and International Security

Often the spectre of mass influxes is invoked as a threat to the national security of host governments. But what constitutes "security" or a threat to a nation's security? How do governments' foreign and security policies stimulate international migrations and what effect do mass displacements both inside and outside a country have on international stability? And how are those concerns related to the humanitarian imperatives of protection and assistance?

Traditionally, security has been defined solely in terms of power relations between states or even more specifically in terms of preserving the territorial integrity of the state or the physical safety and continuity of a particular government in the face of external or internal military threats. Yet for the vast majority of nations, security is a far more complex phenomenon and includes economic and social factors, such as establishing conditions for economic welfare and some degree of political participation and achieving and preserving inter-communal harmony, as well as traditional military factors.

A Kurdish woman faints while waiting in a food line on the Iraq-Turkish border. Massive, violent movement of people inflicts real human suffering. AP

There is no doubt that mass migrations, if not addressed adequately, can endanger social and economic stability and security, particularly in countries already suffering from economic and infrastructural underdevelopment, unstable political systems, and ethnic or other social cleavages. The world's refugee burden, for example, is carried overwhelmingly by the poorest states (the 20 countries with the highest ratio of refugees have an annual average per capita income of $700).[1] Refugees compete with already desperate nationals within host societies for the scarce jobs and services available. The strain on a host population's social services and physical infrastructure, the distortion of local economic conditions, and the racial and religious tensions that sometimes result in countries with acute problems of cultural heterogeneity constitute legitimate security concerns for many developing countries. The Iraqi Kurdish refugee crisis is only the most recent example of this phenomenon.

The pressures created by mass migrations in poor countries can also affect the

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formulation of security and foreign policies in these states. Host governments walk a tightrope in trying to balance economic, national security, and humanitarian interests. Most states are extremely reluctant to accord legal recognition to refugees or migrants from neighboring countries for fear of damaging political relations, encouraging a mass influx of people seeking assistance, or offering protection to an ideologically or culturally incompatible group of people. The presence of refugees may also pose a national security threat to the receiving country by serving as the target of attacks by the sending state or its agents.

Mass migrations are also employed as foreign policy tools by both sending and receiving countries. In the past, Communist governments have employed mass expulsions to rid themselves of political dissidents, unwanted minorities, and other "undesirables" and to destabilize or embarrass Western adversaries. Other sending countries have come to see mass exoduses as a national resource, to be exploited like any other. For sending countries, such as Vietnam, El Salvador, or Morocco, the benefits of out-migration include the export of their unemployed population, the hope to maximize foreign currency earnings through remittances by their expatriate citizens, and the provision of an outlet or "safety valve" for internal dissidence and the relief of economic pressures. In addition, governments have employed mass expulsions to rid themselves of rival groups or unwanted minorities, to punish adversaries and reward allies. Conversely, mass movements of populations may also be used by receiving states to embarrass their foes, to encourage "brain drains" and the departure of much needed skilled and professional workers, and to arm opposition groups. From the perspective of receiving countries, immigration and refugee admissions policies have often been guided by the belief that mass exoduses serve to embarrass enemy nations and to discredit their political systems. More significantly, exiles have been used instrumentally as "freedom fighters" and guerrillas to wage wars of resistance on all continents.

Foreign military or political interventions, or internal or external responses to intervention, often result in mass displacements. Many third world conflicts have their origins in long-standing rivalries between competing ethnic groups and nationalities and between individual states and their internal opponents, but because the structure of conflict in the third world has become increasingly international with both established governments and opposing political forces having external patrons and relatively easy access to weapons, internal wars in the third world have become protracted affairs that generate seemingly endless outpourings of people across borders to neighboring countries. During the past decade, therefore, regional conflicts and political instability, exacerbated by superpower rivalry and intervention, created massive problems of refugees and internally displaced people in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, Southwest and South Asia, Central America, and the Middle East.

These mass displacements, particularly among groups that are politically and militarily active, can also complicate regional security. Armed groups of exiles, the so-called "refugee warrior communities," not only threaten host states and the security of their citizens but also obstruct badly needed regional political settlements. Afghan exiles in Pakistan or Cambodian resistance movements in Thailand, for example, have created obstacles to ceasefires and peace agreements in Afghanistan and Cambodia.

These examples of mass population movements during the past decade underscore the interconnections between strategic and security interests and international migration. Mass migration frequently constitutes a destabilizing factor in national and world politics that is in the interest of both the industrialized and the developing world to resolve. Doing so, however, requires assistance and diplomatic efforts on a scale going well beyond charitable and humanitarian concern. Long-term strategies are required, not only to alleviate the problem in the interim, but to deal with its root causes. In particular, governments need to develop foreign policies that effectively raise human rights issues with countries that expel or persecute members of their populations, that give strong diplomatic support for regional peace and arms control systems, that provide the economic, technical, and structural means to reduce—at least partially—the political and economic tensions that lead to mass migration, and that ensure clear and unequivocal protection for those whose migratory motivations are well-grounded as the victims of persecution and conflict. The former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Thorvald Stoltenberg, has correctly argued that only when the international dimensions of the causes of migration flows are fully recognized and when governments address the issue in its international context will the problem of mass population movements be given sufficient priority and resources by policymakers.

East-West Population Movements

The surge in East-West migration in recent years threatens the future internal stability of the Soviet Union and several Eastern European states and has implications for future regional security. Not since the 1940s and 1950s have so many people moved from East to West. During the past 40 years, most population movements from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were viewed as refugee movements. Not only did Western states recognize the connection between the large uprooted populations of Eastern and Central Europe and future stability in the region, but as East-West

The fall-out from these brutal conflicts has

than a million Indochinese. UNHCR

tensions grew, the West also began to use refugees as part of an ideological conflict. Each defection into Austria or West Berlin was construed as "a ballot for freedom."[2] The Cold War and harsh economic conditions in the East generated large numbers of refugees: between the creation of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, an estimated 3 to 3.5 million East Germans—about 20 percent of the population—fled to the Federal Republic of Germany. Eventually, the consolidation of power in Communist Eastern Europe and the effective sealing off of Eastern Europe from the West reduced the flows dramatically. From the early 1970s to the first half of the 1980s, outflows from Warsaw Pact states to the West involved no more than 100,000 people annually, and the majority of these were ethnic Germans moving home to West Germany.

The dismantling of the Iron Curtain in 1989 eliminated the physical barriers in Europe, and East-West population movements again took on a strategic dimension with significant implications for stability and security in Europe. In 1989, a total of 1.3 million people left Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for the West: 720,000 ethnic Germans *(Aussiedler and Ubersiedler)*, about 320,000 Bulgarian Turks, of whom half then returned to Bulgaria, 71,000 Soviet Jews, and 80,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Poland and Yugoslavia. During 1990, the East-to-West flow continued as more than 200,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union, nearly 400,000 ethnic Germans poured into Germany, and tens of thousands of Romanians and other Eastern European nationalities sought a new start in the West. Most of the emigrants in recent years have been members of ethnic minority or religious groups—ethnic Germans, Jews, Turks, Hungarians (out of Romania), Armenians, Pentecostal Christians, Greeks—with close links to receiving countries, such as Germany, Hungary, Turkey, the United States, Israel and Greece. But if, as expected, the Soviet Union eliminates all travel restrictions on its citizens, outflows from the East in the near future are likely to reach the unprecedented level of 2 to 2.5 million annually.[3]

To this dynamic are added internal movements, generated by ethnic rivalries, irredentist pressures and nationalist disputes, mainly within the Soviet Union. Sixty million Soviet citizens live in republics, other than their own ethnic home areas. Ethnic strife between Azerbaijan and Armenia has forced several hundred thousand to move to other republics, and ethnic Russians living in the outlying republics in Central Asia, the Baltics, and the Transcaucasus have begun to migrate to the Russian republic. It is estimated that already some 600,000 people in all have been internally displaced in the USSR. Long-term East-West relations will inevitably be affected if ethnic conflict and internal displacement provoke a violent and authoritarian reaction from the center and result in political retrenchment within the Soviet Union.

A complete collapse of the Soviet Union would have a significant ripple effect in the West, but because no one can safely assert when the decline of the USSR will end, it is impossible to forecast the likely size, composition, and impact of future population movements from the Soviet Union.[4] Even under the most optimistic scenarios, internal economic reform will lead to continuing unemployment, rising prices, and economic dislocation. Before the benefits of a shift to a market economy take hold in the Soviet Union, the pressures to migrate to the more prosperous West European states will increase. In addition to migratory pressures created by economic deterioration and ethnic conflict, the passage of a new Soviet emigration law—a long sought-after objective of human rights organizations and Western governments—will drastically cut the waiting time for travel requests and will provide greater opportunities for millions of Soviet citizens to travel abroad.

Nevertheless, several obstacles impede the capacity of Soviet citizens to leave their country in extremely large numbers, not least of which are transportation and currency convertibility problems, the capability of the Soviet Army to reinforce its presence on its borders, and difficulties in obtaining entrance to

Western countries. As already noted, to date, most outmigration from the Soviet Union has been restricted to ethnic Germans, Jews, and Armenians. Apart from these large minorities, most of the people of the USSR have few links to the Western world, and unless open civil war breaks out, most population movements are likely to be internal, not necessarily spilling over into neighboring countries.

A mass exodus from the Soviet Union would, however, present major security problems for Central European states. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are going through major structural changes that leave them with little capability to admit, house, and feed large numbers of immigrants without undermining their own attempts at economic and political reform. It is unlikely that these states could absorb large numbers of people, although they might be able to integrate some Soviet citizens with shared ethnic or religious ties or other close connections. In the event of mass migration from the USSR, Central European states will demand burden-sharing agreements with the West. While financial help for the front-line receiving countries would most likely be forthcoming, it is unlikely that Western governments will agree to resettle the majority of Soviet nationals who might seek to move on to a new life in Western countries.

Many East European states are not only countries of asylum but are also sources of emigration to the West. Yet, the potential for mass exodus in the region varies greatly from country to country.[5] Poland and Romania, the countries most affected by emigration pressures, together account for almost two-thirds of the total population of Eastern Europe and share between them over 80 percent of the population growth recorded in the region during the past 20 years. Because the dislocation caused by the transition from centrally planned to market economies in these countries is likely to result in rising prices and further unemployment, particularly among the young, emigration on a large scale is likely unless forestalled by positive action. Already in the last ten years, about one million Poles have left their country and chosen not to return. A Polish construction worker active on the Western black market, for example, can earn as much in 1 or 2 months as he can in 4 years in Poland. In Romania, great uncertainty about the country's political future has dramatically increased the number of emigrants, particularly among Gypsies and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. During the first eight months of 1990, well over 100,000 Romanians fled to Germany and Austria alone. Although Yugoslavs have been able to travel abroad since the 1960s, emigration to other European countries is likely to increase dramatically in the event of a breakup of the country and a civil war among its republics. Albania, the most backward country of the region, has seen several thousands of its citizens escape on different occasions during the past year. These are possibly a forerunner of future mass migrations, particularly among Albania's 400,000 ethnic Greeks. Next door in Bulgaria, thousands of people have left because of the country's worsening economic plight and still feeble and uncertain movement towards political reform. This is in addition to the exodus of 320,000 of its Turkish minority (many of whom have since returned). Alone among their neighbors, however, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—economically more advanced and with smaller populations and fewer emigration traditions—are unlikely to see significant outpourings of people in the near future. Nevertheless, a recent report indicates that unemployment could reach 14 million, or 21 percent of the working population in Eastern Europe by 1994.[6] If economic conditions do not improve markedly and quickly, Eastern Europeans will predictably be more likely to become increasingly disaffected and opt to leave their homelands behind.

> *In responding to these pressures in the future, it is essential that governments abide by the international obligation to accord special protection and assistance to refugees. . .*

A surge westward of large numbers of disaffected people will undermine political and economic stability within Eastern Europe and may adversely affect the future course of political and security relations between East and West. The mass outmigration of many of East Europe's best educated and trained people will hinder the developmental capacity of these states and undermine their attempts to establish more liberal economic and social institutions. Western policymakers may soon be confronted with determining what, if any, are the breaking points beyond which these states will not permit the hemorrhaging of their skilled manpower and what are the implications for future domestic stability and regional security.

Not all migration from the East will involve East European citizens. An estimated 200,000 to 500,000 foreign workers, including Vietnamese, Mozambicans, Cubans, Angolans and Ethiopians, are serving out their contracts in the USSR, former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Economic restructuring and the mass unemployment it brings will eliminate many of the jobs of foreign workers. There is concern that many of these people will seek asylum in the West because they will not be able to return safely to their home countries, which are in the midst of political turmoil or civil war.

The combination of the removal of the physical barriers between East and West and the relaxation of exit border controls imposed by governments in the region with the build-up of migratory pressures in countries undergoing rapid political and economic change have shifted the burden of controlling migration from former East bloc governments to Western countries. At present, the possibility for regular migration to Western Europe is limited. In many countries, East Europeans can only enter if they are rejoining their families, and in a few countries, they are limited to labor migration on the basis of bilateral agreements. Most enter Western Europe on tourist or business visas and simply extend their stay by applying for political asylum. By using the "refugee door" to remain, East European asylum seekers further overburden refugee determination procedures, especially in Germany and Austria. Most West European countries are imposing stricter visa requirements and giving less material assistance to deter these new asylum seekers from the East. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, it is also unlikely that the

In Romania, great uncertainty about the country's political future has dramatically increased the number of emigrants, particularly among Romanies and ethnic Hungarians. Magnum

United States will see the strategic necessity of dramatically increasing its annual intake of immigrants and refugees to accommodate East Europeans and relieve pressure on host states in East or West Europe. In late 1989 and 1990, it stopped registering new applications for refugee resettlement from Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians and limited new applications from Romanians and Bulgarians to those who have identifiable ties to the United States. The United States reduced its 1991 East European refugee admissions ceiling to 5,000, the lowest level since the 1980 Refugee Act came into effect. In addition, although the Immigration Act of 1990 raises the ceiling on immigration from 540,000 to 700,000 people per year, the number of immigrant visas issued to East Europeans is not expected to rise significantly.

It is doubtful whether an immigration and visa policy based solely on exclusion of East European migrants could be maintained over the long run or indeed, would prove beneficial politically or strategically to the West. Barriers to entry can only be partially effective, particularly along the now relatively porous Eastern European borders, and the political and diplomatic costs of an unduly restrictive policy may be high in terms of maintaining good relations with either receiver or transit nations and of upholding the West's international reputation generally. For decades, Western governments persistently requested East European countries to grant their citizens the right both to leave and to return to their countries. One of the major successes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] has been the further liberalization of visa and exit policies in the East, and maintaining access for Soviets and East Europeans to the West for visits and exchanges is important for the political evolution and long-range stability of the East. As long as freedom of movement for the people of Eastern Europe remains an important diplomatic objective of the West, intra-European migration cannot be controlled by restrictive immigration controls.

In the 1990s, mass displacements in the third world are likely to be the result of ethnic and communal conflicts, fueled by . . . modern weaponry and sharp socio-economic inequalities.

South-North Population Movements

At the same time that this East-West migration is increasing, record numbers of asylum seekers and migrants from the developing countries are entering the West as well.[7] Even before the dramatic events of 1989, refugee and immigration policy had become an acute issue in public debate in Western Europe and North America.

Before the 1980s, barriers to international movement kept the numbers of arrivals from developing nations tolerably low, and the West was shielded from a direct spillover of refugees from distant conflicts. The developing world was simply too far away from the industrialized world, and jet age travel was not commonplace for most third world nationals. Those few who were accepted for admission to the West from the developing countries were preselected by immigration officers stationed abroad.

Migration pressures from the third world were also obviated by the relatively open immigration policies pursued by many Western governments in the late 1950s and 1960s. During this period of economic expansion in Europe, industrial nations needed labor, and easily absorbed not only thousands of asylum seekers still coming from East Europe, but also actively recruited millions of guest workers not only from Southern Europe but also from former European colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. European labor recruitment programs brought West Indians and Asians to Britain, North Africans to France, Indonesians and Surinamese to the Netherlands, and Turks and Southern Europeans to Germany. Huge numbers of expatriates streamed home as Europe's colonies in Africa and Asia achieved their independence. By the early 1970s, about 10 million guest workers and about 2 million persons from former colonies had been admitted to Western European countries.

The 1980s rudely shook the industrialized countries out of their old patterns. As communication and transportation improved and as economic and political conditions in neighboring host countries became more difficult, increasing numbers of the distressed people from the developing world began looking for safety, security, and prosperity in Western Europe and North America. During the past decade, the West has experienced a steep rise in the number of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants from the third world. With increasing numbers and rising costs, the asylum systems of many Western countries are on the verge of collapse. In West Europe alone, the number of asylum applications rose from about 70,000 in 1983 to 442,000 in 1990. In 1990, Germany received 193,000 applications for asylum (excluding East Germans and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe), nearly 60 percent more than in 1989, and Britain's asylum application pool rose to 25,000, up from 2,000 per year a decade ago. The United States and Canada experienced similar increases during the 1980s (although U.S. asylum applications dropped in 1990 to 73,637, down from 101,679 in 1989). On arrival in the West, lengthy legal processes have often ensured asylum seekers months or even years of residence, and the costs of their care and handling, currently estimated at more than $6 billion a year, have increased tenfold during the past seven years.[8]

At present, the annual amounts spent on asylum seekers in their own countries by several single West European governments exceed the annual worldwide expenditure of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, an imbalance that suggests the misplacement of resources to address the problem.

The spectrum of causes leading to migration has also considerably widened during the past decade, while the definition of "refugee" from the 1951 Geneva Convention remains a narrow "well-founded fear of persecution." Fleeing not only from political oppression, but also ethnic and communal violence, ecological disasters, chronic unemployment, and hopeless economic conditions and prospects, many of the asylum seekers arriving in North America and Europe cannot prove that they meet the Convention's refugee definition. In addition, the immigration systems in Western Europe are not flexible enough nor adequate to respond to the growing immigration pressures from the third world. As noted above, because in most European states the possibility for regular im-

Crisscrossing borders: there are some 1,868,000 refugees in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan—98 percent of them from those same three countries. UNHCR

migration is limited, a growing number of people who are not really refugees nonetheless apply for asylum and overburden refugee determination procedures.

Also, in recent years, government officials have adopted an ever stricter interpretation of the refugee definition when examining asylum claims and are less willing to give asylum applicants the benefit of the doubt. Thus, less than 20 percent of the total number of applicants for refugee status in developed countries in recent years are approved, although many people have in practice been allowed to remain in the West for humanitarian reasons. Concern is widespread in the West, particularly in Western Europe, that these population movements might be the harbinger of major South-North migratory trends resulting from dramatic demographic change and structural socio-economic crises under way in the third world.[9] The immigration issue touches on deep social, cultural, and political nerves, and opposition to migrants is a major feature of contemporary West European politics.

The governments of France, Spain, and Italy in particular are worried at the possibility of further waves of emigration from the Maghreb, propelled by declining living standards and rising unemployment, and at the danger of heightened racial tensions between existing Arab immigrant communities and the host populations. Six million immigrants of North African origin already live in the European Community. Half of them live in France, and the vast majority of the 800,000 north Africans in Italy are undocumented immigrants. It is feared that in the wake of the economic disruption and political tensions of the Gulf War, the pressures on young Maghrebis to emigrate northwards will be increased. Long-established networks of South-North flows exist with historical roots founded in geographical proximity, trade and investment patterns, and colonial links. In North America, the South-North migration is even more marked. A century ago, most of the new settlers in America were Europeans. Today, nearly 90 percent of immigration arises in developing countries in Asia and the Caribbean Basin where poverty and overpopulation are rife, particularly in major sending countries like the Philippines and Mexico. During recent years, Western Europe has been building barriers, first by revising immigration laws and asylum regulations and procedures, second by adopting restrictive practices and deterrent measures to curb new arrivals of asylum seekers and other migrants, and third, in the run-up to 1992, by "harmonizing" asylum practices in an attempt to construct a system for joint European external borders (the Schengen agreement and the Dublin Convention on Asylum).

Simply building barriers to deter the movements of people will not make the problem of mass migrations go away.

During the 1980s, nearly all Western governments had introduced legislation to make access to their refugee determination procedures more difficult. Simultaneously, Western states have taken strong measures, including imposing visas, fining airline and shipping companies for carrying "undocumented aliens," refusing entry, locking up asylum seekers at ports of entry and in detention centers, pushing people into "orbit" across borders, and putting other restrictions on movement in order to limit the number of asylum claims within their judicial systems.[10]

Migratory pressures in the South are likely to intensify in the 1990s, and how the Western governments deal with continued large-scale population movements is still to be seen. What is clear is that Western countries will not be able to shut themselves completely off from mass migrations from the South any more than they can from the East by policies aimed at restricting movements. No one thinks that there is an easy answer to the numerous and contentious issues raised by the expanding migration pressures. However, in responding to these pressures in the future, it is essential that governments abide by the international obligation to accord special protection and assistance to refugees, a group of migrants the international community has designated as a unique category of human rights victims. This task will be made easier, however, if Western governments, particularly those in Europe, expand existing immigration programs, guest worker agreements, and migration quotas to relieve pressure on their overburdened asylum systems. A general rethinking concerning controlled immigration policies and accompanying development assistance programs, including job creation, management training, and income-generating projects aimed at the sending countries, is therefore essential.[11]

South-South Population Movements

The preoccupation of West European public attention in recent times to the East-West and South-North dimensions of population movements obscures the need for greater attention to the crisis situations facing governments in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. While it is the prospect of massive displacement of populations in Eastern and Central Europe and a disintegrating USSR that most focuses the minds of Western policymakers at the beginning of the decade, South-South mass migrations pose equally severe security challenges.

Patterns of South-South migration during the past thirty years reflect profound economic, political, and social structural changes that have occurred in the international system, the disintegration of colonial empires, the formation of new states, and the confrontation over the internal political and social order in these states.[12] Large numbers of people from developing states not only flee from repressive regimes and flagrant human rights violations characteristic of the extreme volatility and weakness in the third world, but also from economic deprivation and environmental degradation. In the next ten years, at least another one billion people will be born into a world whose resources are already under tremendous pressure. Unrelenting population pressure and rapid urbanization in developing countries further encourage migration.

The Gulf War has demonstrated the impact of regional events on migration and on the stability of labor-supplying countries. The forcible invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the outbreak of war led to the outpouring of over a million Arab and Asian guestworkers from Kuwait and Iraq and some 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan and others are highly dependent on remittances from their nationals working abroad and have suffered greatly. In Jordan alone, the Gulf War wiped out more than $1 billion in grants and workers' remittances from Gulf states, and at the same time, several hundred thousand Jordanians have returned from the war zone, placing an additional burden on over-stretched services. Even before the outbreak of war, there was widespread concern in the Gulf states about the potential destabilizing political activities of temporary workers from elsewhere in the Middle East, especially Palestinians and Iranians. In the wake of the Gulf War, concern about the political militancy of Palestinian and other Arab guest workers will increase.

The largest and most dramatic mass population movements of recent years, however, have been the estimated 30 million refugees and internally displaced people in the developing world. Most third world people on the move today are victims of upheavals caused by wars, particularly long-standing regional and internal conflicts, which spew out millions of victims. Ironically, these wars are often fueled by the arms sales and aid programs of the very Western governments that so fear their migratory consequences. The fall-out from these brutal conflicts have included more than 10 million Southern Africans, 7 to 8 million Afghans, 2.8 million Palestinians, more than 2 million Ethiopians, 2 million Sudanese, 2 million Central Americans, more than a million Indochinese, and many millions more.

Unlike earlier forced migrations that were ultimately resolved by repatriation or overseas resettlement, third world refugees today find only temporary asylum in neighboring states. The majority of these populations languish in camps or survive illegally without any hope of a permanent place of settlement or eventual return home. Desperate poverty, idleness, and the absence of accepted lawful authority often characterize camp environments. These situations provide breeding grounds for violence and terrorism, and camp inhabitants frequently exhibit despair and helplessness at their long-term prospects.

The prospect for the resolution of long-standing refugee problems in the South do not appear to be very good. While the reduction of tension between the superpowers and their disengagement from some of the major internal and regional conflicts that generated so many refugees in the past have opened up opportunities for all regions of the world for terminating conflicts, arresting refugee flows, and creating conditions that might allow large-scale voluntary repatriations, the changes we have witnessed in international relations in recent years may well lead in the short term to an increase in political instability and a rise in ethnic and communal tensions, and hence to more refugees and internally displaced people. In the 1990s, mass displacements in the third world are likely to be the result of ethnic and communal conflicts, fueled by the increasing availability of modern weaponry and sharp socio-economic inequalities.

The annual amounts spent on asylum seekers in their own countries by several single West European governments exceed the annual worldwide expenditure of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. . .

Addressing Migration-Inducing Factors

Simply building barriers to deter the movements of people will not make the problem of mass migrations go away. In the long run, the only effective way of dealing with the problem is to address concretely the conditions that create migrants. To do so, Western governments will have to develop foreign policies that give greater urgency to political and economic reform in the countries of emigration by systematically conditioning aid to movements toward political pluralism and the greater observance of human rights, by curbing arms programs and supporting regional peace initiatives, and by providing adequate levels of assistance, investment, and openness in trade in a manner that produces effective development in less developed countries and in Eastern Europe.

A failure to take action to stem the tide of poverty, violence, persecution and other immigration-inducing factors will have direct or indirect repercussions for the security of the industrialized world itself. In countries where conditions are desperate, people will emigrate by any means possible. Many will seek a more secure existence in the North. Thus, long-range strategies and anticipatory foreign policies that not only alleviate the problem in the short-term but deal with its root causes have not only become a necessity but also coincide with search for long-term strategic stability in the world today.

Notes

1. Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *Refugees: Dynamics of Displacement* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 16.
2. See: Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
3. Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," *International Affairs* (Vol. 66, No. 4, 1990), pp. 749–766.
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5. Jean-Claude Chesnais, *Migration from Eastern to Western Europe, past (1946-1989) and future (1990-2000)* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, November 8 and 9, 1990).
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7. Gil Loescher, "The European Community and Refugees," *International Affairs* (Vol. 65, No. 4, 1989), pp. 617–636.
8. *The Economist*, December 1989.
9. Widgren, *op. cit.*
10. Philip Rudge, "Europe in the 1990s: The Berlin Walls of the Mind," *World Refugee Survey—1989 in Review* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1990), pp. 20–24.
11. An example of this kind of thinking can be found in: *A Comprehensive Refugee and Immigration Policy* (Stockholm: The Swedish Ministry of Labour, 1990).
12. An authoritative account of the causes of refugee movements in the third world can be found in Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Repatriation under Conflict

Barry N. Stein and Fred C. Cuny

These Tamils repatriated from India in 1989, despite continued unrest in Sri Lanka. Violence in Sri Lanka uprooted more than a million persons in 1990. UNHCR

The contemporary international beliefs and principles regarding the repatriation of refugees assume that return to one's homeland will be purely voluntary, will be assisted and monitored by governments and international agencies under the terms of a tripartite agreement between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments of the refugees' country of origin and the country of asylum, and that the refugees' complete safety and socio-economic integration will be assured.

Unfortunately, it is the rare refugee situation that allows for such orderly and organized return. International activities based on the above assumptions may be irrelevant for most refugees' needs.

The changing nature of refugee problems has altered the contemporary practice of voluntary repatriation. For a while during the 1960s and early 1970s, many refugees were able to repatriate after the successful conclusion of struggles for independence and liberation from colonial rule. However, for more than a decade, most refugee-producing conflicts have involved the newly independent states and have been based on issues of internal nation-building, revolutionary change, or conflicts with neighbors. This has caused, in the words of former High Commissioner Poul Hartling, "the massive arrivals of refugees in low-income countries where often no durable solutions are at hand."

The world's refugees are increasing primarily due to a lack of durable solutions

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to refugee problems. The three durable solutions—voluntary repatriation, local settlement in the asylum country, or resettlement in a third country—require the integration—citizenship or permanent status—of a refugee into a society. But for many refugees, only long-term temporary asylum is available. Once the refugees register, many remain there, seemingly forever. Refugees from the 1940s through the early 1980s are still on the assistance list, along with their children and grandchildren. Refugee problems demand durable solutions, not only because of the cost and burden on host countries and the international community, and the waste of the refugees' lives, but because in their second, third, and fourth generation, refugees can be a violent and destabilizing social ulcer. A tragic example occurred in October 1990, when Rwandese refugees in Uganda invaded their homeland. Said Roger Winter of the invasion, "Rwandese refugees are people who have been in exile—stateless and spiritually homeless—for three decades, people whose long-term pain and frustration provide the context from which the war has sprung."[1]

Beyond the tragedy of becoming a refugee is the additional tragedy that almost no country is willing to accept responsibility for refugees. A few countries receiving ethnic kin provide not only shelter, but also the rights and privileges of citizenship. Otherwise, the truth is that no one welcomes or wants refugees. The responsibility for refugees is shared by all, which really means that no country takes responsibility for a durable solution. Refugees may be well-treated, but they will not become citizens or permanent residents; rather the hosts insist that eventually the refugees exercise the best solution, to return home. Less than one percent of the world's refugees escape this limbo of waiting to go home by resettling in third countries. If the number of refugees is to be reduced, it will be by means of voluntary repatriation.

Today, most voluntary repatriations occur under conflict, without a decisive political event such as national independence, without any change in the regime or the conditions that originally caused flight. Countless individual refugees and sizable groups of well-organized refugees return home in the face of continued risk, frequently without any amnesty, without a repatriation agreement or program, without the permission of the authorities in either the country of asylum or of origin, without international knowledge or assistance, and without an end to the conflict that caused the exodus. The fact that refugees are returning to their homelands under these circumstances requires new thinking about voluntary repatriation and the ways of promoting it.

The refugees are the main actors in the contemporary practice of voluntary repatriation. They are the main decision-makers and participate in determining the means of their movement and the conditions under which they are received. In the absence of coercion, refugee-induced repatriation is a self-regulating process that takes place on the refugees' own terms. The refugees apply their own criteria to their situation in exile and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if it is safe and better by their standards.

Refugees' willingness to take risks may focus on repatriation if the community's condition in the host country is hopeless, isolated, or precarious.

This article describes the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees and the decisions refugees make when confronted with unsatisfactory options. It presents some patterns of repatriation that have emerged from an international study of spontaneous voluntary repatriation. We believe that many of the beliefs and principles commonly applied by governments, international assistance agencies, and the public to the problem of voluntary repatriation do not fit the reality of contemporary repatriation—neither the situations in which it is likely to occur or the most common forms it will take.

Recent Repatriations

Below are brief descriptions of five recent repatriations: to Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador. Only the first example, Namibia, fits the conditions for orderly and organized, internationally assisted repatriation. The other repatriations are more ambiguous and disorderly. Where those returns are organized, that organization is induced and controlled by the refugees.

Namibia. Joyous occasions are relatively rare when dealing with refugee problems. One such date was March 21, 1990, when Namibia became independent after decades of struggle. In anticipation of independence, UNHCR repatriated 43,387 Namibian refugees from Angola, Zambia, and 40 other countries. It registered refugees while in exile, and airlifted them home, where they were processed in reception centers, given rehabilitation assistance by a number of international agencies, and received food rations and material assistance to ease their integration into local society.

Mozambique. Independent since 1975, Mozambique continues to be wracked by nightmarish civil war. The RENAMO insurgency practices terror tactics against civilians, with many instances of massacre and mutilation of innocents. Mozambique has produced more than a million refugees and probably twice that many internally displaced persons. Yet, in 1990, UNHCR reported that 4,400 refugees returned to Mozambique with UNHCR assistance, but that as of December 31, 1989, "the number of returnees from Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe was 208,000 persons, the great majority of whom had returned spontaneously." The lion's share, 98 percent of the Mozambican refugees who returned, did so of their own accord, with little or no international assistance, to a homeland still in conflict. At the very time these returned, other new refugees were leaving Mozambique.

Ethiopia. In 1985, some 68,000 Tigrayan refugees returned from Sudan to Ethiopia at the height of the drought and famine, during a period of stepped-up military activity. The first returns occurred while massive numbers were still evacuating central Tigray. The return was aided by the indigenous Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and "protected" by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. Both UNHCR and the U.S. government actively opposed the return, and only Sudan gave limited assistance. Despite great fears, most refugees returned home in good health, but without adequate agricultural assistance to securely re-establish themselves. Indeed, in 1986, even larger numbers (77,000) returned, some with limited international assistance. By late 1987, 164,000 of the original 190,000 Tigrayans to enter Sudan had returned home.

Afghanistan. Afghanistan has produced today's largest current refugee exodus; approximately six million refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran during the last decade, escaping internal revolutionary change backed by the 1979 Soviet invasion. Despite the Soviet troop withdrawal in early 1989, the internal war has not ended; Muslim resistance forces battle the Soviet-supported Kabul regime. New fighting continues to create refugees and discourages the return of those in exile. It is charged that some guerrilla groups oppose any repatriation and have laid mines on roads along which refugees pass and have mobile military units to prevent the return of refugees. UNHCR reported that "the experience in 1989 showed that certain groups had often actively discouraged or prevented spontaneous return movements." Nonetheless, in 1990, UNHCR reported:

> There were indications that sizable spontaneous return movements were taking place in 1990 to rural areas in the south and southwestern parts of Afghanistan, with the possibility that up to 150,000 persons would have returned by the end of the year.

In the same vein, last year's *World Refugee Survey* reported:

> Thousands of people every month were estimated to have returned to their homes in rural areas. Spontaneous returns of internally displaced persons out of Kabul and other towns were reported to the rural parts ... that had been especially hard hit in the war .... Many of the returnees were men coming in advance of their families to clear fields and repair damaged homes. Rural areas, for the most part, remain outside government control.

El Salvador. A last example of the varieties of repatriation is that of the *masivas*, the large-scale, refugee-organized returns from camps in Honduras to communities in El Salvador still considered zones of conflict. For most of a decade in Honduras, the Salvadoran refugees were virtual prisoners in closed camps under the constant harassment of a suspicious and dangerous Honduran military. Although they felt hopeless about their life in Honduras, the Salvadoran refugees did not feel powerless. They organized to return as a community so that they "could take control over their own lives and confront their enemies as an organized force." There had been many individual refugee returns from the camps; but it was believed that even though those individuals had returned discreetly, without calling attention to themselves, they were subject to torture, jail, and massacre in El Salvador. "In contrast to the individual refugees ... the refugees participating in the *masivas* were intentionally testing the political space in El Salvador," said a report by Fagen and Eldridge on the return."[2]

Between October 1987 and late 1989, there were four *masivas* from the Mesa Grande refugee camps, ranging from 800 to more than 4,000 refugees. Nearly 8,000 refugees returned to areas of conflict. The U.S. State Department reported that the Salvadoran government:

> ... originally planned to place the returnees in the less conflictive zone of southern Usulutan Department and provide land, building and farming materials, and other basic needs. Refugee leaders, however, rejected the proposal and insisted that the returnees be allowed to repatriate to areas of their choice from where many had originated. The government eventually agreed to their demands.

In May 1989, the refugees in Colomoncagua camp announced they were ready to return together to "build peace"; a few months later, the refugees at San Antonio camp made a similar declaration. The State Department reported:

> On November 18, [1989] approximately 1,250 refugees left the Colomoncagua camp, the largest in Honduras, and crossed the border, disregarding Salva-

A Namibian mother and child return home after years in exile. The peaceful return of Namibians is a rare example of an orderly, safe repatriation plan. UNHCR doran Government and UNHCR immigration and repatriation procedures. The refugees repatriated in the middle of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front) November offensive.

The Salvadoran refugees in the first *masiva* established "a pattern of confrontations about disagreements between the refugees and private agencies on one-side, and the Salvadoran Government on the other."[3] These conditions also challenged UNHCR's "traditional role as a humanitarian and apolitical mediator." Fagen and Eldridge have noted that:

> The refugees initiated the *masivas* and took charge of their own organization and preparation .... The four Mesa Grande repatriations were all confrontational .... The collective repatriations were intended to demonstrate that the refugees could control their own lives; hence they challenged terms of repatriation they considered to have been imposed upon them rather than initiated by them .... regardless of whether the decisions might be in their long-term interest.

In insisting on points which they knew would be rejected, the refugees also wished to demonstrate to the Salvadoran government the extent of their international support.[4]

Of the five repatriations described above, only that of Namibians fits contemporary international assumptions, beliefs, and principles regarding return. If the refugees had not engaged in independent decision-making and organizing, the returns to Mozambique, Tigray, Afghanistan, and El Salvador would not have occurred. Those four refugee-induced returns total approximately 543,000 refugees, and they are not the only examples of such returns in the last few years.

What has happened to the tired, poor, huddled masses of refugees, the passive, powerless wretched refuse yearning for international assistance and guidance? The international system has failed to provide durable solutions for refugees. As a result, some refugees are taking matters into their own hands and becoming major actors in the repatriation process.

In the last few years, UNHCR has intensified its efforts to promote voluntary repatriation. In several Central American repatriations, UNHCR undertook innovative measures to protect refugees, remain in contact with all parties, and promote return. Nonetheless, despite its importance as a durable solution, voluntary repatriation, particularly under conflict, is difficult for UNHCR to implement. Given the irregular nature of many contemporary refugee movements, many refugees never register with UNHCR while in an asylum country. The forces controlling the area to which the refugees return may not be those of the sovereign government recognized by the UN. Countries of origin often assume that returnees are part of an insurgent movement, and thus refuse to approve their return. Many refugees fear that going through official channels to repatriate and being "turned over" to their government would put them in danger or mark them as suspect. Lastly, although UNHCR's tripartite approach to repatriation is useful and important, its pace is often slow and does not reflect the refugees' own pace and criteria for deciding to go home. Thus, refugees often return on their own rather than wait for formal action by UNHCR.

Voluntary repatriation has received relatively little attention, but today several studies are underway at the Refugee Policy Group (RPG) and at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. The study on which this article is based—"International Study of Spontaneous Voluntary Repatriation"—is the oldest. It is supported by the Ford Foundation, the Intertect Institute, Michigan State University, Georgetown University's Hemispheric Migration Project, and the Canadian International Development Agency. Both the RPG and the University of Manitoba have assisted the study. Complete or partial case studies include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Burundi, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Varieties of Repatriation

Generally, if international agencies and governments do not initiate, manage, and organize a voluntary repatriation, the international agencies refer to it as "unorganized" or "spontaneous." However, as the Tigray repatriation shows most clearly, the failure or inability to provide international repatriation assistance does not mean there is a lack of organization. REST, TPLF, and the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees provided substantial organization. They had woefully inadequate resources, unfortunately, due to the lack of international participation.

To a degree, it is better to avoid labelling types of repatriation and to concentrate instead on examining the range of repatriation experiences. It is useful to think of types of repatriation as lying along several continuums or spectrums. Among the possible continuums would be (1) whether a repatriation is unassisted or organized and by which actors; (2) the degree to which a repatriation is purely voluntary, encouraged, induced, or forced; (3) whether it is an individual, small group, or more sizable collective return; and (4) a political conflict spectrum reflecting the degree to which there has been a significant change in the original cause of flight.

Today, most repatriations occur under far from ideal conditions. Instead, they take place under conflict and raise serious questions of coercion and protection. A spectrum showing repatriation under political conflict would include several points: (1) return after fundamental political change such as independence (Zimbabwe, Namibia); (2) return after a political settlement or major political change (Nicaragua); (3) return after a political settlement that does not end the political conflict and that leaves the contending parties with substantial political and military power (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Angola); (4) return to areas controlled by a rival political force or by local forces rather than by the government of the country of origin (Tigray, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Cambodia); (5) return to a country controlled by the government that originally caused the flight (Guatemala); (6) return caused by deteriorating political security conditions in the host country (the post-1985 return from southern Sudan to Uganda, the 1989-1991 return from Somalia to Ethiopia); and (7) forced return of impressed refugees to a conflict zone (Khmer Rouge).

Repatriation Decisions and Patterns

In examining refugee-stimulated repatriation under conflict, it is necessary to take a split screen view of two interacting factors, the pattern of repatriation and the purpose of refugee decision-making. These two factors interact and drive the repatriation process.

This study's conceptual framework includes four main phases of repatriation: the "ricochet" effect, relocation-stimulated repatriation, community and alienation, and major repatriations. The pattern of these phases is not rigid, and the process may be drawn out or short-circuited. Progression through the phases may flow smoothly or be jumbled by events. Key factors drive the events: the assistance decisions and attitudes of the host country, changing conditions within the homeland, the location of the refugees in exile, and the evolution of refugee communities at sites where refugees are concentrated. The fact that most borders are relatively porous, allowing refugees to visit and communicate with their homeland, also influences this process.

Decision-Making

On one side of the split-screen are the nature and purpose of refugee decision-making, both of which interact with the pattern of repatriation. There are two points to note about refugee decision-making. First, not all refugees are alike: there will be different responses to forced location often rooted in different levels of mobility, urbanization, education, and economic status among the refugees. Second, we are examining refugee responses during a long period of time. The refugee community will behave differently at the beginning, generally with a conservative risk-aversive response, than years later when greater initiative and risk-taking will occur.

Our analysis of refugee decision-making views the refugees as making "rational" choices among unsatisfactory options, striving for an outcome that achieves relative security and some small degree of control over their lives. We assume that refugee actions are purposeful; their behavior may be interpreted as directed toward attaining a goal. Refugees make choices for some purpose, and we must understand those purposes. Indicating that a choice is "purposeful" or "rational" does not necessarily mean that it is careful or conscious, that it lists all alternatives and consequences, or estimates and defines probabilities and preferences. Many people simplify complex decisions by relying on habit, instinct, simple cues, and trial and error. "The assumption of purposeful choice implies simply that, after taking account of people's perceptions, values, and beliefs, we can model their decisions by asserting that they act as if they make such calculations," says Peter C. Ordeshook.[5]

Although refugees are commonly considered powerless, and they are certainly relatively powerless, it is important to remember that the decision to flee, or to stay, or to return home is an action and a choice. (The choice is often influenced by geography; those near the border cross it and become refugees; others, far from the border, flee to the cities and become internally displaced persons. Their status differs, but the cause of flight is often identical.) For almost everyone, the process of becoming a refugee is a transition from relative security and prosperity to uncertainty and poverty.

The decision to flee obviously reflects the refugee's belief that his or her power over others and level of self-control are now inadequate to provide protection from insult, injury, imprisonment, or death. Thus, flight represents an attempt to use whatever power, control, and mobility the person still possesses to escape from danger to safety. To stay or to flee internally are other alternatives usually available. Refugees make their moves to flee, to repatriate, to accept settlement or resettlement because of decisions that compare alternatives.

In comparing alternatives, refugees attempt to conserve and strengthen their control over their own lives and to reduce the possibility that further stress will occur. Their basic response is conservative, to limit change and disruption. Not surprisingly, refugees seek security. To cope with the stress of flight, they cling to old behavioral patterns, old institutions, and old goals. In clinging to the familiar, refugees attempt to move the shortest distance not only in space to remain in contact with a familiar habitat, but also in terms of the psychological and sociocultural context of their lives. They attempt to transfer old skills and farming practices, to relocate with kin, neighbors, or their own ethnic groups in order to recreate the security of an encapsulating community with familiar institutions and symbols.

In the "relocation" phase of repatriation, refugees scattered along the border consider the move to refugee camps or farther inland to settlements as a threat to their identity, a move from a known to an unknown world, farther away from kin and familiar territory. For example, one author recently noted, "The refugees [Mozambicans] don't appear very happy at being sent farther away from the border. They actually cross it from time to time, to 'stay in touch and see how the situation is developing.'"[6] Returning home to a previously established social identity with rights and obligations can be seen as allowing the refugee to retain more power and stability and control over his own life.

Salvadorans return from camps in Honduras to communities in El Salvador still considered zones of conflict. UNHCR

The passage of time is likely to alter the refugees' approach to decision-making, but not the goal of the decisions—security and control. Rarely will the transition stage, marked by a conservative response, be shorter than two years. Where refugees play an active role in reconstructing their lives and communities and so reestablish a positive image of themselves, the transition stage may be relatively short.

The later stage of decision-making is marked by increased initiative and risk-taking. Refugees reach this turning point when they have regained much of their former standard of living and degree of self-sufficiency. Local leaders emerge who are capable of pushing local interests with the hosts and government officials. The refugee community abandons its initial dependency, and an outward-looking and dynamic leadership emerges. Refugees organize themselves into more effective political units to obtain benefits from the external environment. This organization requires the passage of time, but also gives the refugees a sense of control over their own community. Such organizing can be encouraged by nongovernmental organizations and by growing confidence in the international presence and delivery of supplies; it can be enhanced by the organizational skills of resistance-connected refugees. The refugees' willingness to take risks may focus on repatriation if the community's condition in the host country is hopeless, isolated, or precarious.

Refugees who are conservative and who have an aversion to taking risks will act as individuals and, suspicious of anything official, will avoid contact with government and international agencies. They will repatriate spontaneously. Over time, as initiative and risk-taking re-emerge in the refugee community, the refugees will be willing to confront their hosts, their homeland, and the international community with requests for officially sanctioned, but refugee-stimulated repatriation.

A "mine-awareness" program for would-be Afghan returnees. UNHCR

Afghan refugees wait for a chance to go home. UNHCR

Patterns of Repatriation

On the other side of the split screen, actively interacting with the refugees' desire for security and some degree of control over their lives, are the events in exile: "ricochet" repatriations; relocation-stimulated repatriation; return by refugees alienated from the emerging refugee community; secondary relocation-stimulated repatriation; and major repatriations.

Ricochet Repatriations. If the exodus was sudden, resulting from military action or a "stampede" away from danger, a substantial number of people who might not have felt personally threatened or whose sympathies were not in line with the majority of the refugees will immediately seek ways to return. These initial "ricochet repatriations" will be spontaneous and unassisted.

Relocation-Stimulated Repatriation. The next phase is the host government's rounding up of refugees scattered along the border and moving them to refugee camps in order to assist and control them more easily. At this point, refugees must decide whether to accept host government control and reside in the camps or try to elude the authorities and find a place to live away from other refugees. For those who stay in the camps, repatriation will inevitably become a less immediate option. But for those refugees who settle outside the camps, repatriation is more likely to be a viable alternative, especially if they cannot find work in the asylum country.

The international system has failed to provide durable solutions for refugees. As a result, some refugees are taking matters into their own hands and becoming major actors in the repatriation process.

Community and Alienation. One of the more interesting common denominators found in our case studies is the formation of politically organized, cohesive communities by uprooted people. Rounded up by the host government and relocated to refugee camps, refugees are placed in unaccustomed communal situations that may change their way of life and crowd them in among strangers. In these circumstances, refugees show an impressive ability to organize a coherent new community with its own mores and values. Frequently, refugee organizations are formed that ally with insurgent groups. Refugees come to believe that their situation is a key part of the political equation in the struggle of their group for social, cultural, or economic change.

Some refugees will be indifferent to or alienated from the emerging refugee community, its values, and common cause. These aloof refugees, seeking control over their own lives, are candidates to move away from the camp or settlement or to repatriate.

As time passes, the available space for repatriation is likely to increase. At home, the locus of the conflict may change; the levels of violence may decrease; political or economic changes may occur. The border may become more porous as a result of internal changes in the homeland. Cross-border trade may normalize, providing an opportunity for families in the camps and spontaneously settled refugees to send "scouts" back to check on conditions and to find out if it is feasible for small numbers of people to go back. If refugees learn that internally displaced people are returning to certain regions, that, too, may trigger some repatriation.

Inevitably, some scouts will report that people can return with relative safety. Gradually more and more people will begin to leave, primarily those who are on the periphery of the mainstream refugee community, or who feel they no longer "belong." The refugee organizations may oppose the return of these less committed refugees, feeling that repatriation somehow undercuts the political and/or moral position of the refugee community. Repatriations during this period may expand the political space at home, although not significantly.

Secondary Relocation-Stimulated Repatriation. At some point, in almost every refugee situation, the host government will decide, or propose, to relocate or transfer refugees from camps near the border to camps or formal settlements farther inland. Political concerns may dictate this relocation, as in the case of Guatemalans in Mexico, or operational concerns, as in the case of Sudan. Whatever the reason, the decision to relocate forces the refugees to decide whether to accept the transfer and its disruption of their lives and their established sense of community, or to leave the camps and either attempt to integrate into the surrounding communities or repatriate.

During this period, the perceived loss of the sense of community that has evolved in the camps becomes a key consideration. The emotional stress of having to move yet again and form still another community prompts many refugees to choose to repatriate. Few refugees may cite the relocation as the primary cause, but the fact that substantial numbers return home when transfers begin underscores the importance of this event. If more refugees show an interest in repatriation than the existing political conditions and organization of assistance allow, then organizational attitudes start to change, and agencies working with the refugees actively begin to seek ways to expand the space for repatriation.

Refugee-controlled organizations are the first to actively assist repatriation. No longer are those who are repatriating deemed the "alienated"; many represent the core of the refugee community. The fact that many mainstream refugees are returning, apparently successfully, enlarges the political space in the homeland and draws the attention of outside organizations to the repatriation process. Governments on both sides of the border must now make decisions about the limits of their involvement. The host country will naturally seek to encourage repatriation, while the country of origin may be unable to decide how to respond to the repatriation challenge.

In the country of origin, the civil government, the military, and various political, social, ethnic, and economic groups may have different political agendas. Inevitably, as the number of returnees increases, the government will seek to either control the repatriation or to benefit politically from the return. If the government wants to control the return, it will usually seek UNHCR participation.

Major Repatriations. UNHCR participation is the final stage in the repatriation process. Responding to governmental pressures (usually from the host government and then from the country of origin), UNHCR will begin to provide assistance, in some cases reluctantly due to concerns for the refugees' safety. Whether or not this is carried out as part of a formal tripartite agreement may depend on the way the international community perceives the repatriation.

Once repatriation becomes formalized under UNHCR, two very divergent patterns may emerge. In some cases, a formal agreement will lead to a decline in repatriation because some refugees fear being registered and being brought to their government's attention, while others may delay their return, waiting for assistance programs to be established and implemented. In other cases, however, while formal repatriation agreements may produce little organized return, they can improve the political space for repatriation. Tripartite agreements enable UNHCR and nongovernmental agencies to operate in the country of origin, they spur development of civilian refugee aid agencies in the homeland, and they facilitate the refugees' ability to communicate home and develop better information on conditions there. The large-scale unorganized returns to Mozambique and Afghanistan may reflect this process.

A Failure to Provide Durable Solutions

The ability of refugees to take matters into their own hands and organize repatriations is a hopeful sign. But often they are forced into this position by hopelessness, danger, and lack of assistance. What is the connection between malnourished refugee children in Malawi and "spontaneous repatriation" to Mozambique? The *masivas* to conflict zones in El Salvador grew out of the hostile, hopeless situation in the closed refugee camps in Honduras. Attacks on refugee settlements in southern Sudan have driven hundreds of thousands of refugees back to Uganda.

The international community has failed to provide durable solutions for millions of refugees. It compounds this failure by repeatedly declaring that voluntary repatriation is the most desirable solution, and by failing to effectively promote the other two solutions—resettlement and local integration. The international community also fails to effectively promote voluntary repatriation. At the 1990 Extraordinary Executive Committee of UNHCR, several countries of origin, such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia, complained bitterly that "refugees were awaiting the helping hand of the international community in order to return home," but that the funding crisis had reduced repatriation programs.

We take the view that repatriation is not a panacea. Where is "home" for those in exile for thirty years or for those born in exile? Hostile, ill-prepared homelands still embroiled in conflict are not ideal arenas for re-integration and protection. Nonetheless, despite significant protection worries, there is a need to actively promote voluntary repatriation—at times, even under conflict. In an imperfect world that only offers long-term temporary asylum to most refugees, there is a need to assist refugees to go home. Confronted with unsatisfactory options, one must search for the best that is available. Rather than a passive international approach, there are circumstances where repatriation should be carefully and actively promoted even before the formal end of hostilities. And repatriation should be seen as a tool for reducing confrontations along tense borders, for expanding or securing zones of peace and stability for returnees, and possibly as an encouragement to talks between the adversaries.

Many of the almost one million refugees who returned home under imperfect conditions in the last few years have stayed at home. Many are in desperate circumstances, but they do not flee again. It is evident from a number of repatriations to date that the end of conflict is not a precondition for repatriation, and that suggests there are political possibilities that need to be explored.

NOTES

1. Roger Winter, "Preface," in Catharine Watson, "Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion," U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, February 1991.
2. Patricia Weiss Fagen and Joseph Eldridge, "The Salvadoran Repatriations from Honduras," draft case study report to the International Study on Spontaneous Voluntary Repatriation, July 1, 1990.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
6. Annick Billard, "Biding Their Time: Mozambicans in Zambia," *Refugees*, August, 1986.
7. Michael S. Barton, "Honduras: A Difficult Dialogue," *Refugees*, August, 1985.

Filling a Critical Gap in the Refugee Protection Regime: The Internally Displaced

Charles P. Keely

What may be a quirk of fate during a frantic effort to flee violence or persecution can determine the world's organized response to uprooted people. The reason for this state of affairs can be summed up in a simple phrase: national sovereignty. There is no international apparatus for internally displaced persons who have not taken the crucial step of crossing an international border.

There is, however, an international apparatus for refugees—persons outside their country of origin who fear return. This apparatus, which provides protection, material assistance, and help in negotiating solutions for their plight, has its origins in the 1921 mandate of the League of Nations to Fridjof Nansen on behalf of Russians who were in Europe and unwilling to return. Its parts are both tangible and intangible. The latter include the UN Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967) on the Status of Refugees, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statute, the Geneva Conventions, the refugee definition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Cartagena Declaration, statements and decisions of the Executive Committee of UNHCR, and precedent based on General Assembly mandates to UNHCR. More tangible aspects include organizations and their activities like UNHCR, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and multilateral efforts like the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) and Operation Salaam in Afghanistan. Finally, bilateral and multilateral aid efforts are also mounted.

These examples and others taken collectively make up a "regime," a framework of precedent, agreement, organization, and assets focused on refugees. The apparatus is far from perfect and certainly not without its critics. No doubt, however, it has prevented much suffering and loss of life, while helping to bring about stability in many regions of the world. Given the analogous situations of refugees and displaced persons, is there a basis in the political structure of the world system of states for an international regime on behalf of the internally displaced, national sovereignty notwithstanding?

Is there a basis in the political structure of the world system of states for an international regime on behalf of the internally displaced, national sovereignty notwithstanding?

The Political Basis for the International Refugee Apparatus

Refugees are the product of the nation-state system. This statement is true in two senses. First, the category "refugee" as defined in international law makes sense only in the context of a system of formally independent states which collectively claim that everyone belongs somewhere. When large numbers of persons are beyond the jurisdiction of their place of citizenship and are unwanted by a host government, the international community has decided to act collectively and concertedly. The objectives are to contain mass movements, to protect, assist—and, thereby, also control—the refugees, and to return to normalcy by repatriation, integration, or resettlement in a third country. This is all quite familiar, but it is also historically conditioned.

In the era when mercantilist ideology dominated, nations paid more attention to preventing exit, not entry. At least for economic and military reasons, exiles were welcomed. In the aftermath of World War I, when four empires were rearranged and the world embraced the concept of self-determination of peoples, large-scale displacements occurred with some regularity. The League of Nations mandate to Nansen for Russians expanded to Turkish refugees in 1922 and Armenians in 1923. The European countries also tried to cope with the new realities by a series of minority treaties in the interwar years. The economic and political changes around World War I resulted in refugees being perceived as a burden and a threat. Collective action was necessary because of the numbers involved. It was advisable because even those states not immediately affected might be in the future and because post war instability in Europe was in no country's interest. It was in such a situation that the social category of refugee and the international refugee regime began to evolve.

Refugees are a product of the nation-state system in a second fundamental sense. As the work of Aristide Zolberg has demonstrated,[1] the state-building process produces refugees. The norm of international political structure is the nation-state. The ideal type of a nation-state is a homogeneous, self-reproducing people (a folk, a nation), with a common history, culture, language and usually religion, a shared sense of fate and relation to and claim on a territory rooted in

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

During 1990, the civil war displaced hundreds of thousands of Liberians. Many sought refuge at centers for the displaced in the capital, Monrovia. USCR/H. Ruiz

long-standing settlement. A nation's peoplehood is politically expressed in a state, which can take various forms such as monarchy or republic. This ideal type is at the basis of the presumption of a right of self-determination.

In a people's (a nation's) drive for autonomy, a government often seeks homogeneity. Thus, for example, early in the nation-state building process in Europe, Spain expelled the Moors and Jews, and France did the same to Huguenots about a century and a half later. More recently, former colonies expelled both the descendants of the European colonizers and third country nationals imported by colonial authorities (e.g., Asians from Uganda).

Although many countries are multinational (that is, contain a variety of peoples, tribes, etc.), the presumption remains that a country should have a united people. Sometimes a dominant group suppresses or tries to expel minorities; sometimes an attempt to forge a new national identity is made; or sometimes a substitute ideology, such as socialism, is offered or imposed in place of nationalism in order to unite diverse peoples in a functional substitute to nationality or peoplehood for state building.

The existence of refugees, therefore, is endemic to the world's nation-state system as we know it. That system, based on the ideal type of the nation-state, is built on a presumption more honored in the breech than not. Many, if not most states are multinational. Even some of the European states thought of as homogeneous retain remnants and echoes (and often more than echoes) of former attempts at nation-building. Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, for example, all have regional minorities that defy homogenization.

Given the model of nation-state, and its accompanying principle of self-determination, many multinational countries remain capable of producing refugees. The unresolved, interwar minorities problems of Central and Eastern Europe that re-emerged in the post-1989 period remind the world of this fact. The reality of multinationalism combined with the model of nation-state leads to political instability and refugees.

Even in a more homogeneous nation-state, the possibility of deep differences about the form of political, social, and economic organization means that a breakdown of consensus is possible. Revolutions of the left or right and "fundamentalist" religious revolutions have all taken place recently. National homogeneity is no guarantee of agreement on state organization. Any number of state types are compatible with nationalist aspirations.

In sum, the world system of states has two endemic sources of instability. The first is the reality of multinationalism in a world built on the assumption that a state is the political expression of peoplehood and that a people have a right to their own state (self-determination). Second, there is no inherent connection between nationalism and any particular kind of state structure. Despotism and democracy have both been supported by strong nationalism. For these two reasons, refugees are a product of the state-building process, a process that can never be assumed to be over or set in concrete.

The nation-state system, therefore, not only produces refugees, but also defines them and determines who will receive the benefits (and concurrently the attempt to contain and control) offered by the refugee apparatus. The 70-year evolution of the refugee regime is an attempt by nation-states to provide a self-correcting mechanism to deal with the effects of state formation and state building that threaten the nation-state model. The *raison d'etat* for collective action by states was and remains the threat to the economic, social, and political stability of host states, of regions, and, ultimately, of the nation-state system itself.

Collective action, however, is based on the ultimate responsibility of host states. The host state has to invite intervention on behalf of refugees. Thus, collective action to maintain the nation-state system is taken within the framework of the principle of national sovereignty.

From Nansen's 1921 League of Nations mandate until the 1951 Convention, refugee groups to be protected by League or other multilateral mandates were specifically named groups, (such as Greeks, Turks, or Armenians. This, in effect, was a mass determination and included people uprooted by war as well as persecution.

In the 1951 Convention, the focus on persecution, heavily influenced by the Cold War, came to dominate. The tendency was toward a generic definition of a person eligible due to specific political causes in place of specifying a nationality group qualifying for international action on its behalf.

Something of a return to the 1921–1951 approach occurred when developing countries became the predominant producers and hosts of refugees. A trend developed to make the definition more inclusive, to drop the temporal and geographic criteria in the 1951 Convention. The expanded definition of a refugee by the Organization of African Unity (to include those fleeing civil or international war along with the persecuted) and a similar thrust in the Cartagena Declaration broadened the scope for the refugee regime. There is a great resistance to this incremental expansion of the mandate of the international refugee regime on the part of the Western industrialized democracies. Most notable is the restrictive operational definition of refugee for purposes of resettlement or asylum. The focus is on individuals and on persecution rather than on groups of people at risk of death and grave harm from violence.

The foremost conclusion from this all too telegraphic analysis of the basis of refugee production being inherent in contemporary geo-political structure is that the international refugee regime is based on reasons of state. Specifically, the refugee regime was created to contribute to the maintenance of a system of sovereign states with a mutually recognized right of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The international refugee regime exists, has strength, and is enhanced primarily because of enlightened self-interest by states—a price of system maintenance like postal agreements. The foundation for the refugee regime is to preserve the ability of states to operate in the face of destabilizing masses of persons whose presence is unwelcome by the host state.

Conversely, the political basis to explain the absence to date of a regime on behalf of internally displaced persons is that states are responsible for citizens inside their territory, and the state system generally precludes collective interference. Is there, however, an alternate view, still based on reasons of state and within the context of the nation-state system, for collective international action on behalf of internally displaced people? There already is opposition to expansion of the refugee mandate beyond the politically persecuted to the escapees from violence. Is there any basis in reasons of state to argue for a geographical expansion to assist the uprooted inside their own country?

De Facto International Action on Behalf of Internally Displaced Persons

In fact, collective state action on behalf of internally displaced persons exists already. This section will review seven categories of multilateral and bilateral protection and assistance activities, some rooted in law, others only in practice. By analyzing these already existing, if somewhat haphazard and circumscribed behaviors, a formal justification for collective action on behalf of internally displaced persons may be developed. This should provide a more convincing argument than deduction from abstract principles.

(1) **Cross-Border Operations** is a euphemism for extra-legal aid to displaced persons by states, multilateral agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from a staging area outside the conflicted country. There are unwritten rules for such operations that deal with the content of aid; with informing the host government, but permitting deniability; with maintaining a low profile; with remaining even-handed by stressing humanitarian interest; and with avoiding substantive abetting of military opposition, etc. These operations often are interrupted or ended because of actual or perceived advantage to a government's opponent. The rules of cross-border operations ought to be formalized, but nevertheless are known in practice to participants.[2] Cross-border operations are ad hoc and depend on someone or a small group in a government, NGO, or multilateral agency, who decides to "do something" and pushes, often single-mindedly, to get an operation going.

Cross-border relief operations for the last half-dozen years into Ethiopia are a prime example of this type of humanitarian relief. Similar efforts have taken place from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In a more formal program, Operation Lifeline Sudan attempted to provide humanitarian aid to Sudan. The operation from Kenya to southern Sudan had many of the characteristics of a cross-border operation. These examples underscore that there exists a good deal of experience with these improvised efforts. Participants and commentators usually note the need to formalize these efforts in order to strengthen fragile programs and to maximize capacity of participating agencies.

(2) **Comprehensive Settlements** of country and regional conflicts provide a second instance of international efforts on behalf of the internally displaced. Such settlements aim at a peace building process. They focus on a development process that directly addresses the problems of the uprooted, including repatriated refugees, internally displaced, and populations who stayed in place, but whose areas received influxes of uprooted people caused by war and civil unrest.

Internally displaced widow from Huancavelica, Peru

The CIREFCA process in Central America, which was linked to the Esquipulas II agreement of August 1987, the plan by five Central American presidents for a "firm and lasting peace" in the region, shows how addressing displacement can go hand in hand with promoting wider peace initiatives.

To date, rhetoric outstrips performance. Rhetoric, however, is not unimportant; it can establish the principle that peace needs successful development and that development, in turn, requires addressing the realities of large segments of society being unable to "go home." All elements of a society must be included in the development process or the seeds of future unrest are sowed. To complicate matters, attempts at comprehensive settlements often take place while conflict still goes on. Development, repatriation, and integration of displaced under conditions of continuing conflict (as in El Salvador or Afghanistan) have resulted in little progress.

and her two daughters, now living in a Lima shantytown. Vera A. Lentz

(3) **The Good Offices of UNHCR** have been invoked to authorize the High Commissioner to stretch the mandate. Most notably in this context, UNHCR activity in Cyprus involves people still in their country. UNHCR provides protection and assistance to displaced Greek and Turkish ethnics in Cyprus affected by the conflict.

(4) **Extension of the UNHCR Protection Mandate to Repatriated Refugees** has meant de facto situations where UNHCR presence affords protection against human rights abuses of nationals who never left their country. It is often difficult or counter-productive to disentangle repatriates, internally displaced, and natives of a region or province in on-the-ground activities.

UNHCR protection officers in El Salvador, for example, when monitoring the repatriates from Honduran camps, often deal with populations in conflicted areas that contain internally displaced and local people, as well the repatriated Salvadorans. The protection officers can intervene with authorities on behalf of non-repatriates or bring abuses to the attention of NGOs or others who can take up the cause. The presence of UNHCR officials as a deterrent to human rights violations should not be discounted. Similar situations prevail in Guatemala and Sri Lanka. It is conceivable in these situations that UNHCR could have a broader mandate given its presence on behalf of repatriates. Repatriation often is accompanied by international development aid. Such aid could be a lever to induce nations receiving their repatriated citizens to permit UNHCR also to assist the government in monitoring and reporting rights abuses and providing protection for all residents in the regions to which the repatriates return. National sovereignty is not violated because of government invitation, any more than UNHCR monitoring of repatriates in their own country is a violation of sovereignty, if done at government invitation.

(5) **The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)** has specific mandates under the Geneva Conventions that cover people in their own country of citizenship. The ICRC is very careful in the way it carries out its functions in order to avoid being prohibited from performing its functions under the conventions. This allows it to traverse many of the obstacles rooted in governments' reluctance to allow international bodies to "interfere" in their internal affairs. Although performing life-saving humanitarian functions, its reticence underscores the fundamental rule of sovereignty in this state of affairs. Whether ICRC can be given encouragement to be more aggressive is debated. Nevertheless, the role of ICRC has been crucial in protecting people under the specific circumstances covered in the Geneva Conventions.

(6) **The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)** has been designated by the Secretary General as the lead UN agency for responsibility on displaced persons. UNDP has been developing a general strategy that emphasizes integration of uprooted people (internally displaced and repatriates) into a national development process. Uprootedness is part of the development situation that must be addressed, and the focus is on integration rather than separate programs for uprooted people. Protection needs and the opportunity of using displaced persons as a lever to reduce hostilities between conflicting parties by making resources available for peace-building have been less emphasized. Nevertheless, UNDP's long experience in coordination and resource management provide important international resources in some situations where peace building processes



Internally displaced southern Sudanese congregate at the only water supply in Narus, Sudan.
USCR/R. Winter

have been undertaken. UNDP, for example, is designated to take the lead in the development components of the CIREFCA process in Central America. UNDP continues to work to define its role regarding internally displaced within its larger developmental mission. Whether that role will go beyond situations of comprehensive settlements as described above and encompass initiatives on behalf of internally displaced earlier in conflict situations remains to be seen. Like ICRC, UNDP has a thin line to walk because of national sovereignty. A program can be stopped or stymied if initiatives become too "aggressive" for the government. Declaring key personnel as *personae non grata* is not unheard of for UN and ICRC staff.

(7) **The International Human Rights Regime**, specifically revolving around the UN Commission on Human Rights, might take a stronger interest in and action on behalf of internally displaced people. The resolution in early 1991 of the UN Human Rights Commission to study the rights of the internally displaced signals an awareness of and interest in the subject. Time will tell whether concrete action follows.

Each of these categories or examples of international action on behalf of the internally displaced is to some extent *ad hoc*. Not all have a basis in law, nor are any of the examples consistently and predictably put into practice. As a result, there is neither authoritative accountability for the internally displaced, nor an internationally sanctioned mandate to assist and protect them. Equally, therefore, there is no established mechanism through which internally displaced persons are able to claim protection and assistance from the international community.

Reasons of State for Expansion of Protection Mandates by Multilateral Entities to Internally Displaced Persons

The arguments for expanding the refugee regime's mandate from only those who are politically persecuted to those who escape from violence inhere in the analysis of reasons of state for support of the whole refugee apparatus. Those escaping violence (as defined, for example, in the OAU definition of refugee that includes those fleeing war-time devastation) cannot get their government's protection, are as unwanted as are the politically persecuted, and, therefore, are perceived as a threat to stability. That the refugee regime should assist, protect, and attempt to develop "durable solutions" for them is as compelling as it is for the politically persecuted. The arguments typically used against broadening the refugee definition focus on cost and the desirability of an expanded definition for judging eligibility for resettlement.

The thrust of this analysis is that equally compelling arguments exist for an expansion of international action for internally displaced because of their destabilizing force. Any argument in favor of such an expansion requires maintaining the current state system, if the argument is to be a credible option for serious consideration. This requires respecting the principle of national sovereignty, which is the very reason that purportedly prevents collective action. The objective is to find a way out of this contradiction beyond *ad hoc* and serendipitous modes of action which take place irregularly and remain fragile.

The key objective is to increase the probability of obtaining permission from governments to allow international agencies to provide protection and aid to internally displaced people. As with action on behalf of refugees, there are no guarantees a government will allow international presence and activity on its territory. The existence of UNHCR, the statute, and all the rest of the regime increases the likelihood of a government invitation in a refugee situation. There is international law; there are precedents. There are the mandate and accountability of multilateral agencies, as well as pressures on countries to use the international mechanisms on behalf of refugees. Refugees, in turn, have some claim and leverage in practice, although they are neither absolute nor ironclad. The existence of the refugee regime increases the probability of governments' permission for multilateral agencies to act on behalf of refugees.

Specific circumstances lead to international actions to reconstruct internally torn societies. Windows of opportunity often appear when words like "reconciliation" and "peacemaking" enter political discourse. These are circumstances when probabilities for international action on behalf of internally displaced also increase. Analysis of the seven previously cited examples of actions that already take place on behalf of internally displaced reveals variables that may increase the probability of government permission to assist and protect the internally displaced. These include:

(1) willingness by a government to receive international economic and development assistance;

(2) willingness by a government to gain international affirmation and support—that is, to give legitimacy to the sincerity of its efforts at economic and social reconstruction;

(3) willingness to admit international observers for elections, for repatriation, or for other monitoring;

(4) need of international assistance for rebuilding along with a willingness to link assistance to other behavior, such as human rights;

(5) a desire or willingness of a government to be inclusive of all elements in national reconstruction because of (a) international pressure, (b) a long-term view to reduce sowing seeds of future unrest by avoiding exclusionary policies of reconstruction, or (c) a desire to prevent or reduce opposition efforts to sabotage reconstruction by the presence of international monitoring.

Settlement of internal conflicts often involves other governments because internal conflicts have external destabilizing effects that often spill over boundaries, a phenomenon acknowledged in the Esquipulus II Presidents' Peace Plan in Central America. These spillovers include refugees, rebel armies, and lack of access to crucial materials or markets. Internally displaced persons are usually perceived as a threat to the nation-state system because they, too, are destabilizing. When a situation has developed with one or more of the five characteristics just outlined, then the probability of accepting an international role on behalf of internally displaced is increased. If a mandate for persons internally displaced as a result of war, political unrest, or persecution existed in UNHCR, the UN human rights apparatus, ICRC, UNDP, or some other multilateral group, pressure could more effectively be brought to bear, if necessary, to have governments request assistance in providing protection to their citizens. The *raison d'etat* for states collectively to offer this help is the same as for refugees: to reduce the destabilizing threat of persons beyond the effective protection and authority of their government.

National sovereignty is not ignored, much less frontally attacked. It is to protect national sovereignty that states should let international protection mechanisms for internally displaced come in. The apparent contradiction of preserving both stability in the global system of states and sovereignty is resolved because all states, including those wracked by conflict and civil war, have an interest in preventing such instability from spilling over onto their neighbors or farther distant states. Internal displacement is a potential threat because it is a harbinger or concomitant of refugees and opposition military activity extending beyond borders. It carries the potential of destabilizing markets and resources either regionally or further afield. To reduce internal opposition and resolve conflict often involve other states in various capacities. When a state is willing to accept such help, the likelihood of its accepting international action on behalf of internally displaced is also increased.

The development of an international refugee regime is inherent in the logic of the multinational state-building process. It is also inherent in the logic of the preservation of the nation-state system that collective action on behalf of the internally displaced eventually be adopted to maintain that system. The destabilizing effects of internally displaced on a regional or global level, like the destabilization caused by the refugees that accompany or shortly follow displaced people, can threaten the nation-state system. Given the growing internal displacement due to man-made causes, the international community ignores taking a role in their assistance and protection at its peril.

If this analysis holds any truth, it requires translation into an effective political rhetoric that will lead to policy and program action—perhaps even a new international legal instrument relating to the internally displaced that would update and supplement the refugee Convention and Protocol. Such an instrument, along with other elements (like a responsible UN agency) of a regime for internally displaced, should put some pressure on governments and non-government opposition groups that control territory to allow protection and assistance to persons in territory under their control. The existence of a displaced person regime, therefore, should increase the probability of protection and some aid even while conflict rages. We must be realistic, however. A displaced person regime, like the refugee regime, would exist in the context of the nation- state system. It would be a creature of that system. Therefore, it is entirely possible that essentially evil governments may persecute citizens and resist all pressures to admit international protection and aid. Short of an international coalition to intervene in the internal affairs of a rogue government, help for victims of inhuman governments is hard to envision in the current geopolitical structure. The good, however, should not be the victim of the better. A good, even if a flawed beginning, can be made by modelling an internally displaced regime on the 70 years of international efforts on behalf of refugees.

It is not clear whether UNHCR, the UN Human Rights Commission, ICRC, UNDP, or some other locus is best situated to move ahead on a course to a more predictable response to internal displacement and increased probability of governments' (and opposition groups') using an international apparatus for aid and protection of internally displaced.

While a convincing rhetoric is developed, analysis and discussion must proceed on the most effective organization for developing a capacity to respond. An ability to respond is required not just by our common humanity, but by the current global system's need to protect itself from the destabilizing potential of internally displaced populations who are beyond the authority, responsibility, and protection of a sitting government. Like refugees, the internally displaced threaten the very system that produces them.

Notes

1. See, for example, A. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, S. Aguayo, *Escape from Violence.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, and the references there to Zolberg's early work on the genesis of refugees.
2. See, for example, James Cheek, "Bilateral Diplomatic Issues in Aiding Internally Displaced Persons," in C.B. Keely, ed. *Internally Displaced Persons and the International Community.* New York: Center for Migration Studies, forthcoming. For a case study of Operation Lifeline Sudan, see Larry Minear, *Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan.* Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1991. A condensation appears in *A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Report to the Aid Agencies*, published by the Refugee Policy Group, Oct. 1990.
3. Patricia W. Fagen and Joseph Eldridge. *Salvadoran Repatriation from Honduras.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Hemispheric Migration Project, forthcoming (1991).

Observations on Afghan Women Refugees in Pakistan, 1990

Nancy Hatch Dupree

Profound disenchantment quiets the hopes that have glimmered among the Afghan refugees since the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988. New arrivals in Pakistan fleeing continued bombardment of villages and destruction of crops offset the relative trickle of those repatriating. In Afghanistan, vicious local power disputes inflict further loss and distress. Mines scattered indiscriminately throughout wide areas maim young shepherds and farmers, women and children gathering fuel and water. The *jihad* (war of resistance) sputters intermittently without stirring the pride and purpose that sustained it in the past, but the killing goes on, and mourning for those who fall is no less intense.

In Pakistan, the Interim Government commands scant respect, and members of its political leadership stand censured for self-serving incompetence. As a result, expressions of grudging admiration for Najibullah's wily posturings in Kabul are more frequently heard. Most disheartening is the underlying conviction that Afghanistan's future is being manipulated to fit the designs of outsiders—that the Afghan voice is mute.

Social Constraints

These negative factors combine to create an atmosphere of unease in Pakistan, which in the early months of 1990 fostered a tense ideological campaign. Whipping at raw emotions, clandestine newsletters touted the allegation that humanitarian assistance merely masks the sinister introduction of unacceptable Western influence in general, and evil permissive practices inimical to Islamic values regarding women in particular.

The campaign was aggressive and culminated in a number of ugly incidents during which foreign assistance organizations were attacked, burned, and looted; Afghan women working with agencies funded by foreign money were served with warnings to quit or suffer dire consequences; female facilities entirely managed by Afghan women shared in the abuse. "Woman's place is in the home," it was said, "so there is no need for education or training beyond the family environment."

It is yet unclear who orchestrated these hostilities. It appears, however, that they relate to the strategies religious conservatives are using to legitimize their bids for the right to succeed the secular regime in Kabul: by evoking the purity of their Islamic views, they seek to delegitimize opposing moderate voices. Promoting women's morality looms large in their rhetoric. In short, women's issues are highly politicized.

> *Women will be in the majority after repatriation, and vast numbers of these women will be alone; many will be primary providers for their children or disabled men.*

Although this particular anti-feminist assault went largely unheeded by the Afghans, who regarded it with measured perspective, the foreign assistance community reacted with more timidity. While there is every reason to be circumspect, problems associated with security can be raised to excuse inaction. It is unfortunate when donors hesitate to consider expanded programming. Many Afghan women are anxious to become involved.

It is an undeniable fact that some Afghan men actively curtail women and that some are overly reticent in offering women encouragement, but it must also be emphasized that there are still others who are responding courageously to the persuasive efforts of growing numbers of women to prepare for positive, culturally compatible roles. In examining the current social dynamics energizing Afghan women, this centrality of males in family decision-making must be kept uppermost. This was so in the past; it is doubly so today.

Involvement and Its Problems

On the positive side, Afghan women in Pakistan are enrolling in a wide variety of training courses, mainly, as would be expected, in the fields of education and various branches of medicine, including dentistry. The University of Afghan Muslim Women, with six faculties, opened its doors in March 1990. A total of 129 Afghan women have won highly competitive scholarships at Pakistani universities for studies in education, medicine, sciences, engineering, agriculture, and veterinary sciences. Applicants far exceeding the capacity to accommodate them vie for courses in English language and public administration, and show an enthusiastic interest in computer sciences.

The popularity of training programs emphasizing childhood development attests to the fact that motherhood is and will remain a cherished role for most Afghan women. Indeed, the responsibilities women must assume in molding a healthy and productive new generation are stressed by the advocates of female

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Afghan women direct projects for vulnerable groups: widows, wives of the disabled, and teenage orphan girls. UNHCR

education. It is an argument even the most conservative find hard to contest.

Gradually, more and more of these initiatives are being wholly or partially staffed by Afghan women, including the newly graduated, as well as qualified professionals with prior career experience in Afghanistan. One young surgeon single-handedly raised funds, equipped, trained staff, and opened a women's hospital, while running a school for girls on the side. The largest obstetrics and gynecology hospital for Afghan refugees is staffed entirely by women who also conduct training courses. Mobile teams with only male drivers as escorts visit outlying refugee camps daily. The drive to establish almost all the primary and secondary girls schools comes from the women who both staff and administer them.

Afghan women direct projects for vulnerable groups found among widows, wives of the disabled, and teenage orphan girls. Their programs provide instruction in Islamic studies, literacy classes, and training in income-generating skills. One group assists nineteen primary girls schools inside Afghanistan, even to providing building plans prepared by their own female architect/engineers.

In addition, thousands of rural women in Pakistan are reached through informal basic health and sanitation education projects, as well as mine-awareness programs, all of which are conducted by newly trained professionals and paraprofessionals whose experiences it is hoped will enable them to organize services in their own communities after repatriation. Income-generation projects per se benefit thousands more. Most involve the production of handicrafts, and although their long-term viability beyond providing immediate income can be debated, they do help counter the traditional stigma clouding the propriety of women working for earnings, and they also provide valuable managerial and marketing experience.

One unique program conducted by Afghan graduates from Kabul University's Faculty of Agriculture, who themselves are refugees, assists village women in setting up forest and shade-tree nurseries in Pakistan; saplings are sold for distribution in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These types of innovative programs will have far-reaching effects after repatriation.

In the months following the spate of troublesome events in Pakistan noted earlier, only a few isolated incidents directed against women have occurred. Occasional groups of irascible clerics have massed to issue ultimatums demanding the closure of a project, but so far these outbursts have been sparked by personal grievances mollified through patient negotiation.

The overall situation is far more encouraging than generally represented, therefore, although the already-mentioned tensions and social constraints cannot be discounted. As one example, women are discouraged from moving freely in public streets, which means that transportation must be provided. This is very costly, but when it is not provided, many women simply cannot participate.

Directly allied to this is the inability of women to accept jobs requiring travel necessitating overnight stops outside the city. This is totally unacceptable to most families, so mobile teams often must spend as much as five hours a day on congested roads where traffic moves slowly in order to return to their homes by nightfall. Such attitudes are limiting, if only because they preclude the extension of programs into remoter areas, where the needs of women are greatest, and hamper individual career development.

Another hindrance discouraging participation is the almost universal discrepancy between male and female pay scales. For instance, female doctors with long years of experience often are offered less than male drivers. Regarding the shamefully low salaries as an affront to their esteem, numbers of women prefer to remain at home.

Agencies seeking to employ women are often unrealistic in their requirements. Few women have been able to acquire the full range of qualifications listed in job descriptions, yet only a few agencies are prepared to offer on-the-job training. As a result, the roster of women registered at the employment bureau remains full, while capable women sit idle. More wastefully, too, many graduates are unable to use their newly acquired skills because projects do not plan for follow-up employment. This fuels frustration and swells the ranks of families seeking resettlement abroad. Those unable to avail themselves of this option miss out on the practical experiences they will need to participate actively in reconstruction.

One positive development is the recent formation of a discussion group of active women who meet to identify problems, define roles, and devise solutions. They are aware that Afghan women's voices have been almost totally excluded from the decision-making processes governing refugee assistance, and that this will continue until they are able, and willing, to speak out as advocates for their aspirations. These, they emphasize, are firmly bonded within the teachings of Islam. If this incipient forum can be sustained, it will significantly enhance the status of women, particularly after repatriation.

Current attitudes toward assistance and repatriation are a maze of ambiguities. Using the argument that continued support is likely to impede the chances for repatriation, some agencies consider terminating or at least severely curtailing funds for female institutions. Other agencies entertain proposals for three-to-five year training courses. Such inconsistencies are discouraging, and consequently the initial momentum falters.

Options for Repatriation

By late September 1990, a few families had responded to the three-month pilot project initiated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in July 1990. Three factors loom large in the hesitancy of larger numbers to leave: opposition from Afghan leaders in Pakistan who fear an erosion of power if their constituencies dwindle; lack of security in areas infested with banditry because there is no recourse for law and order; and the absence of guaranteed economic survival. Interestingly, the refugees themselves tend to minimize the danger from mines.

Of more singular importance to them are reports such as that of 4,000 returned refugees living in the ruins of their former houses under conditions all too similar to those remembered from their arrival in Pakistan: scarce, expensive housing materials; inadequate food and water; insufficient incomes; inflated prices; and no visible solutions. These are powerful deterrents. Also inhibiting is the pervasive feeling that the very act of returning may in truth lend credibility to the Kabul regime, thereby negating the existence of the values for which they have sacrificed so heavily. Logic and practicalities simply have no meaning when such deep passions are involved. Outsiders seeking an "Afghan solution" may chafe with impatience, but this elemental factor cannot be lightly discounted.

Women are not immune to such feelings, and they have their particular anxieties. They express despair at the thought of once again experiencing the travails of displacement, pessimism about the chances for survival, and cynicism about the ability of the authorities to provide even minimal services. Although rural women, the majority of the refugee population, have been physically circumscribed in their movements while living in Pakistan, the variety of refugee experiences has widened their horizons and heightened expectations. They have learned to consider options, but they see few chances of doing so under circumstances prevailing inside Afghanistan.

They have learned to consider options, but they see few chances of doing so under circumstances prevailing inside Afghanistan.

Instead they hear some of their leaders vociferously claim that to give women the vote is alien and patently un-Islamic, ignoring the fact that Afghan women have responsibly exercised the right to vote since 1964. In place of the vote, they are offered vague assurances centered around the argument that it is in fact unnecessary for women to exercise choice because Afghan culture has always seen to the protection and well-being of its women. According to this reasoning, nothing has happened during the last decade to warrant change.

Such attitudes are indeed worrisome. More than 1.5 million Afghans have perished, a large proportion of them young male providers. Women will be in the majority after repatriation, and vast numbers of these women will be alone; many will be primary providers for their children or disabled men.

True, the society will not abandon these women to wander in destitution through the streets, but unless they are given the means to contribute economically to the extended families who give them shelter, they may well find themselves relegated to the status of servants, and their children deprived of even basic growth opportunities. Every aid sector, including the legislative and judiciary, should include women and children in their plans, but this reality has yet to receive the attention it so urgently deserves. In fact, almost nowhere do women and children figure significantly in current planning. The Ministry of Public Health has specifically mentioned in its strategy papers the need to involve women beyond the provision of basic services, but even they admit they are at a loss in formulating workable implementation procedures because of the social constraints discussed previously.

The complexion of the future Afghan government is the key to the kind of future that awaits Afghan women, but as yet, it remains an imponderable, impossible to predict. It seems certain, however, that no matter which end of the political spectrum emerges triumphant, ultraconservative or moderate, women will probably function for some time in institutions separate from men. Separate need not equate with inferior; given equitable funding, training, and monitoring, it may be predicted with reasonable assurance that women will compete favorably with men. Their determination is strong, as well as courageous, and this will lead them to apply themselves with single-minded diligence.

By contrast, young men have grown to maturity on the battlefield, having eschewed formal education in opting for the more manly exploits of war. Today, many of these men are restive individuals who find it difficult to submit to the constructive discipline required for study or routine productive activities. This may well characterize the future behavior of a part of the society. There will, of course, be many notable exceptions.

Different scenarios are possible, but whatever form of government materializes, the Afghan women now living as refugees in Pakistan ask that they be given a dignified place in society consistent with Islamic injunctions ensuring equality and justice for all. And they further ask that their voices be heard, for they are confident in their abilities to become productive participants in building a self-sufficient society prepared to meet the challenges of the future. On their return to Kabul, these women will be joined by able women unseduced by the hardline rhetoric of the war years. It seems unlikely that the male forces now ranged against these women will prevail.

UN Member States: Signatories and Non-Signatories to the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Below are governments that belong to the United Nations, listed according to whether or not they have signed the 1951 UN *Convention* and/or the 1967 *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.*

Signatories		Non-Signatories
Algeria	Japan	Afghanistan
Angola	Kenya	Albania
Argentina	Lesotho	Antigua and Barbuda
Australia	Liberia	Bahamas
Austria	Luxembourg	Bahrain
Belgium	Madagascar (C)	Bangladesh
Belize	Malawi	Barbados
Benin	Mali	Bhutan
Bolivia	Malta	Brunei
Botswana	Mauritania	Bulgaria
Burkina Faso	Monaco (C)	Comoros
Burundi	Morocco	Cuba
Brazil	Mozambique (C)	Czechoslovakia
Cameroon	Netherlands	Dominica
Canada (P)	New Zealand	Guyana
Cape Verde (P)	Nicaragua	Honduras
Central African Republic	Niger	India
Chad	Nigeria	Indonesia
Chile	Norway	Iraq
China	Panama	Jordan
Colombia	Papua New Guinea	Kuwait
Congo	Paraguay	Laos
Costa Rica	Peru	Lebanon
Cyprus	Philippines	Libya
Denmark	Portugal	Malaysia
Djibouti	Rwanda	Maldives
Dominican Republic	Samoa (C)	Mauritius
Ecuador	Sao Tome and Principe	Mexico
Egypt	Senegal	Mongolia
El Salvador	Seychelles	Nepal
Eq. Guinea	Sierra Leone	Oman
Ethiopia	Somalia	Pakistan
Fiji	Spain	Poland
Finland	Sudan	Qatar
France	Suriname	Romania
Gabon	Swaziland (P)	Saudi Arabia
Gambia	Sweden	Singapore
Germany	Tanzania	Solomon Islands
Ghana	Togo	South Africa
Greece	Tunisia	Sri Lanka
Grenada	Turkey	St. Christopher and Nevis
Guatemala	Tuvalu	Syria
Guinea	Uganda	Thailand
Guinea-Bissau	United Kingdom	Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti	United States (P)	Ukraine
Hungary	Uruguay	St. Lucia
Iceland	Venezuela (P)	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Iran	Western Samoa (C)	United Arab Emirates
Ireland	Yemen	USSR
Israel	Yugoslavia	Vanuatu
Italy	Zaire	Vietnam
Ivory Coast	Zambia	
Jamaica	Zimbabwe	

(C) Signatories to the *Convention* only.
(P) Signatories to the *Protocol* only.

NOTE: Although not UN members, the following countries have also signed the UN Convention: Holy See, Liechtenstein, Switzerland.

World Refugee Statistics

Published documents and other sources often vary in the numbers of refugees reported in a particular situation. Such variation can be disconcerting and may bring into question the sources' credibility. One obvious reason for discrepancies is the fluidity of refugee situations—a country quiet in February may be overwhelmed by June, and equally correct reports might be available for both periods. Counts obtained in relatively stable or contained situations may be more reliable than those from large or rapidly changing ones; statistics about populations in camps from which refugees are processed for resettlement, as in Southeast Asia, for example, appear regularly and are quite reliable. But even here, updated or revised censuses or estimates can lead to some discrepancies. Media reports—although providing prompt, continuing information—may be inconsistent about whom they term a refugee, or may not cite sources.

More subtle differences in refugee counts arise because those collecting data, while most often drawing on figures provided by the governments of asylum countries, do so according to definitions and criteria that may differ significantly. For example, numbers provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees include all refugees (of whom UNHCR assists some) reported by asylum country governments, while reports such as those of the U.S. State Department classify refugees as "requiring protection and assistance" or "refugees resettled and persons granted asylum."

Politics and nations' administrative procedures affect counts of refugees. Some sources, for example, report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees, while others term them as economic migrants. It may be in the political interest of a government to understate its refugee population or, in other instances, to report inflated numbers. Because countries may admit individuals under classifications other than refugee, some who may fit this description by virtue of their circumstances may not be counted as such; in countries of resettlement, these might include family reunification and special humanitarian admissions. Asylum seekers who have not been granted permanent asylum but who nevertheless are permitted to stay in a country may also not be reflected in refugee counts.

Some clarity in reporting is feasible: for example, agencies can report with some confidence the numbers for whom aid is provided or planned. Ideally, assistance and protection would be provided to all those who require it, and thus, counts of actual recipients of aid or "registered" refugees would represent all who are in need. In reality, of course, this is not always the case. Also, international assistance is sometimes provided to individuals who do not meet the international refugee definition, per se, but who are deemed to be "in refugee-like situations": these may appear in refugee counts. In Africa, for example, UNHCR operates in accordance with the mandate of the Organization of African Unity, whose refugee definition is broader than that of the UN's own Convention and Protocol, so its count of refugees of concern there is of broader scope than for other regions.

In some instances, accuracy may be detrimental, even dangerous. Figures following rigid definitions may jeopardize agencies' ability to provide adequate services to those quite obviously in need. Also, individuals may rightfully fear to draw attention to themselves, even in countries of asylum, for fear of retribution.

In view of the many deficiencies in the available data, questions may arise about the usefulness of collecting and reporting refugee statistics at all. But when used carefully and with a good understanding of their flaws, statistics provide one means to grasp the magnitude of "the refugee problem." Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement. For assistance to be provided and programs to be planned, reasonably reliable numbers are vital; data also allow one measure of success of efforts on behalf of refugees. Numbers are useful, too, to establish clearly that the burden of caring for refugees is shared, and that nowadays it is often the least well-off nations that support refugee populations.

In collecting data for the statistics and country reports, in addition to our own field research, we rely on a variety of sources whom we judge to be responsible. Instances where key sources differ significantly (for reasons we could identify as other than time period of reports) are indicated in the statistical tables with an asterisk (*). We have used the most current figures available. All numbers have been rounded, and we stress that none should be interpreted as absolute. For further detail or clarification of numbers in the tables, see the country reports.

TABLE 1

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

(as of December 31, 1990)

Refugees and asylum seekers who require international protection and/or assistance are unable or unwilling to repatriate due to fear of persecution and violence in their homelands. This table does not include refugees permanently settled in other countries. In some cases, refugees listed in Table 1 may no longer require assistance, but still need international protection. Starting in 1989, USCR began to include asylum seekers in Table 1, recognizing the increasing numbers of countries worldwide that have instituted asylum adjudication procedures and the need for protection and assistance while their claims are pending. In this table, totals for asylum seekers (primarily in Europe and North America) are for those persons who applied for asylum during the past year. Hundreds of thousands of other cases are pending from previous years.

Asylum Country	Subtotal by Source Country	**Total**
AFRICA		
Algeria		**189,400***
W. Sahara	165,000*	
Mali	21,400	
Niger	3,000	
Angola		**11,900**
Zaire	9,500	
S. Africa	2,100	
Namibia	300	
Benin		**800**
Chad	800	
Botswana		**1,000**
S. Africa	1,000	
Burkina Faso		**300**
Chad	300	
Burundi		**90,700***
Rwanda	80,600*	
Zaire	10,000	
Somalia	100	
Cameroon		**6,900**
Chad	6,500	
Others	400	
Central African Rep.		**6,300**
Sudan	5,100	
Chad	1,200	
Congo		**3,400**
Chad	2,300	
Zaire	400	
CAR	300	
Others	400	
Côte d'Ivoire		**270,500**
Liberia	270,000[1]	
Others	500	
Djibouti		**67,400**
Somalia	61,000	
Ethiopia	6,400	

Egypt		37,800
Kuwait	25,000[2]	
Somalia	6,000	
Palestinians	5,700	
Ethiopia	600	
Others	500	
Ethiopia		783,000
Sudan	398,000	
Somalia	385,000[3]	
Gabon		800
Gambia		800
Senegal	800	
Ghana		8,000
Liberia	8,000	
Guinea Bissau		1,600
Senegal	1,600	
Guinea		325,000
Liberia	325,000	
Kenya		14,400
Uganda	5,100	
Ethiopia	3,000[4]	
Rwanda	2,000	
Somalia	1,000[4]	
Others	3,300	
Lesotho		1,000*
S. Africa	1,000*	
Malawi		909,000
Mozambique	909,000	
Mali		10,600
Mauritania	10,000	
Niger	500	
Liberia	100	
Mauritania		22,000*
Senegal	22,000*	
Morocco		800
Mozambique		700
S. Africa	700	
Namibia		25,000*
Angola	25,000*	
Niger		800
Chad	800	
Nigeria		5,300
Chad	3,300	
Liberia	1,700	
Others	300	
Rwanda		21,500*
Burundi	21,500*	
Senegal		55,300
Mauritania	50,100	
Guinea Bissau	5,000	
Others	200	
Sierra Leone		125,000
Liberia	125,000	
Somalia		358,500*
Ethiopia	355,000[5]*	
Kenya	3,500	
South Africa		201,000*
Mozambique	200,000*	
Lesotho	1,000	
Sudan		726,500*
Ethiopia	700,000*	
Chad	20,000*	
Zaire	4,500	
Uganda	2,000	
Swaziland		47,200*
Mozambique	39,500*	
S. Africa	7,700	
Tanzania		266,200
Burundi	154,700	
Mozambique	72,000	
Rwanda	22,300	
Zaire	16,000	
S. Africa	1,000	
Others	200	
Tunisia		200
Uganda		156,000*
Rwanda	87,000*	
Sudan	64,000	
S. Africa	2,000	
Somalia	1,500	
Zaire	1,300	
Others	200	
Zaire		370,900
Angola	312,700	
Sudan	32,000	
Rwanda	12,000	
Burundi	10,000	
Uganda	4,000	
Others	200	
Zambia		133,950
Angola	98,000	
Mozambique	22,000	
Zaire	9,000	
S. Africa	3,500	
Uganda	1,200	
Malawi	250	
Zimbabwe		186,000*
Mozambique	185,000*	
S. Africa	1,000	

TOTAL AFRICA 5,443,450

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

China		5,000
Burma	5,000	
Hong Kong		52,000
Vietnam	52,000	
Indonesia		20,500
Vietnam	18,700	
Cambodia	1,800	
Japan		800
Vietnam	800	
Korea		200
Vietnam	200	
Macau		200
Vietnam	200	
Malaysia		14,600
Vietnam	14,600	
Papua New Guinea		8,000
Irian Jaya	8,000	
Philippines		19,600
Vietnam	19,600	
Singapore		150
Vietnam	150	
Taiwan		150
Vietnam	150	
Thailand		454,200
Cambodia	326,000	
Laos	67,400	
Burma	45,000	
Vietnam	15,800	
Vietnam		16,700
Cambodia	16,700	

TOTAL EAST ASIA/ PACIFIC 592,100

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Austria		22,800
Belgium		13,000
Canada		36,600
Czechoslovakia		1,600
Denmark		5,500
Finland		2,700
France		56,000
Germany		193,100
Greece		6,200
Hungary		18,300
Italy		4,800
Netherlands		21,200
Norway		3,900
Portugal		100
Spain		6,800
Sweden		28,900
Switzerland		37,000
Turkey		178,000*
Iran	150,000*	
Iraq	28,000[7]	
United Kingdom		25,000
United States		73,600
El Salvador	22,300	
Nicaragua	18,300	
Guatemala	12,200	
Others	20,800	
Yugoslavia		2,500

TOTAL EUROPE/ NORTH AMERICA 737,600[6]

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina		1,800
Belize		6,200
El Salvador	4,400	
Guatemala	1,800	
Bolivia		100
Brazil		200
Colombia		700
Costa Rica		26,900
Nicaragua	20,000	
El Salvador	4,000	
Cuba	2,500	
Others	400	
Cuba		3,000
Ecuador		3,750*
Colombia	3,000*	
Chile	750	
El Salvador		600
Nicaragua	600	
French Guiana		10,000
Suriname	10,000	
Guatemala		6,700
El Salvador	3,800	
Nicaragua	2,900	
Honduras		2,700
El Salvador	2,200	
Guatemala	400	
Nicaragua	100	
Mexico		53,000
Guatemala	43,000	
Others	10,000	
Nicaragua		500
El Salvador	500	
Panama		1,200
Peru		600
Cuba	400	
Others	200	
Uruguay		100
Venezuela		900

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN 118,950

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Bahrain		7,500
Kuwait	7,500[2]	
Gaza Strip		496,300
Palestinians	496,300	
India		415,800*
Sri Lanka	228,000	
China (Tibet)	100,000	
Bangladesh	75,000*	
Afghanistan	11,100	
Burma	800	
Others	900	
Iran		2,860,000*
Afghanistan	2,350,000*	
Iraq	500,000*[8]	
Kuwait	10,000[2]	
Iraq		60,000
Iran	60,000	
Jordan		929,100
Palestinians	929,100	
Lebanon		306,400
Palestinians	302,000	
Others	4,400	
Oman		3,000
Kuwait	3,000[2]	
Nepal		14,000
China (Tibet)	14,000	
Pakistan		3,668,800
Afghanistan	3,666,000	
Iran	1,100	
Iraq	1,700	
Saudi Arabia		300,000
Kuwait	300,000[2]	
Syria		280,700
Palestinians	280,700	
United Arab Emirates		40,000
Kuwait	40,000[2]	
West Bank		414,300
Palestinians	414,300	
Yemen		1,300
Ethiopia	1,300	

TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTH ASIA 9,797,200

GRAND TOTAL 16,689,300[9]

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* Indicates sources vary significantly in the number reported.

[1] By 5/1/91, there were 320,200 Liberians in Côte d'Ivoire.

[2] Although Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait, and some Kuwaitis returned home, most who fled remained in countries of asylum as of 3/31/91.

[3] By 5/1/91, there were approximately 600,000 Somalis in Ethiopia.

[4] By 5/1/91, there were 23,100 Somalis and 6,000 Ethiopians in Kenya.

[5] By 5/1/91, there were less than 35,000 Ethiopians remaining in Somalia.

[6] Except for Turkey, numbers in Europe and North America represent persons who applied for asylum in 1990. The top four source countries for asylum seekers in Europe in 1990 were Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of asylum applications from previous years remain backlogged in Europe and North America.

[7] By 5/1/91, another 400,000 Iraqi refugees had entered Turkey or were living in Iraq in close proximity to the Turkish border.

[8] By 5/1/91, another 1,300,000 Iraqi refugees had entered Iran.

[9] By May 1991, as a result of the changes noted in the footnotes above, the grand total had grown to **18,355,400.**

TABLE 2
SELECTED POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE-LIKE SITUATIONS
(as of December 31, 1990)

Great numbers of people who may fear persecution if returned to their home countries—and thus may, in fact, be refugees—are undocumented, unregistered, or for some other reason fall outside the legal protection mechanisms of host countries and international agencies. Information on these groups is fragmentary, and estimates of their numbers often vary widely, especially those numbers marked by an asterisk(*).

Host Country	Origin	Number
Bangladesh	Pakistan (Biharis)	250,000
Belize	Central Americans	25,000
Burundi	Rwandans	187,000
Cameroon	Chadians	42,000
Costa Rica	Central Americans	160,000*
Cyprus	Lebanese	10,000
Egypt	Palestinians+	70,000*
El Salvador	Central Americans	20,000
Guatemala	Central Americans	220,000–300,000
Honduras	Central Americans	237,000–250,000
Jordan	Palestinians+	400,000–600,000*
Kuwait	Palestinians+	170,000
Mexico	200,000 Salvadorans 126,000 Guatemalans 22,000 Nicaraguans 12,000 Hondurans	360,000*
Nicaragua	Central Americans	16,000*
Pakistan	India (Kashmiris)	8,000
Saudi Arabia	160,000 Ethiopians 50,000* Palestinians+ 30,000 Afghans 1,000 Somalis	241,000*
Syria	Lebanese	100,000
Uganda	Rwandans	120,000*
United States	Central Americans	500,000–1,000,000

+UNRWA's mandate is limited geographically to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Israeli occupied territories. UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees are included in Table 1. Unregistered Palestinians, both inside and outside the UNRWA mandate area, are reflected in this table. Additional Palestinians in the Gulf States, Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Africa, Europe, and North America are not counted due to difficulties in determining their numbers and status.

TABLE 3
SELECTED LIST OF SIGNIFICANT POPULATIONS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED CIVILIANS
(as of December 31, 1990)

Table 3 identifies selected countries in which substantial numbers of people have been displaced within their homelands as a result of human conflict, or as a result of forced relocations. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross international borders, they are generally not eligible for international refugee assistance. Because information on internal displacement is fragmentary, this table presents only reported estimates and no total is provided. It is important to note that even this selected list includes 20 million people, and that the total number of internally displaced civilians is undoubtedly much higher.

Sudan	4,500,000
South Africa	4,100,000
Mozambique	2,000,000
Afghanistan	2,000,000
Sri Lanka	1,000,000
Ethiopia	1,000,000
Lebanon	800,000
USSR	750,000
Angola	704,000
Liberia	500,000
Iraq	500,000+
Philippines	900,000
Somalia	400,000
El Salvador	400,000
Nicaragua	354,000
Uganda	300,000
Cyprus	268,000
Burma	200,000
Peru	200,000
Cambodia	140,000
Guatemala	100,000
India	85,000
Colombia	50,000
Turkey	30,000
Honduras	22,000

+ The number of displaced Iraqis has increased considerably in 1991, to as many as 2 million people.

TABLE 4
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES
(as of December 31, 1990)+

This chart is a retabulation of Table 1. It identifies countries that have generated the greatest numbers of the world's refugees. Counts may understate the total number of refugees from a given country, as asylum nations do not always specify countries of refugees' origin. This table does not include populations considered to be in refugee-like circumstances listed in Table 2, many of whom are also refugees. Also, it does not include populations who left their countries as refugees or in refugee-like circumstances, but who have been offered permanent resettlement and status in another country. Examples include 62,000 Vietnamese who left Vietnam via the Orderly Departure Program in 1990 and 235,029 Soviets who departed for Israel and the United States. It also does not include permanently resettled refugees listed in Table 9.

Afghanistan	6,027,100*	Burundi	186,200
Palestinians	2,428,100	W. Sahara	165,000*
Mozambique	1,427,500	Vietnam	122,200
Ethiopia+	1,066,300*	China (Tibet)	114,000
Liberia+	729,800	Bangladesh	75,000*
Iraq+	529,700	Laos	67,400
Sudan	499,100	Mauritania	60,100
Somalia+	454,600*	Guatemala	57,400
Angola	435,700*	Burma	50,800
Kuwait+	385,500	Zaire	50,700
Cambodia	344,500	Nicaragua	41,900
Sri Lanka	228,000	S. Africa	40,000*
Iran	211,100*	El Salvador	37,200
Rwanda	203,900*	Chad	34,400

* Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

+ See footnotes, Table 1, for changes in certain populations in early 1991.

TABLE 5
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATIONS—1990

Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect estimates of refugees who spontaneously returned to their homelands, as well as those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR. This is not a comprehensive list, and no total is given.

To	From	Numbers
Afghanistan	Iran	36,000–60,000
Afghanistan	Pakistan	80,000–200,000
Angola	Zaire	2,200
Chad	Central African Republic	11,000
El Salvador	Honduras	8,000
Guatemala	Mexico	780
Iraq	Iran	4,500
Iraq	Turkey	2,500
Laos	Thailand	1,480
Mali	Algeria	2,000
Nicaragua	Honduras and Costa Rica	30,100
Namibia	Angola	2,000
Vietnam	Hong Kong	5,430

TABLE 6
SIGNIFICANT INVOLUNTARY RETURNS—1990

The involuntary repatriation of *refugees* is prohibited under the UN Convention and Protocol. However, many *potential asylum seekers* are pushed back before entering the refugee determination process. Other *asylum seekers* are involuntarily returned under questionable refugee-status determination procedures. Some numbers are approximate or may not reflect all involuntary returns.

From	To	Numbers
Kenya	Uganda	1,000
Malaysia	High Seas	5,000
Mexico	Guatemala	110,000+
Nepal	China (Tibet)	200
Thailand	Burma	2,900
South Africa	Mozambique	37,000
United States	El Salvador	3,024
United States	Guatemala	2,214
United States	Haiti	2,026

+ This figure includes other than Guatemalans, so is not strictly involuntary repatriation for other Central Americans deported to Guatemala.

TABLE 7
REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE IN RELATION TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION AND PER-CAPITA GNP OF THE ASYLUM COUNTRY
Top 20 Countries

(in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

The sheer size of refugee populations should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a situation. Both the relative size of indigenous populations and the economic strength of asylum countries, for example, are important considerations. Table 7 presents refugee populations in relation to the size of each receiving country's indigenous population and its per-capita gross national product.

COUNTRY	Ratio of Refugee/ Non-Refugee Population	Population in Millions	Number of Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1/4	4.1	929,100	$ 1,500
Djibouti	1/6	0.4	67,400	N/A
Malawi	1/10	9.2	909,000	160
Lebanon	1/11	93.3	306,400	N/A
Swaziland	1/17	0.8	47,200	790
Iran	1/19	55.6	2,860,000	N/A
Somalia	1/23	8.4	358,500	170
Pakistan	1/31	114.6	3,668,800	350
Belize	1/32	0.2	6,200	1,460
Sierra Leone	1/34	4.2	125,000	240
Sudan	1/35	25.2	726,500	340
United Arab Emirates	1/40	1.6	40,000	15,720
Syria	1/45	12.6	280,700	1,670
Côte d'Ivoire	1/47	12.6	270,500	740
Saudi Arabia	1/50	15.0	300,000	6,170
Zimbabwe	1/52	9.7	186,000	660
Zambia	1/61	8.1	133,950	290
Burundi	1/62	5.6	90,700	230
Ethiopia	1/66	51.7	783,000	120
Bahrain	1/67	0.5	7,500	6,610
Gaza Strip	1/1.2	0.6	496,300	N/A
West Bank	1/2.1	0.9	414,300	N/A

TABLE 8
1990 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES
Top 20 Countries

(Ranked by contribution per capita)

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution+ (in millions)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	$12.03	4.2	$ 50.5	$20,020
Sweden	8.68	8.5	73.8	19,150
Finland	6.81	5.0	34.1	18,610
Denmark	6.08	5.1	31.0	18,470
Switzerland	4.36	6.7	29.2	27,260
Netherlands	2.04	14.9	30.3	14,530
Canada	1.90	26.6	50.5	16,760
Luxembourg	1.02	0.4	0.4	22,600
United States	1.02	251.4	256.2	19,780
Germany	.82	63.2	52.1	18,530
United Kingdom	.78	57.4	44.7	12,800
Kuwait	.71	2.1	1.5	13,680
Japan	.54	123.6	66.3	21,040
Australia	.45	17.1	7.7	12,390
Italy	.44	57.7	25.4	13,320
France	.32	56.4	18.2	16,080
Saudi Arabia	.32	15.0	4.7	6,170
Belgium	.27	9.9	2.6	14,550
Libya	.24	4.2	1.0	5,410
Brunei	.20	0.3	60.0	14,120

+ See note, page 36, Table 10.

TABLE 9
REFUGEES RESETTLED AND PERSONS GRANTED ASYLUM IN RELATIONSHIP TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION
Top 14 Countries
(In order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Refugees accepted for permanent settlement are no longer regarded as in need of protection or assistance. Hence, individuals below were not included in Table 1.

Resettlement Country	1975–1989 Cumulative	1989 Only	Population in millions	Ratio Refugees/ Population
Sweden	108,315	23,961	8.5	1/78
Canada	287,225	35,000	26.6	1/93
Australia	172,823	11,663	17.1	1/99
Denmark	28,733	N/A	5.1	1/177
United States	1,355,858	106,250	251.4	1/185
Norway	17,941*	7,450	4.2	1/234
New Zealand	10,988	802	3.3	1/300
France	186,957	8,711	56.4	1/302
Switzerland	21,487	821	6.7	1/312
Austria	20,571	2,070	7.6	1/369
Netherlands	20,171	2,755	14.9	1/739
Germany (FRG)	84,960	5,991+	63.2	1/744
Spain	38,186	3,677	39.4	1/1,032
United Kingdom	13,797*	1,587	57.4	1/4,160

NOTE ON TABLE 9: The primary source for numbers of refugees resettled or granted asylum was the U.S. State Department. Countries that have established resettlement programs generally provide particularly precise data, but data were not available for all countries for all years.

* Denotes that statistics were unavailable for 1975–1981.
+ Does not include 720,000 ethnic Germans from GDR, USSR, and Eastern Europe.

TABLE 10
1990 CONTRIBUTIONS TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES
Top 20 Countries
(In millions of $)



NOTE ON TABLE 8 AND GRAPH: Table 8 and this graph report the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries. The relative significance of contributions should be considered not only in terms of absolute size, but also in relation to population and gross national product. Included are estimated 1990 contributions to UNHCR, IOM, and UNRWA.

Each country's contributions to the European Community are not reflected. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid that are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank, which may benefit refugees, are also not reflected.

AFRICA



UNHCR

Algeria

The hopes raised in 1989 for a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict that would enable the repatriation of Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria were set back in 1990. A UN-sponsored referendum on the future of Western Sahara did not materialize during the year, despite a June meeting under UN auspices in Geneva between all parties involved in the conflict to prepare a list of eligible voters. The standoff between Morocco and the Sahrawi Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) continues.

The estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees (some sources, including the U.S. government, say the number is closer to 100,000) live in the barren Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria. Conditions in the refugee camps are harsh, and the refugees are totally dependent on outside assistance. Some of that support comes from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international community, but most is from the Algerian government and Sahrawi support groups overseas.

Sahrawis began entering Algeria after Spain relinquished its colonial rule over the area in 1975. Morocco claims Western Sahara as part of its territory and has stationed tens of thousands of troops there, while the Polisario seek independence for the territory. The purpose of the UN referendum is for Sahrawis to choose between allegiance to Morocco and independence.

Besides the Sahrawis, some 19,000 ethnic Tuaregs, who entered Algeria from Mali in search of food following the 1984–85 Sahelian drought, remain in Algeria. They sought food aid in Algeria fearing persecution in Mali. Thousands of other Tuareg Malians have repatriated to Mali in recent years, including 1,000 who returned in 1989 after being promised international aid upon their return. By mid-1990, that aid was not forthcoming, and some of the returnees joined a rebellion against the Malian authorities by ethnic Tuaregs. Since July 1990, another 2,400 Malians have entered Algeria, bringing the total of Malians there to 21,400. Also, some 3,000 ethnic Tuaregs from Niger have entered since October following ethnic disturbances in Niger. In late 1990, the influx of ethnic Tuaregs from both countries continued.

Angola

As 1990 ended, hundreds of thousands of Angolans were threatened by famine caused by drought and continued fighting. Yet international relief efforts that promised to bring food aid to many of those in need were repeatedly blocked. In December, the relief efforts were officially cancelled.

Developments earlier in the year had offered hope that at-risk civilians might receive the assistance they urgently needed. First, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a U.S.-backed rebel group that controls significant portions of Angola, made an unprecedented request for international food aid for people in areas it controls. Previously, UNITA had asserted that it could provide for all these food needs. Second, both the government and UNITA agreed to an international relief effort aimed at feeding people at risk in both government and rebel-held areas. Nevertheless, despite the all-around acknowledgement of the crisis and agreements to cooperate on relief, both the government and UNITA pursued political and military objectives at the expense of humanitarian concern for hungry Angolans, and little food reached the at-risk populations.

Although food shortages caused by both the civil war and natural phenomena have been a major problem in Angola for some years, the problem escalated in early 1990 as a result of intensified fighting and particularly severe drought in parts of Angola and neighboring countries. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—which has carried out relief programs in parts of Angola for several years—said that the level of malnutrition was the most serious in the region for five years, and a U.S. relief official labeled Angola "the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa, bar none."

In February 1990, the Angolan government, which in October 1989 had launched an appeal for international aid that met with little response, warned that the famine threatened more than 2.6 million people. In March, USCR issued a press advisory that said, "Hundreds of thousands of civilians are at risk.... A report on the situation in UNITA-held areas by a U.S. team found that 41.7 percent were malnourished ... and that in three provinces, 97,000 persons are in critical danger of starvation."

In June, Jonas Savimbi, the head of UNITA, asked the United States to help establish direct relief corridors into UNITA-controlled areas of southern Angola to bring food aid to more than 780,000 people at risk. The Angolan government initially refused to agree to the plan. However, in September, following a visit to Angola by State Department relief officials, the Angolan government announced that it would allow relief operations into both government and UNITA-held areas through various channels (including cross-border from Namibia). The ICRC began relief operations into both government and UNITA areas in October, but its operations—as well as those of UN and private U.S. relief groups—were thwarted by continued bickering between the government and UNITA. The UN operation, scheduled to deliver 100,000 metric tons of food over a six-month period, in fact delivered only 1,500 metric tons in its first two months. Food arriving in Angola for distribution to the interior was stockpiled at the ports. In late December 1990, first UNITA and then the government officially withdrew from the agreement to allow relief operations to proceed.

Meanwhile, ironically, progress was made on the peace front. In April 1990, the government and UNITA renewed direct talks that continued on and off throughout the year. The peace process received a boost in December, when the government's ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (MPLA), proposed sweeping political changes calling for multiparty democracy, direct election of the president, and a much greater degree of free enterprise, all of which UNITA has advocated. Several days later, UNITA leader Savimbi, on a visit to Washington, said he thought a cease-fire could be attained early in 1991. Observers speculate that the relief agreements broke down because both the government and UNITA wanted to achieve as much military gain as possible before a cease-fire, and relief efforts inhibited their abilities to achieve these aims.

The conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA has uprooted millions of Angolans—some 436,000 to neighboring countries. According to government estimates, 704,000 Angolans are internally displaced by the conflict and 1.5 million people are "affected" by drought and war. The lives of many other Angolans have been seriously disrupted beyond displacement and hunger. Landmines have maimed countless thousands; children have been orphaned; 92,000 children in Luanda alone cannot attend school.

Although most of the Namibian refugees in Angola repatriated in 1989, according to UNHCR, some 2,100 remained at the end of that year, all but 300 of whom repatriated during 1990. There are also an estimated 9,500 Zairean and 2,100 South African refugees in Angola.

In 1989, UNHCR began a program assisting Zairean refugees to repatriate to Zaire and Angolan refugees to repatriate from Zaire to Angola. A total of 6,400 Angolans returned home between September 1989 and March 1990 (4,200 in 1989 and 2,200 in 1990). Some 2,900 Zaireans repatriated between September and December 1989. In March 1990, the program was cancelled due to security problems in the Angolan returnees' home area.

Burundi

Burundi hosts a substantial but relatively stable refugee population. The vast majority of the estimated 80,600 assisted refugees in Burundi are Rwandese who arrived in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, some 1,000 of them arrived in Burundi in October 1990, fleeing conflict associated with an invasion of Rwanda by Uganda-based Rwandese exiles (see Uganda). The government of Burundi estimates that another 187,000 unassisted Rwandese refugees live in Burundi. They are fully integrated economically and socially—although they may not obtain Burundian citizenship.

In August 1988, violent clashes between Burundi's mostly Tutsi army and Hutus (the vast majority of Burundi's population) in northern districts—which left more than 5,000 (mostly Hutu) dead—led more than 55,000 Burundian Hutu refugees to flee to Rwanda. But later that year, Burundi announced changes that gave Hutus an expanded role in government, and all but 1,000 of the refugees returned home.

Some 100 Somalis (possibly including Kenyan citizens of Somali ethnicity) entered Burundi in 1990 because of onerous new Kenyan government policies applicable to ethnic Somalis (see Kenya). Due to fighting among the refugees, the Burundi government held them under armed guard. Before the Somali civil war escalated in December 1990, the Burundian authorities were arranging to repatriate to Somalia any who wished to return.

Large numbers of Burundian refugees remain in neighboring countries. While the situation of many is stable,

Barren fields in Eritrea: drought and war-induced famine again threatened millions in Africa. At the end of 1990, 9 million were at risk in Sudan alone. USCR/H. Ruiz

some, particularly those in Tanzania, experienced problems during 1990 (see Tanzania).

Cameroon

For decades, Chadian refugees have come and gone from Cameroon, generally coinciding with the various changes in government in Chad since that country's independence from France in 1960. Prior to December 1990, most of the Chadians in Cameroon—some 3,500 registered with UNHCR as refugees and an estimated 35,000 to 42,000 others locally integrated in northern Cameroon—were among the hundreds of thousands of Chadians who had fled during the 1979–1982 civil war (the vast majority of whom subsequently returned to Chad), or after Hissein Habre took power in 1982. Most of those registered as refugees were living in the UNHCR-assisted settlement at Poli/Faro.

In December 1990, the government of Chadian president Hissein Habre was overthrown by his former chief aide, Colonel Idriss Deby, who led a rebel movement based in western Sudan that Habre and U.S. officials said was Libyan-backed. Following Habre's overthrow, an estimated 3,000 Chadians (including Habre, who was subsequently granted political asylum in Senegal) fled to Cameroon. They entered the same areas in which the existing Chadian refugee groups and self-settled Chadians were living. To avoid conflict between the two sets of refugees, the government of Cameroon increased security in the region. Reportedly, representatives of the earlier refugee groups sent a message of congratulations to Deby and indicated a willingness to repatriate.

Some 400 refugees of other nationalities are assisted by UNHCR and allowed to work and apply for social services available to Cameroonians.

Chad

Since independence in 1960, Chad has generated periodic waves of refugees, usually coinciding with overthrows of successive governments. Between 1979 and 1982, an estimated 238,000 fled a civil war that ended when Hissein Habre ousted then president Goukouni Oueddei (who later led various unsuccessful attempts to overthrow Habre). In 1984–85, another 175,000 refugees fled renewed fighting, ethnically motivated abuses by government soldiers, and drought.

During the late 1980s, as the country stabilized, most—though not all—of the refugees returned home. In fact, for the past six years, the movement of Chadian refugees has been overwhelmingly one of repatriation.

That trend was reversed in December 1990 when the government of president Hissein Habre was overthrown by rebel leader Colonel Idriss Deby, Habre's former chief aide. An estimated 8,000 Chadian refugees, including Habre and many of his government's officials and their families, fled to Niger and Cameroon.

By late 1990, it was not yet clear whether the new Chadian refugee exodus would continue or if the refugees would accept Deby's assurances that they could safely return.

Côte d'Ivoire

Along with Guinea and Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) became a major new refugee-receiving country during 1990. Before December 1989, Côte d'Ivoire hosted only a few hundred refugees from various countries. By December 1990, according to the U.S. State Department, there were an estimated 270,000 Liberian refugees living there. The Liberian refugee influx coincided with increased social and political tensions in Côte d'Ivoire, a country that for years has been among the most prosperous and stable on the West African coast.

The influx began when Liberian rebels led by Charles Taylor launched an attack on Liberian government positions in Nimba county, Liberia. The rebels, said to be backed by the Ivorian government, sought to overthrow the government of the then-president, Samuel Doe. Doe's soldiers retaliated against civilians of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, from which the rebels drew most of their support. Tens of thousands of Gios and Manos crossed the border into Côte d'Ivoire. During 1990, they were joined by more Gios and Manos as well as refugees of other ethnic origins who were also fleeing the fighting and the chaos that took hold in Liberia. Late in 1990, as Doe's forces—mostly comprised of the minority Krahn ethnic group—suffered repeated defeats, the rebels began to attack Krahn civilians indiscriminately, and waves of Krahns fled to Côte d'Ivoire, particularly to southern regions, away from the areas to which most Gio and Mano refugees had fled.

Côte d'Ivoire is better equipped to handle the refugee influx than its neighbors. Its gross national product is twice that of Guinea or Sierra Leone, and it has a much more developed infrastructure, including a good road and transportation system. Thus the impact of the refugees has not been as great as in Guinea or Sierra Leone. Initially, Côte d'Ivoire did not request UNHCR assistance, preferring to care for the refugees by integrating them in local villages. That policy changed as it became apparent that the numbers would grow beyond the government's capacity to assist.

Providing adequate water is a major problem since many of the villages in the three border districts where refugees are concentrated did not have adequate water supplies even before the refugees' arrival. Beginning in late 1990, some 100 to 200 refugees per week spontaneously repatriated to Liberia.

Following negotiations with the Ivorian government in the summer, UNHCR began transporting food and medicine for Liberian refugees in Guinea through Côte d'Ivoire. Previously, transportation problems in Guinea kept adequate relief from reaching the refugees. The route through Côte d'Ivoire provides the most direct access to the refugees in Guinea.

Djibouti

Djibouti's record in the treatment of refugees has been uneven. During the mid-1980s, the government of Djibouti detained refugees and asylum seekers picked up by the police during roundups of "illegal immigrants," and during the mid-1980s was often accused of forcibly deporting Ethiopian refugees. More recently, it has withheld refugee status from tens of thousands of Somalis who have fled the conflict in northern Somalia.

Djibouti, a tiny country of only 400,000 people, views refugees within the context of its national security. The government believes that their presence may draw Djibouti into the conflicts that have dominated its two large and turbulent neighbors, Somalia and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, many refugees from those conflicts have still fled to Djibouti. More than 45,000 Ethiopians went to Djibouti following the 1977–78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia. During the mid-1980s, most of those refugees repatriated, many by themselves, but others under much-criticized official repatriation programs. Observers claimed that Djibouti forced many of the refugees to return to Ethiopia, while UNHCR was criticized for not carrying out its protection mandate.

The last official repatriation program ended in February 1989, and Dikhil camp, which once housed most of the refugees, was closed. Some 1,400 registered Ethiopian refugees remain in Djibouti, mostly living in the capital. But there are another 5,000 Ethiopians living in Djibouti whom the government labels illegal immigrants and UNHCR does not recognize as refugees. However, USCR, which has made two site visits to Djibouti since 1989, believes that many of these people—some of whom applied for asylum but were rejected, others of whom never applied fearing rejection and deportation—are in need of protection and assistance. USCR estimates the total Ethiopian refugee population in Djibouti is 6,400.

Opportunities for integration of Ethiopians in Djibouti are very limited, and for several years, the government discouraged third-country resettlement in order to avoid creating a "pull-factor" for more refugees. More recently, according to UNHCR, the Djibouti government has favored resettlement for the registered Ethiopian refugees. In April 1990, an Ethiopian refugee who had been in Djibouti since 1978 tried to kill the UNHCR representative. He then tried to kill himself.

Some 31,000 Somali refugees entered Djibouti in 1988 fleeing the conflict between the Somali government and the Somali National Movement in northern Somalia.

During 1990, as fighting in northern Somalia once again escalated, there was a further influx of some 30,000, bringing the total number of Somali refugees in Djibouti to 61,000. Some 15,000 of the Somali refugees are living in three new refugee camps near the Somali border. The remainder live in Djibouti ville. UNHCR has offered some assistance to those in the town, but is encouraging them to move to the refugee camps if they wish further assistance.

Egypt

Egypt's generally tolerant attitude towards some 70,000 Palestinian residents underwent strains during 1990, first, as prospects for a negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem dimmed with the abrogation of the PLO-U.S. dialogue, and, secondly, as the Gulf conflict increasingly polarized the Arab world.

Adding to the strain was the new presence on Egyptian soil of about 25,000 Kuwaiti exiles and the return to Egypt of more than 250,000 of her own citizens who had been working in Iraq and Kuwait. The return of the expatriate workforce was estimated to result in a $1 billion loss for Egypt, and to exacerbate an unemployment rate of about 20 percent.

While the Egyptian press glowingly covered the generosity of the Egyptian people in welcoming Kuwaiti refugees, that same press expressed increasing hostility toward Egypt's Palestinian population. The Kuwaiti exiles were essentially cost-free for Egypt, as they were being supported financially by the Kuwaiti government-in-exile or through their own resources. But the return of expatriate Egyptian workers thrust the Palestinians into direct competition with Egyptians in a tightening job market. Although entry visas for Palestinians had been abolished in July 1990, by September they had been invoked once again, and Palestinians without entry visas were being denied admission to Egypt. The crossing at Rafah was also blocked, at least temporarily in September, barring the entry of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

Modest progress was made toward the repatriation of about 5,800 Palestinians from the "Canada Camp" in Rafah, who had been separated from the Gaza Strip at the time of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. By the end of July, 35 heads of families had crossed to the Israeli-occupied side to begin building homes in Tel es-Sultan, and another 35 more were expected to arrive in August and September. At this pace, however, all 465 refugee families would not be resettled for another seven or eight years.

There were 1,740 UNHCR-registered refugees in early 1990. However, the 600 registered Somalis understate by a fac[illegible]f 10 the number in Egypt in late 1990. Most of the Somalis are from the Issak clan.

UNHCR also registered 648 Ethiopians, mostly Eritreans, and about 500 refugees from various other nationalities. A group of 33 Ethiopians were arrested in Cairo on November 13, 1989 for holding a demonstration outside the UNHCR offices. They were protesting the rejection of some of their number for refugee status and were demanding to be recognized as a group. In January 1990, eight of the group were deported to Sudan, though several were reported subsequently to have returned to Egypt. Some of the group were still being held at the Kenater Male Prison late in the year.

Sudanese in Egypt have largely been overlooked by international humanitarian agencies. At least a half million Sudanese live in southern Egypt, some of whom likely fear persecution in Sudan. In general, however, it is unclear whether this population left Sudan primarily for political or economic reasons.

Ethiopia

USCR conducted two site visits to Ethiopia during 1990. In January, USCR traveled overland from Sudan to Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)-held areas of Eritrea to assess the potential for famine and refugee movements due to drought and war, and the need for international relief to avert starvation among the five million civilians at risk in northern Ethiopia at that time *[one year later, a similar number were again threatened by famine in the region]*. In August, USCR was in western Ethiopia, documenting the conditions for southern Sudanese refugees and the potential for continued influxes as a result of war, human rights abuses, and famine in Sudan.

To an even greater degree than its neighbors to the east and west, Somalia and Sudan, Ethiopia is both a refugee-hosting and refugee-producing country. At the end of 1990, Ethiopia hosted an estimated 783,000 refugees (Sudan: 398,000; Somalia: 385,000).

Ethiopians Affected by Civil War and Drought Most Ethiopian refugees and internally displaced have been uprooted by civil war between Ethiopian government troops and insurgents associated with three main rebel groups: the EPLF; the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF); and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The EPLF, which has fought for Eritrean independence since 1967, now controls most of Eritrea except the capital city of Asmara and environs. In February, it captured the port of Massawa, through which most relief entered into what were then government-held areas. The TPLF (a group described as hard-line Marxist that seeks an overthrow of the current regime in Addis Ababa and a larger role in government for Tigrayans), in alliance with other rebel groups, holds all of Tigray and much of Wollo province. In mid-1990, TPLF and allied troops advanced within 100 kilometers of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The separatist OLF, the smallest of the three main groups, holds territory in both eastern and southwestern Ethiopia. In January 1990, with significant aid from the Sudanese military and the EPLF, the OLF captured the southwestern Ethiopian town of Asosa, site of a refugee camp that was home to 40,000 Sudanese refugees, all of whom had to flee the area.

Other Ethiopians have fled or have been displaced as a result of unpopular government policies, particularly the resettlement and villagization programs, that forced people out of their traditional homes and into new, government-built villages or to other regions of the country. Finally, many individuals have fled Ethiopia due to the government's human rights abuses.

In early 1990, Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo faced widespread famine. As many as 500,000 people were at imminent risk of starvation, yet relief was reaching only a minority of those at risk, largely because Addis Ababa would not agree to international relief operations that crossed from government into rebel-held areas or vice versa. During a site visit to Eritrea, USCR witnessed the impressive relief operations carried out by the Eritrean Relief Association, but also the devastation of crops and almost total absence of food stocks. USCR warned, "It is possible to keep people from starving, but we must act now—the window of opportunity is closing."

After the EPLF captured Massawa, the government bombed the port city, destroying 50,000 metric tons of food stored there and killing dozens of civilians. USCR communicated its condemnation to the Ethiopian Charge d'Affaires in Washington. In August, the EPLF threatened airplanes airlifting food into Asmara, the only means for food to reach the million-plus civilians living in the city and surrounding government-held enclave. USCR protested to the EPLF's U.S. representative. The EPLF replied that Asmara airport is used by the Ethiopian military to resupply its military garrison in Asmara and is therefore a legitimate military target. The people of Asmara are particularly vulnerable. According to a September Africa Watch report, "Food supplies are running out, and there is scarcely any fuel and water.... The civilians of Asmara are ultimately held as hostages, a human shield for the army garrison."

Widespread starvation and significant displacement of people was in fact averted in 1990 as a result of increased donor response to appeals for aid to those at risk in northern Ethiopia, and an eventual agreement between the government and the rebel groups to create relief corridors for food.

However, due to continued fighting and the failure of 1990 rains, which again led to drought both in northern Ethiopia and Sudan, in late 1990, famine once again threatened some 5.6 million people throughout Ethiopia. Once again, pledges of food by major donors were running well below the need. The only bright spot was a December agreement between the EPLF and Ethiopian government to allow the use of Massawa port for relief shipments destined for both government and rebel-held areas. *[A UN-chartered ship carrying 10,000 metric tons of relief food docked in Massawa on January 8, 1991.]*

Somali Refugees Most of the 385,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia as of December 1990 are members of the Issak clan who entered Ethiopia in a sudden and massive influx in mid-1988, when war broke out in northern Somalia between the Issak-supported Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali government forces. Many in that influx were northern urban dwellers from Hargeisa, Somalia's second largest city, and other towns. Subsequent arrivals included those initially displaced from the cities to rural areas, as well as traditional pastoralists who fled northern Somalia as the civil conflict spread and the Somali army continued to assault civilians. An August 1989 U.S. State Department report concluded that "at least 5,000 unarmed civilian Issaks were purposefully murdered by the Somali Armed Forces between May 1988 and March 1989."

During the early stages of the emergency, UNHCR and the Ethiopian government were criticized for a tardy and irresolute response. Despite the refugees having generally arrived in good health, within months nutritional levels in the camps had deteriorated alarmingly.

The areas of Ethiopia into which the Somali refugees fled were devoid of the basic infrastructure and natural resources necessary to sustain them. Lack of water sources and problems related to transportation and logistics severely constrained (and continue to hamper) the ability of UNHCR and the government of Ethiopia to respond to the refugees' basic needs. At the main Somali refugee camp, Hartisheik, water—the single largest problem area—has to be trucked in from Jijiga, a city 75 kilometers away. The refugees are therefore receiving only 3 to 4 liters of water per day, well below the 10–15 liters generally recommended by UNHCR.

Security in the camps is also a problem. Many of the refugees are reportedly armed, and there is a high level of violence, particularly at night when most of the camp workers withdraw. The Ethiopian government does not allow foreign workers to live in the camps; they must commute each day from Jijiga. Foreign health workers serving the Aware camps had to suspend their work in June after they were robbed at gunpoint three times on the road to the camps.

Despite continuing problems, health conditions at the camps improved during 1990. Mortality rates have decreased significantly and are comparable to those of the local population. According to a UNHCR/U.S. State Department-sponsored study of health conditions in the camps conducted in June, despite the improvement, "The high incidence of certain communicable diseases is cause for serious concern."

A number of Somali refugees have wound up in the Ethiopian military after being caught up in large-scale round-ups of young men being forcibly recruited by the Ethiopian government. Although some of the Somalis had UNHCR-issued refugee identification cards, they were conscripted and sent to the war front.

Increased fighting in both northern and southern Somalia led to the ouster of President Siad Barre from Mogadishu by the United Somali Congress (USC) rebels and a full SNM takeover of the north. As a result, beginning December 1990, there was a further Somali refugee influx into Ethiopia. *[By April 1991, the Somali refugee population had increased by more than 200,000, to a total of 585,000. The size of the influx stretched UNHCR's ability to assist to the breaking point, leading to reduced rations and rapidly escalating malnutrition among the refugees. The poor conditions led some of the refugees to begin to return to Somalia precipitously.]*

This Somali refugee woman, who lost both sons in the civil war, returned home from Ethiopia to find her home also gone. Relief workers described her as "the true picture of misery in Somalia." USCR/H. Ruiz

Sudanese Refugees Refugees fleeing civil war and war-induced famine in southern Sudan began arriving in Ethiopia in 1983. The civil war in Sudan is between the Sudanese government army and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Beginning in 1987, the Sudanese influx increased dramatically after the Sudanese government armed members of Arab ethnic groups that live primarily in areas bordering southern Sudan and who are hostile to the southern Sudanese. These ethnic militias have massacred unarmed southern Sudanese and forced many southern children into slavery. A disproportionate number of the refugees arriving in Ethiopia in 1987 and 1988 were young boys and adolescent males—mainly from the Dinka, Nuer, and Uduk ethnic groups—who had suffered severe physical and emotional trauma before and during their flight.

In addition to the special problems associated with the large number of unaccompanied minors (40,000), the Sudanese refugees were further disadvantaged by their isolation in western Ethiopia. Poor roads, seasonal flooding, and inadequate planning combined to create periodic shortages of some food commodities in the camps. Overcrowding and contaminated water sources also endangered the refugees' health. Beginning in 1989, UNHCR and the Ethiopian government began to deal more effectively with these problems.

After visiting the Sudanese refugee camps in August 1990, USCR said, "Today, although new refugees still arrive with starving, scrawny children . . . most food and medical needs are being met in a basic fashion." According to the June 1990 UNHCR/State Department health study, the health and nutritional status of refugees who arrived in the camps prior to January 1990 is "comparable with, if not better than, that of the non-refugee population in the region."

When Asosa was overrun, the camp's 40,000 refugees were forced to flee. About half made their way to an area near Itang, another Sudanese refugee camp (the rest fled to and remain in SPLA-held areas of southern Sudan). They arrived in Itang in very poor health, and for months the death rate among former Asosa refugees was four times that in the region and ten times that among refugees who had been at Itang prior to January. The rate of acute malnutrition among children under age 5 was 58 percent, one of the highest recorded in the Horn of Africa in a decade. The arrival of the Asosa refugees (as well as an influx of 8,000 other Sudanese refugees in June) stretched the camp's resources, and, at the time of USCR's August visit, the health and nutritional status of the Asosa refugees was still poor. By December 1990, U.S. emergency funding of expanded health programs succeeded in improving health conditions and beginning the rehabilitation of those children most seriously affected by malnutrition.

Ethiopian Returnees Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians fled to Somalia in 1978 (in the aftermath of the Ogaden war) and the mid-1980s (due to the Ethiopian government's resettlement and villagization policies). Many returned home spontaneously during the mid-1980s, though only a small number with UNHCR assistance. In a 1990 UNHCR survey of remaining Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, many of the refugees indicated that they would agree to repatriate. UNHCR sought donor funding (mostly unsuccessfully) for the repatriation project, but the plan was overtaken by events in Somalia.

[The intensified fighting in the Somali civil war beginning late 1990, which affected areas where many Ethiopian refugees were living, led more than 150,000 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia to return suddenly to Ethiopia between December 1990 and March 1991. Only some 15,000–35,000 remain in Somalia.]

Ethiopian Jews Most of the Ethiopian Jews living in the Gonder region moved to Addis Ababa during early 1990 in anticipation of receiving permission to emigrate to Israel. An estimated 20,000 were living in tents on the outskirts of the city in conditions described as extremely harsh. In July 1990, the Ethiopian government said that it would not allow the Jews to emigrate, but following further discussions with the Israeli government, which has provided Addis Ababa military aid in recent years, that decision was reversed. The Israeli government said that it expected all Ethiopian Jews would be in Israel by the end of 1991.

[In May 1991, President Mengistu fled Ethiopia, the EPLF seized control of Asmara and Assab, the 15,000 Ethiopian Jews in Addis Ababa were airlifted to Israel, and a TPLF-led coalition of rebel groups entered and took control in Addis Ababa.]

Gambia

Senegalese refugees in Gambia are fleeing fighting in their home region of Casamance between Senegal government troops and Casamance separatists, who are said to be backed by Mauritania and Iraq. The fighting escalated in May, and dozens, perhaps hundreds, of civilians have been killed. Senegalese security forces have been accused of human rights violations against Casamance villagers suspected of sympathizing with the rebels.

Gambia's government authorized 326 Senegalese refugees to remain there. The Red Cross reports that there are between 600 and 800 Senegalese refugees in Gambia, but other well-informed sources say the figure is in the thousands. On October 12, the government *refouled* (forcibly repatriated) ten Senegalese refugees, one of whom later died after being tortured by Senegalese authorities. Other sources say that the total number of refugees *refouled* is higher. The Gambian government admitted that it *refouled* nine Senegalese refugees.

Ghana

The exodus of Liberians fleeing the civil war in that country spread beyond Liberia's immediate neighbors. An estimated 8,000 Liberians also fled to Ghana, arriving mostly by ship.

Prior to the military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian crisis, Liberian refugees were fleeing by land into immediately adjacent countries. The arrival of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force—known as ECOMOG—in Monrovia altered that pattern as ships ferrying troops and supplies for the ECOMOG troops departed Monrovia filled with civilians fleeing the war. Most were nationals of other West African countries who had been living in Liberia, but many Liberians also managed to secure places on the ships. The largest number of Liberians fleeing by ship made their way to Ghana.

A temporary refugee camp was set up at Buduburam, 30 kilometers from Accra, the Ghanaian capital. By late October 1990, nearly 6,000 Liberian refugees were living there. The refugees are assisted by local church groups, but the unexpectedly large numbers became a problem and the government sought international relief assistance.

Guinea

Guinea received the single largest new refugee influx in Africa during 1990. Liberian refugees began to arrive in late December 1989, when a Liberian rebel group seeking to oust the regime of Liberian president Samuel Doe invaded Liberia's Nimba county, which borders Guinea. The rebel group, led by Charles Taylor, drew most of its support from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, who live in both Nimba county and in neighboring Guinea. As Doe's soldiers retaliated against Gio and Mano civilians, members of those groups began fleeing into Guinea. By December 31, 1989, just one week after Taylor's invasion, there were already 13,000 refugees in Guinea. That number grew to 80,000 by mid-February 1990. By December 1990, the Guinean Red Cross recorded as many as 438,000 Liberian refugees, but an international assessment team that visited Guinea in November determined that the number was lower and established a planning figure of 325,000 until a January 1991 UNHCR census could begin.

The initial international response to Guinea's refugee crisis was slow and inadequate. The refugees entered Guinea's forest region, a remote and underdeveloped area at the far end of the country from the capital, Conakry. The refugees' remote location exacerbated the problems caused by lack of early donor response and international and private agencies' slowness. Lack of transportation, fuel shortages, heavy rains, and bureaucratic delays hampered relief operations.

The burden of assisting the refugees fell on the local people, who responded heroically, welcoming the Liberians into their homes, and sharing their meagre resources until aid finally began to arrive. Living primarily in local homes rather than refugee camps is rare for such a large refugee group.

In June, the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), concerned about inadequate aid to the refugees in Guinea, called for urgent U.S. action to better assist the refugees. That same month, USCR asked UNHCR to expand its presence in Guinea, calling on UNHCR to take a more active lead in coordinating and improving upon still-inadequate relief efforts there.

Increased donor support and negotiation of new, more direct relief routes through Cote d'Ivoire brought about improvements in food delivery. However, according to UNHCR, as of mid-November difficult logistics still impeded refugees' access to needed food, health care, and sanitation projects. Although the refugees' health has generally been considered satisfactory, there was an outbreak of cholera and severe diarrhoea in late 1990, largely reflecting unclean drinking water and sanitation.

The refugees' remote location did have one positive side: since the refugees, despite their large number, were out of sight and far from Conakry, their presence did not pose as much of a political problem for the government, as was the case in neighboring Sierra Leone.

While the international community has applauded the generosity that local people in Guinea have shown to the refugees, it has been loathe to assist those same people now that they too face food shortages, decreased access to health care, deforestation of their land, and a deterioration in sanitation conditions. Having depleted their own food reserves to help feed the refugees when they first arrived, local Guineans were then not eligible to receive the food aid that arrived for the refugees. The United Nations launched a special appeal for assistance to Guineans affected by the refugee influx, but the international response was virtually nil.

In testimony before the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee in November, USCR urged the United States to respond generously to that UN appeal. USCR said that not assisting affected local people would not only jeopardize the hospitality currently being offered to Liberian refugees, but also sends a negative message to residents of countries that may receive future refugee influxes.

Kenya

For many years, Kenya's treatment of refugees has been spotty. While it has allowed thousands of refugees from neighboring countries to remain in the country, the Kenyan government has denied refugee status to many, has used refugees as political scapegoats to draw attention away from domestic problems, and has forcibly repatriated individual refugees.

The Kenyan government's overall human rights record has also seriously deteriorated, prompting protests at home and abroad. In July 1990, seven people were killed and more than 1,000 arrested in protests over the government's arrest of opposition figures.

In 1989, several thousand Somali refugees entered Kenya fleeing the civil war in their country—more than 2,500 entered in September 1989 alone. The Kenyan government denied the refugees even the most basic assistance, and some reportedly starved. The refugees suffered beatings, arrests, and other forms of harassment by Kenyan authorities before being forcibly repatriated to Somalia. Although it is not known how many Somalis entered Kenya during 1989–90, or how many of those who did enter were forced back or continued on to other countries, USCR estimates that as many as 1,000 Somali refugees may have remained in Kenya.

Although Kenya is a signatory to the 1951 refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, even UNHCR, which is circumspect in criticisms of governments, has acknowledged what amounts to Kenya's lack of compliance with its obligations under those agreements. UNHCR reported that in 1989–90, "The legal protection situation for asylum seekers and refugees in Kenya continued to give cause for concern. . . . The government decided to confine asylum seekers to the Thika Reception Center (which though built for 320 held 1,400 in April 1990) and not to allow Ugandan asylum seekers access to the asylum procedure. . . . UNHCR was denied access to groups that had reportedly crossed into Kenya to seek refuge." The Kenyan authorities also frequently deny refugee status to individuals whom UNHCR considers to be refugees. Besides the registered refugees in Kenya, there are also some 2,100 other mandate refugees (i.e. not granted refugee status by the host country but considered refugees by UNHCR).

In late 1989, the Kenyan government also began a program under which all ethnic Somalis in Kenya had to register and prove that they were either Kenyan citizens or otherwise legally in Kenya. The purpose of the screening—which was only applied to ethnic Somalis—was reportedly to identify undocumented aliens. Those acknowledged as citizens were issued pink identity cards that distinguish them from other Kenyans. There were reports, however, that many ethnic Somali Kenyans who could prove their citizenship were refused identity cards. It is difficult to establish the exact number of people affected by the screening program, but according to UNHCR, 3,500 ethnic Somalis who claimed to be Kenyan citizens were deported to Somalia.

In October 1990, following an armed invasion of Rwanda by Rwandan exiles living in Uganda, Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi issued a directive that all Rwandese refugees must leave Kenya immediately and that Ugandan refugees engaged in "illegal activities" would also have to leave.

According to Africa Watch, following Moi's declaration, police carried out swoops in most major towns, "seizing refugees from their homes." Some legitimately registered refugees "had their documents destroyed by the police and security forces." More than 1,000 refugees, mostly Ugandans, were expelled to Uganda and many others arrested.

USCR wrote to the Kenyan government in December expressing deep concern and alarm at the Kenyan authorities' actions. "These actions are not only serious abuses of the human rights of refugees as individuals; they are in clear violation of the government of Kenya's responsibilities and commitments under the *UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, to which it is party."

[Intensified fighting in the Somali civil war beginning in late 1990 and continuing through early 1991 led to a new influx of Somali refugees. Some arrived on board flights that were carrying foreigners out of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, others arrived by boat in the Kenyan port cities of Mombassa and Lamu, and others crossed the border by land. By March 1991, new Somali arrivals totaled 23,100. They were allowed to stay, but not granted refugee status. The border sites allocated for the refugees were inadequate. In April, Somalis fleeing fighting in Kismayo were stopped at the Kenyan border, where they remained in poor condition. Some 3,000 Ethiopian refugees—particularly ethnic Oromos—who wanted to flee Somalia but not return to Ethiopia entered Kenya. Others were turned back at the border.]

Prior to the late 1990–91 Somali influx, Kenya hosted some 11,300 registered refugees, 2,100 mandate refugees, and 1,000 unregistered Somalis (registered refugees: 5,100 Ugandans, 3,000 Ethiopians, 2,000 Rwandese, and 1,200 others; mandate refugees: 2,100 of various nationalities).

Lesotho

Only 250 of the estimated 4,300 refugees living in Lesotho are officially recognized and assisted by UNHCR. Most are South Africans who have spontaneously settled in Lesotho.

Since 1986, when a military government took power in Lesotho, newly arrived South African refugees are only offered temporary asylum until their transfer or resettlement to another country. During 1990, the number of arrivals and departures of refugees remained roughly equal.

Hundreds of Basotho exiles—who had mostly fled Lesotho to South Africa and Botswana during the 1970s—began repatriating to Lesotho in 1986, when the new government offered them amnesty. However, some 1,000 Basotho refugees remain in South Africa.

In February 1990, the military government stripped King Moshoeshoe II of all executive and legislative powers. In March, the king was forced into exile in the United Kingdom.

Liberia

Liberia produced 1990's largest new outflow of refugees. More than 730,000 Liberians are now living as refugees in neighboring countries, primarily in Guinea (325,000), Cote d'Ivoire (270,000), and Sierra Leone (125,000), with smaller numbers in Ghana (8,000), Nigeria (1,700), and other countries. At least 500,000 other Liberians are thought to be displaced within Liberia, bringing the total number of civilians uprooted by the civil war to 1.26 million, more than half the total population of Liberia.

Liberia, which was established in 1847 by freed black American slaves, was ruled until 1980 by the founders' descendants, known as Americo-Liberians, who represented only two percent of all Liberians. A military coup led by Samuel Doe removed the Americo-Liberians from power, but largely placed power in the hands of members of Doe's ethnic group, the Krahn, also a small minority.

The civil war that caused the massive uprooting of Liberians during 1990 began on December 24, 1989, when a small rebel force led by Charles Taylor invaded Nimba county, in northern Liberia. Nimba county is home to many of the nation's ethnic Mano and Gio people, from whom the rebels drew much of their support. Taylor's aim was to oust Doe's government, which had been widely condemned for human rights abuses. Retributions against Manos and Gios in Nimba county by Doe's soldiers, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), led to the first wave of refugees, mostly Manos and Gios fleeing into Guinea and Ivory Coast. Taylor's forces also engaged in indiscriminate attacks against civilians of the Krahn and other ethnic groups, causing further refugee outflows.

Inter-ethnic violence spread throughout the country. In May, the United States stationed 2,100 Marines in ships off the coast of Liberia to protect U.S. citizens if necessary. Many Liberians reportedly flocked to Monrovia thinking that the United States would act to protect Liberian civilians, but though the Marines helped evacuate hundreds of Americans and thousands of nationals of other countries, they remained offshore.

As Taylor's forces and those of a splinter rebel group led by Prince Johnson advanced towards Monrovia from opposite directions, the AFL went on a rampage of killing, raping, and looting directed primarily but not exclusively against Manos and Gios. Liberians of all ethnic groups and from all areas of the country, including Monrovia, poured across the borders seeking to escape the bloodshed. The worst atrocity attributed to the AFL was the massacre on July 30 of an estimated 600 civilians at a church that was serving as a Red Cross refuge. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) condemned the massacre and called for international action to protect Liberian civilians.

In August, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a peace-keeping force known as ECOMOG to Monrovia to protect civilians and attempt to restore order in the capital. Shortly after ECOMOG's arrival, Johnson seized, tortured, and killed Doe. The AFL, by then reduced to some 700 to 2,000 armed men, retreated to the late president's mansion, where they remained with several thousand civilian dependents. AFL soldiers continued to roam the streets at night looting and attacking civilians.

ECOMOG and Johnson subsequently mounted a joint offensive against Taylor's forces and by October had driven Taylor out of Monrovia. Tens of thousands of displaced civilians who had been living in Taylor-held areas began flocking into Monrovia, exacerbating an already desperate shortage of food, water, and medical care. Reportedly, malnutrition in Monrovia reached 80 percent among children, and there were 40 to 50 hunger-related deaths per day. Little was known about conditions for the displaced and other civilians in rural areas held by Taylor's forces, though some food was known to be reaching them via Taylor-held Buchanan, Liberia's second largest port and city.

The relative calm that resulted from the front line being pushed well outside Monrovia made it possible for the first shipment of relief food in months to arrive there. The Belgian medical relief group, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the first private relief group to enter Monrovia, began providing some medical services, but largely had to devote its attention to helping a newly formed local self-help group, Special Emergency Life Food (SELF), distribute the first food to arrive in the city in months. By early November, when international relief personnel began returning to Monrovia, SELF was distributing food to more than 250,000 civilians in the capital. However, ECOMOG's subsequent bombing of Buchanan and Taylor's retaliatory shelling of Monrovia's port delayed relief efforts throughout the country because ships once again refused to dock in Liberian ports, particularly Monrovia. The civilian population in Monrovia continued to swell during November and December, as more former residents of the city and people from rural areas flocked into the capital in search of food. By the end of 1990, there were some 500,000 civilians registered for food distribution in Monrovia, many of them displaced persons, and relief efforts were severely strained. Children—thousands of whom were orphaned—particularly suffered, as there was an absence of protein and food items appropriate for supplementary feeding of malnourished children. A survey carried out in both Monrovia and Taylor-held areas by MSF found that 70 percent of children still suffered some level of malnutrition.

USCR was present in Monrovia during early November 1990 to document the condition of the displaced population and other civilians, assess their need for international assistance, and evaluate the prospects for the eventual successful reintegration—when the situation permits—of the more than three quarters

Monrovia's killing fields: remains of dozens of people executed by one or another party in the Liberian civil war. Civil war has left countless [illegible] and displaced millions from Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, and other African countries. USCR/H. Ruiz

of a million Liberian refugees in neighboring countries. In testimony before the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee after returning from Monrovia, USCR said that once peace prevailed, Liberia would require a massive infusion of outside assistance to rebuild its shattered infrastructure before displaced Liberians could be successfully reintegrated. USCR called on the U.S. Congress to enact a Liberia Relief and Reconstruction Act to ensure that funds would be available for growing relief needs, repatriation of Liberian refugees, and reconstruction of Liberia.

In late November, leaders of all the factions involved in the conflict, plus members of an interim government elected by Liberian exiles and supported by ECOWAS, met for the first time. A cease-fire was declared, offering at least some hope that an end to the conflict might be at hand. However, by late 1990, although Monrovia remained calm and some of the city's normal activities and services—including running water, sporadic electricity, trading, and some local transportation—resumed, a political solution had not been reached, and there were still two governments in Liberia, one led by Interim President Amos Sawyer in Monrovia and another led by Charles Taylor, whose NPFL continued to control most rural areas.

[A meeting attended by all parties in early February 1991 in Togo yielded a promise on the part of all groups to keep armed personnel in their barracks. A peace conference in Monrovia in March to select a new interim government failed to bring unity, as Taylor refused to attend. Sawyer was re-elected interim president, but the country remained divided.]

Malawi

The Mozambican refugee population in tiny Malawi—already the largest on the African continent—grew by 87,000 during 1990, bringing the total to an astonishing 909,000. While some nongovernmental agencies working in Malawi believe that figure may be somewhat high, all agree that despite the staggering impact on Malawi of such a vast refugee population, Malawians and their government have shown the refugees admirable generosity.

The Malawi government has been strongly criticized, however, for its treatment of its own people. The State Department has called Malawi's human rights performance "the reverse" of its "exemplary" handling of the refugee program, and Africa Watch has labeled Malawi a totalitarian state where free expression, and indeed all manifestations of independent civil society, are effectively forbidden. The government's generosity towards refugees is said to reflect, in part, Malawi's desire to foster a good public relations image in the West.

Malawi is one of Africa's smallest, most overcrowded countries. According to the World Bank, it is the fourth poorest country in the world; one in three Malawian children die before the age of five.

Between 1976 and mid-1986, an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 Mozambicans sought refuge in Malawi. Since September 1986, Malawi has received wave after wave of refugees. Of the 87,000 refugees who entered during 1990, 25,000 entered during a one-month period, October, into Nsanje, the district already most heavily populated with refugees. Countrywide, Malawi has one of the highest ratios of refugees to nationals in the world: there is one Mozambican refugee for every ten Malawians. In

Nsanje, refugees outnumber Malawians by more than three to two.

The massive influx of Mozambican refugees has severely taxed Malawi's social services, drained food reserves, strained the nation's road and transportation network, and caused major deforestation. In late 1986, as numbers skyrocketed, the government of Malawi, which had forcibly returned a number of refugees, allowed UNHCR to establish a presence. The early refugees were allowed to settle in and around Malawian villages, and, in the few areas where it was possible, Malawi made land available for them to cultivate. A survey carried out in 1990 found that 19 of 20 village leaders interviewed had given up between 16 and 75 percent of their land to the refugees.

Beginning in 1988, when the numbers of new arrivals were too large for feasible local integration, special refugee camps were established. Since then, most new arrivals have settled in the ever-growing camps.

Despite Malawi's generosity, the refugees' situation is far from ideal. Most live at a subsistence level. Distributing food and providing essential services such as water, health, education, and sanitation is difficult, not only due to the large numbers, but also because the refugees are widely scattered. Wherever possible, the Malawian government has offered services through existing government structures. UNHCR and other international agencies, as well as the Malawi Red Cross, have helped bolster these structures, enabling them to serve refugees as well as locals.

The funding crisis that UNHCR has experienced during the past two years has hit refugees in Malawi particularly hard. Plans to build classrooms and replace inadequate medical facilities were cancelled, and an inability to meet basic food requirements (particularly protein sources, such as beans or peanuts) led to a major outbreak of pellagra (niacin deficiency disease) among the refugees. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, the 17,000 cases of pellagra recorded among the refugees in Malawi between April and October 1990 represented the largest outbreak of pellagra in the past four decades, although there were no recorded fatalities. There was an outbreak of cholera at Nyamithutu refugee camp during 1990, and malnutrition rates at the camp trebled, primarily among newly arrived refugee children.

In early 1990, the situation worsened with the closure of the Tete corridor—the road between Zimbabwe and Malawi that crosses through Mozambique's Tete province—through which most food for the refugees is transported. The closure came after Zimbabwean troops, who had protected the 150 vehicles per week that transported the food, were withdrawn as part of the Mozambican government-RENAMO peace negotiations. RENAMO then began attacking the convoys, forcing the closure. Since then, UNHCR has had to transport food for the refugees via Zambia, adding 1,000 kilometers and time delays to an already stretched food delivery system.

Reduced international assistance, continued influxes, and the refugees' long stay in Malawi have taken their toll on relations between locals and refugees. While relations have generally remained very good considering the scale of the influx, since 1989 there have been reports of some hostilities. One refugee and two Malawians were killed following unrest at Nyamithutu refugee camp in December 1990.

In December 1988, Malawi signed a tri-partite agreement with Mozambique and UNHCR that provided a framework for repatriating refugees who wished to do so. Less than 10,000 have repatriated to Mozambique through this official channel thus far, and some of those who have repatriated are known to have re-entered Malawi as refugees a second time. The repatriation program was suspended briefly in mid-1990 due to the outbreak of cholera in the region, but resumed in September when 500 refugees repatriated to Mozambique with UNHCR assistance.

Mali

An estimated 10,000 black Mauritanians either fled or were expelled from Mauritania to Mali beginning 1989 (See Mauritania). The Mauritanian influx into Mali began at about the same time as the flight and expulsion of tens of thousands other Mauritanians to Senegal. The Mauritanians in Senegal received some international attention and aid, but the influx of Mauritanians into Mali went largely unnoticed. The Mali government did not request international aid until late 1990, when the refugees, who had barely been supporting themselves by working as laborers or herdsmen, were facing severe problems.

A UNHCR assessment team that visited the refugees in November found their nutritional status deteriorating daily and concluded that without immediate help, more than 7,000 would be threatened by malnutrition and starvation. UNHCR also feared that without assistance more refugees would wander from town to town seeking work, food, and water and risk becoming an unwelcome burden for local people, possibly leading to protection problems for the refugees.

During 1990, some 60 Liberian refugees and 50 Malians with Liberian citizenship who fled the civil war in that country made their way to Mali. UNHCR made plans to transfer the Liberian refugees to another asylum country.

Following a revolt in April by ethnic Tuaregs in Niger, an unknown number of ethnic Tuareg Nigeriens entered Mali, at least some of whom were arrested. The arrival of Tuareg refugees from Niger sparked discontent that had been growing among ethnic Tuaregs in Mali, some of whom had been in exile in Algeria but had returned in recent years to Mali (including more than 2,000 in 1990) after being promised international aid. Little aid materialized, however. In June, Tuaregs in Mali also began a revolt that left hundreds of Tuaregs and other Malians dead. According to Amnesty International, 55 Malian Tuaregs arrested following the revolt were subsequently executed by the Malian authorities. Some 2,400 others fled to Algeria, where they joined 19,000 Tuareg Malian refugees already living there.

Mauritania

During 1990, the government of Mauritania was widely condemned for human rights abuses against its black citizens, including forced deportations, torture, extrajudicial executions, and continued tolerance of slavery. Between November 1990 and January 1991, some 3,000 black Mauritanians were arrested and held without charge. According to Amnesty International, as many as 15 of the detainees are thought to have died as a result of torture. Thousands of Mauritanians were either forcibly deported or fled as a result of these abuses to Senegal and Mali during the year, joining Mauritanian refugee populations already in those countries, mostly since 1989.

Mauritania, an Islamic state, is politically dominated by Moors, descendants

Besides the 1.47 million Mozambican refugees in neighboring countries, two million others—like this family in Tete province—are internally displaced. USCR/H. Ruiz

of Arabs and Berbers, who are lighter-skinned than black Africans. Although the Mauritanian government, which in recent years has sought to Arabize Mauritania, claims that Moors constitute 75 percent of the population, other sources say that blacks in fact comprise more than half the population. Some black Mauritanians, known as Haratines (descendants of freed black slaves who share the culture and language of the Moors), are politically allied with the Moors. Haratine militias armed by the government are said to participate in abuses against the non-Arabic speaking black population, particularly the Peuls (whose traditional homelands straddle the Mauritanian-Senegalese border and who have ethnic ties to Peul-speakers throughout much of West Africa), and the Wolof.

In April 1989, a minor incident on the Mauritania-Senegal border escalated into violent conflict and a diplomatic confrontation between the two nations. Groups of Senegalese looted Mauritanian-owned shops in Senegalese towns; Mauritanians killed 200 Senegalese living in Nouakchott; retaliations in Senegal left 60 Mauritanians dead.

Because of the rapid escalation in the violence, the Mauritanian and Senegalese governments agreed to a large-scale evacuation of their citizens from the other country. More than 90,000 Senegalese living in Mauritania were returned to Senegal, while about 100,000 Mauritanians living in Senegal were returned to Mauritania. The government of Mauritania reportedly used the opportunity of the evacuation to also forcibly deport black Mauritanians with no link to Senegal. As many as 45,000 Mauritanians were either forcibly deported or fled to Senegal during 1989.

During early 1990, an average of 50 black Mauritanian refugees per week continued to arrive in Senegal, some forcibly deported and others fleeing continued human rights abuse by the Mauritanian government and Haratine militias. Most of those who have been deported or who have fled to Senegal lived along the Mauritanian side of the Senegal river. The Mauritanian government has repopulated many of their former villages with Haratines. The Mauritanian government denies that it has deported any of its own citizens, claiming that the deportees are in fact Senegalese who are confused about their nationality.

Skirmishes along the Senegal river also continued during 1990. Mauritanian refugees linked to newly formed paramilitary groups re-entered Mauritania seeking to repossess some of their belongings, including cattle. Mauritanian troops and Haratines shot at them and others crossing the river, and their fire was in turn returned by Senegalese troops. The ongoing skirmishes, and the failure of the two governments to reach any diplomatic accord, raised concern about the safety of refugees on both sides of the border and about the possibility of increased fighting and further refugee flows.

Several thousand other black Mauritanians have been forcibly deported or have fled to Mali. At the end of 1990, the Mauritanian refugee population in Mali stood at 10,000 (See Mali). Some 22,000 Senegalese ethnically linked to Mauritanian Moors were deported by the Senegalese government or fled to Mauritania during 1989. Mauritania has granted refugee status and offered to extend citizenship to 20,500 of these Senegalese, and a UNHCR team that visited Mauritania in late 1989 also found that most qualify as refugees. As with many of the repatriates, the refugees continued to live in impoverished camps near the Senegalese border.

The Mauritanian government has alleged that Senegal has forcibly detained more than 250,000 Mauritanian citizens who wish to repatriate, but separate investigations by two international human rights organizations have failed to confirm the allegations. The Mauritanian authorities have been accused of fabricating the allegations to divert international attention away from its own abuses against its black citizens.

Mozambique

There were both positive and negative developments with implications for Mozambique's refugee, displaced, and war-affected populations during 1990. The Mozambican government finally held direct peace talks with leaders of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) (after many false starts), and adopted a new constitution guaranteeing multiparty elections, freedom of the press, and an independent judiciary. These two actions raised at least guarded hopes that the brutal civil war would, at last, be nearing an end.

But the year also saw further death, destruction, and displacement, and international aid for those affected by the war fell well below the need. Virtually every news report from Mozambique detailed further atrocities committed by RENAMO, increasing numbers of displaced and malnourished people, and problems in getting food and other assistance to those in need.

Estimates of the number of Mozambicans who have died directly or indirectly as a result of the conflict, which is now in its second decade, reach as high as 900,000, nearly half children. Thousands of civilians have been tortured or maimed, and many others, particularly women and children, have been kidnapped. Although government troops are not without blame, RENAMO is considered responsible for most of the killings and atrocities committed against civilians.

According to the Mozambican government, nearly 2 million Mozambicans are internally displaced. Of those, 1.4 million are living in areas accessible to the government and are dependent on international assistance; 2.4 million other Mozambicans who have been affected by the conflict also require assistance. More than 1.4 million Mozambicans are living as refugees in neighboring countries.

It is not just the displaced and war-affected who are suffering, however. UN officials say that 90 percent of all Mozambicans live below the poverty level (60 percent in extreme poverty), and malnutrition is widespread—an estimated 58 percent in Zambezia, the country's most populous province. Many of the country's schools, hospitals, and other public buildings have been destroyed.

While Mozambicans who have fled to neighboring countries receive assistance through established international channels, internally displaced and war-affected Mozambicans must rely on whatever aid the Mozambican government can raise from the international community. In May, donor countries responded to Mozambique's appeal for help to assist its citizens in need, but the amount of aid pledged was $30 million short of the amount required to meet basic needs. According to a December 1990 World Food Program report, "Distribution of relief food continues below target in all areas except Zambezia." The report warned that there would be a crisis by mid-1991 if donors did not respond more generously to Mozambique's food needs.

Getting assistance to those in need is a formidable task. Deliveries by road are difficult due to RENAMO attacks and because of the destruction of trucks, roads, and bridges. In areas completely inaccessible by road, food has to be transported by air, a very expensive undertaking that the government can ill afford and that in any case can only partially meet the need. Government inefficiency has also been a problem, and, during 1990, corruption for the first time became a major concern. Pilfering at the local level was said to reach between 12 and 25 percent. Some donors, including the European Community, have decided to channel aid through nongovernmental organizations rather than Mozambican government agencies. According to some sources, the Mozambican government, alarmed at this loss of credibility, has taken positive steps that largely eliminated the problem.

In 1990, fewer Mozambicans repatriated than fled to neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the Mozambican government requested food aid for a total of 154,000 returnees (other sources indicate that the number of returnees may be much lower). Only a small percentage of returnees have repatriated through official, UNHCR-sponsored returnee programs. Most have returned on their own.

The number of returnees could increase dramatically—and suddenly—if the peace process is successful. The government has been laying the groundwork for direct talks with RENAMO for several years. In 1987, president Joaquim Chissano declared an amnesty for RENAMO combatants, 3,000 of whom laid down their arms. In 1988, he sanctioned talks between Mozambican church leaders and RENAMO. The next year, the government party, FRELIMO, dropped its Marxist-Leninist ideology and moved towards multi-party democracy and a free-market economy, all long-standing RENAMO demands.

An attempt to hold direct talks between the government and RENAMO in Malawi in June 1990 failed, but a second attempt in Rome in July proved successful. An agreement was reached that RENAMO would not attack the two corridors that link Zimbabwe to the sea via Mozambique if the Zimbabwean troops that have been assisting Mozambique in the war against RENAMO were restricted to those corridors. Both sides also agreed to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out relief operations throughout Mozambique. Although relatively small steps, these were the first agreements worked out directly between the two parties and raised hopes for negotiations to end the hostilities altogether.

If that were to come about, Mozambique and the international community might be ill-prepared to respond to the "returnee emergency" that could develop if many of the nearly 3.4 million uprooted Mozambicans rush home. In a December 1989 report on Mozambican refugees, USCR raised concerns that the international community is not making adequate preparations for that eventuality—concerns repeated in March 1990 by UN officials, who said that donor response to appeals for a potential returnee emergency have been poor.

Namibia

Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in March 1990, the last step in a year-long process that included the return of more than 41,000 former refugees from more than 40 countries around the world, democratic elections, and the adoption of a new constitution.

Sam Nujoma, head of the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—for 23 years the main rebel group fighting South African rule in Namibia, but now the largest party in the new national assembly—became the country's first president.

The repatriation of Namibian refugees, mostly completed by September 1989, was a costly and complex undertaking, with most of the refugees flown home from Angola and Zambia. A small number of Namibians remain in exile. Some 5,000 who are integrated in the Cunene area of southern Angola chose not to repatriate. Drought in some rural areas of Namibia and high unemployment rates in the cities have hampered the ability of returnees to successfully integrate.

According to UNHCR, a number of Angolans who had entered Namibia during 1990 to escape the conflict in their home country later returned home. It is estimated, however, that some 25,000 other Angolans who have entered Namibia for similar reasons during recent years remain settled in northern Namibia.

Niger

Niger is a new addition to the roster of refugee-hosting African countries. In 1989, only 15 individuals were registered as refugees in Niger. In early December 1990, however, an estimated 800 Chadian refugees entered the Diffa region of eastern Niger following the overthrow of the government of Hissein Habre in Chad. Local press reports claimed that the Chadian refugees numbered 5,000, but UNHCR put the figure at 775. The refugees include former Habre government officials and soldiers, but also women, children, and the elderly.

Local people assisted the refugees, and the Nigerien government launched an early appeal for international aid. Nigerien officials also quickly met with the new Chadian president, Colonel Idriss Deby, who offered assurances that the refugees could return to Chad without fear. Representatives of Deby's government also visited the refugees in mid-December to repeat those assurances. However, by the end of December, there were no reports of any significant repatriations.

A revolt by Niger's Tuareg minority in April was followed by brutal repression by Nigerien authorities that reportedly left hundreds of Tuaregs dead. More than 3,000 Nigerien Tuaregs fled to Algeria, and an unknown number fled to Mali, where at least some of them were arrested.

Rwanda

More than 19,500 Burundian refugees of the Hutu ethnic group have lived in Rwanda—where ethnic Hutus are a majority of the population and are also the dominant political force—since 1972 and are integrated into the local society and economy of Rwanda. In 1988, Rwanda offered refuge to more than 50,000 new Burundian refugees, also Hutus, who fled their country following the massacre of more than 5,000 Hutus there by the Burundi army, consisting largely of ethnic Tutsis. In response to improved conditions and government policies towards Hutus in Burundi, all but 2,000 of the new refugees returned home later that same year, leaving a total population of some 21,500 Burundian refugees in Rwanda at the end of 1990.

Another 6,000 Rwandese were uprooted during 1990. Some 391,000 Rwandans are refugees, or live in refugee-like circumstances, in neighboring countries. Aidan Hartley

The exile of refugees from Rwanda, mostly ethnic Tutsis, has endured three decades; it is one of the longest in the world, at great cost to Rwanda, the refugees themselves, and the international community. For the last decade, the government of Rwanda has refused to allow the refugees to return en masse, arguing that Rwanda is overpopulated.

The largest and best known Rwandese refugee population lives in Uganda. There are now 87,000 UNHCR-assisted and perhaps another 120,000 who are spontaneously settled. Some 50,000 to 70,000 Rwandese fled to Uganda between 1959 and 1964, in the wake of inter-ethnic violence between Tutsis and Hutus that was characterized by massacres of each group by the other. Many of the Rwandese refugees in Uganda were born in that country and are the children of the refugees who fled in the early 1960s. Large numbers of Rwandese refugees also fled to Tanzania and Burundi in the early 60s, with smaller numbers fleeing in subsequent years as inter-ethnic strife between Tutsis and Hutus continued. There are currently some 80,000 Rwandese refugees in Burundi, 22,300 in Tanzania, 12,000 in Zaire, and others scattered throughout Europe and North America.

On October 1, 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), whose 7,000 fighters came primarily from among Ugandan-born Rwandese exiles, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The RPA scored some successes, but by late October the Rwandese army rallied and the RPA adopted guerrilla warfare, which continued in early 1991. Some 6,000 new Rwandese refugees fled to Uganda as a result of this conflict.

[Subsequent to the initiation of this civil war, Rwanda announced its intentions to eliminate its much criticized identity card system, allow the return of those refugees who would like to do so, and to move forward with plans to diversify its current one-party political system.

Intergovernmental meetings attended by most governments in the region continued in January and February of 1991, seeking a solution to both the conflict and the situation of Rwandese refugees regionwide.

In February 1991, USCR issued a report on the situation, "Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion."]

Senegal

Of the 50,100 Mauritanian refugees living in Senegal, the vast majority entered during 1989, though several thousand arrived during 1990. Most of the new arrivals fled continuing human rights abuses against black Mauritanians by the Mauritanian government and armed militias, while others were forcibly expelled by Mauritania, as was the case with the majority of those who entered in 1989. The refugees are living in some 220 settlements along the Senegal river, which forms the border between Mauritania and Senegal. They are assisted by the Senegalese government, UNHCR, the Red Cross, and other organizations. Yet their lives remain bleak. They are located in a hot, inhospitable region; food distribution is irregular; and, according to the Red Cross, 20 percent of the children are malnourished.

The refugees entered or were forced into Senegal following border clashes between Mauritanians and Senegalese in April 1989, and subsequent widespread killings in each country of nationals of the other country (see Mauritania). Besides the refugees, another 90,000 Senegalese who had been living in Mauritania were repatriated to Senegal during 1989. Most have been socially if not economically reintegrated, but some

15,000 who had lived on the Mauritanian side of the Senegal River, alongside the Mauritanians who are now refugees in Senegal, live in similar circumstances to the refugees. Under Senegalese law, the refugees have the right to apply for Senegalese citizenship. However, most appear to want to return to Mauritania when conditions permit, even though that is considered unlikely soon.

An estimated 100,000 of the 300,000 Mauritanians who lived in Senegal before April 1989 were repatriated to Mauritania in 1989, and some 22,000 Senegalese citizens with ethnic links to Mauritania's politically dominant Moors were deported to Mauritania.

Besides the Mauritanian refugees, there are about 100 urban refugees of various nationalities living in Senegal. The former president of Chad, Hissein Habre, who was ousted by force in December, was granted refugee status in Senegal. Some 5,000 persons from Guinea-Bissau who entered Senegal as refugees in the early 1970s are now fully integrated and self-sufficient.

A fierce but little-publicized civil war between Senegalese troops and a rebel group in southern Senegal's Casamance region, which is sandwiched between Gambia and Guinea Bissau, led thousands of Senegalese to flee to those two neighboring countries beginning late 1990. More than 300 Senegalese have been officially allowed to remain in Gambia, but the local Red Cross puts their number at 800 (other sources say thousands). The Red Cross in Guinea-Bissau say they are assisting 1,600 Senegalese who entered that country in November 1990.

Young victim of Liberia's civil war.

USCR/H. Ruiz

Sierra Leone

Liberian refugees began entering Sierra Leone in small numbers early in 1990. Initially, their presence, particularly in light of the low numbers, did not create a burden for Sierra Leone. But in midsummer the trickle quickly turned into a tide as fighting intensified in and around Monrovia, the Liberian capital, and many of the residents of that city and surrounding areas fled to Sierra Leone. Between July and September, more than 1,000 refugees were crossing the border each day. By late 1990, UNHCR estimated that the number of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone had reached 125,000.

USCR made a site visit to Sierra Leone in October-November 1990. Government ministers told USCR that the presence of the refugees was hampering the government's ability to provide even basic services to its own people in the refugee-impacted area, and had caused rents and prices of basic commodities to rise in the capital, Freetown, and other towns where urban Liberian refugees are living. They appealed for international aid not only for refugees but for the affected local people. Other sources reported that the economic and social problems created by the refugee influx were creating grave political problems for the government.

As in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, the vast majority of the refugees are living in the homes of local people in the border areas, but some 10,000 to 15,000 are living in Freetown. Some of them are former residents of Monrovia who drove or flew to Freetown in the early stages of the crisis and who have been self-supporting (although in many cases their private funds are depleted). Others entered at the time of the large influxes but bypassed the rural border areas and continued to Freetown. Some arrived in Freetown aboard ships that ferried West African peace-keeping forces (known as ECOMOG) to Monrovia between August and October and which returned from the beleaguered Liberian capital carrying thousands of Liberian refugees and nationals of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and other countries seeking to escape the fighting.

Most of the ships were deplorably overcrowded and carried little or no food or medicine. Sierra Leonean nationals who arrived by ship returned to their home areas, but were not eligible for the international aid given to refugees because they were the responsibility of their own government. Nationals of third countries who arrived on the ships were mostly assisted to repatriate by their embassies in Freetown, though some—particularly those whose countries do not have embassies in Sierra Leone—remained in Freetown in difficult circumstances. The Liberian refugees who arrived by sea were left to find their own housing or were placed in one of three impromptu refugee centers.

In October, the government clamped down on new arrivals by sea, refusing to allow Liberian refugees and other non-Sierra Leoneans to disembark from a Nigerian vessel that arrived from Monrovia. Several people died on board the ship while it was anchored in Freetown harbor. The ship eventually proceeded to Conakry, Guinea, where its passengers were allowed to disembark.

The Sierra Leone government announced on October 30 that it would also close its land border with Liberia as it could no longer cope with the influx of Liberian refugees. Nevertheless, reliable sources indicated that refugees were still allowed to enter Sierra Leone by land in late 1990.

Although the local people remain generous in their welcome, the number of refugees is too large, particularly in the Zimi area, for them to all be accommodated in private homes. Many are being housed in public buildings such as schools, and in new temporary shelters. They are assisted by the local Red Cross, which is in charge of food distribution. *[In April 1991, troops associated with Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor invaded eastern Sierra Leone, causing both refugees and locals to flee to safer areas of Sierra Leone.]*

Somalia

Beginning in 1978, Somalia became one of Africa's major refugee-hosting nations. Ten years later, in 1988, Somalia became a significant refugee-producing country, when more than 350,000 Somalis fled the civil war between government forces and the Somali National Movement (SNM) rebel group in northern Somalia. In late 1990, the civil war spread to southern Somalia, setting off a new wave of displacement.

Ethiopian Refugees in Somalia Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees, mostly ethnic Somalis, entered Somalia in 1978–79, after Ethiopia, with Soviet and Cuban help, repelled an invasion by Somalia. Beginning in 1984, another wave of refugees, largely Oromos fleeing Ethiopia's forced villagization and resettlement programs, entered Somalia. Thereafter, the government and UNHCR negotiated a "planning figure" of 840,000 refugees, but this was highly inflated, particularly as hundreds of thousands of refugees repatriated spontaneously to Ethiopia during the mid-1980s. USCR estimates that in 1990 the number of refugees was no more than 350,000. *[It has subsequently become clear that even that figure was too high; the actual number was probably below 200,000.]*

For many years, there were reports that the Somali government was arming and recruiting Ethiopian refugees, particularly in camps in northern Somalia. When civil war broke out in northern Somalia in 1988, refugee camps were attacked by SNM forces, and some of the refugees became active participants in the conflict, supporting the government against the SNM.

The refugees' participation in the conflict and UNHCR's need to assure that aid intended for noncombatant refugees would remain strictly humanitarian led UNHCR to cut off assistance to refugees in northern Somalia in late 1989. However, in February 1990, in response to a request from the UN Secretary General, UNHCR agreed to participate in a six-month program to provide emergency food assistance to Ethiopian refugees in the north.

In southern Somalia, UNHCR concluded an exercise begun in late 1989 aimed at identifying durable solutions for the Ethiopian refugees there. Refugees were re-registered and given one of three options: voluntary repatriation, local integration (with a cash and food starter grant), or application for continued refugee status (those denied would lose any further UNHCR assistance). According to UNHCR, 30.7 percent of the refugees in the south chose voluntary repatriation, 68.7 percent chose local integration, and less than 1 percent chose to apply for continued refugee status. UNHCR launched a special appeal to finance the mass repatriation and local integration programs, but received little donor support. Some observers speculate that donations may not have been forthcoming in part because the government had inflated the figures of the refugee population. By late 1990, the program had not been implemented.

Some 4,500 Ethiopian refugees did repatriate during 1990 through a smaller-scale repatriation program begun in 1987. A total of 15,500 refugees have repatriated officially from southern Somalia to Ethiopia since that program began. Another 4,400 refugees still living in northern Somalia repatriated to Ethiopia in 1990 with the help of the ICRC, which provided some relief services in northern Somalia.

[Beginning in December 1990, as fighting in the Somali civil war intensified in areas where the refugees lived, UNHCR personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and assistance programs for the refugees stopped. Large numbers of Ethiopian refugees began fleeing Somalia and returning to Ethiopia. By March 1991, some 150,000 Ethiopian refugees had repatriated; only some 15,000–35,000 remained in Somalia, mostly in Mogadishu and Qorioley. Some 3,000 Ethiopian refugees, mainly Oromos, fled from Somalia to Kenya rather than repatriate. Reportedly, many others were turned back at the border by the Kenyan authorities.]

Somali Refugees in Ethiopia and Internally Displaced Somalis The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia (documented in a State Department report that said at least 5,000 civilians were purposely murdered), led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti.

Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of president Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic

Most Ethiopian refugees left Somalia beginning in December 1990, when civil war there intensified. This woman was among those who fled the camps and sought refuge in Mogadishu, the Somali capital. USCR/H. Ruiz

Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital.

USCR estimates that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis.

[Between late December 1990 and April 1991, an estimated 200,000 Somali refugees fled to Ethiopia and 23,100 fled to Kenya. The Somali influx into Ethiopia comprised both southern Somalis entering southeast Ethiopia (the same areas to which Ethiopian refugees who had been living in Somalia returned), and Somalis from the north—both Issaks and other groups—entering eastern Ethiopia.

Barre and his remaining troops were forced to flee Mogadishu in January (he retreated to his home area of Garba Hare) and the USC announced a new government. But that did not signal the end of the problem. As of March 1991, the government created by the USC had not been able to restore order in Mogadishu, preventing any relief work in the city. Also, the new government was rejected by both the SNM and SPM, and fighting was reported to have begun between the USC and the SPM south of Mogadishu.

The number of internally displaced Somalis increased significantly between December 1990 and March 1991. Much of the population of Mogadishu fled the mayhem in that city, taking refuge in towns and villages throughout southern Somalia. Reportedly, by March 1991 conditions in these towns were very serious, with malnutrition widespread and starvation threatening many. USCR staff was in Somalia in April 1991 to document the situation of refugees and internally displaced civilians.]

South Africa

As a refugee-hosting country, South Africa has—indisputably—Africa's worst record. The South African authorities try to prevent the entry of Mozambican refugees into South Africa, hunt down those who manage to cross the border, and deport those whom they catch.

South Africa is also a refugee-producing country, from which tens of thousands have fled to escape the rigid, internationally condemned system of racial separation, *apartheid*. Also, millions of blacks in South Africa have either been forced from their traditional homes into so-called "homelands" (territories where blacks have been concentrated, which the South African government claims are independent nations), or have had to abandon their home areas and move into overcrowded black townships and "squatter" camps near South Africa's large urban centers in search of food and work.

During 1990, the first major cracks appeared in the *apartheid* system. One of its best-known opponents, Nelson Mandela, was freed in February, after 27 years in prison; one week earlier, the African National Congress (ANC), the group that has led the fight against *apartheid*—and of which Mandela is deputy leader—was legalized, and some of the legislation that shaped *apartheid*—for example the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which provided for the segregation of public facilities—was repealed.

Although some ANC leaders were able to return after decades of exile following the legalizing of the ANC, full agreement was not reached on terms (including full pardons for ANC members, financial assistance, and skills training) or a process for repatriating some 40,000 other South African refugees, including an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 ANC rank and file members—and fighters—living in exile throughout southern Africa. Following several false starts, a repatriation agreement was apparently reached in November 1990, but was not implemented by year's end.

The positive developments during 1990 did little to improve the day-to-day situation of most black South Africans. Indeed, violence increased between ANC supporters and supporters of the ethnic Zulu organization, Inkatha. This conflict, which some observers believe was fueled by South African authorities' covert assistance to Inkatha, terrorized many blacks living in urban townships, and especially in the Natal homeland. Reportedly, some 400 South African refugees fleeing the violence in Natal entered Zambia in September and October 1990. Others who had fled to Zambia for similar reasons in May were reportedly transferred to Tanzania from Zambia. The internal displacement of black South Africans also continued, as tens of thousands more blacks moved to burgeoning squatter camps, now home to an estimated 7 million persons.

Mozambicans have entered South Africa in search of work for many decades. Today, an estimated 50,000 Mozambicans work legally in South Africa, primarily in diamond mines. But more than 200,000 other Mozambicans may have entered South Africa partly in search of work, but also to escape the continuing civil war and terrorization of civilians in their homeland. The South African government regards these Mozambicans as illegal aliens. It has told USCR that Mozambicans "enter neighboring states illegally, mainly in order to find employment. . . It is an indisputable fact that the economy of a developing country such as the Republic of South Africa cannot absorb an evergrowing illegal alien element." However, given that the million-plus Mozambicans who have fled to other southern African countries (all far poorer than South Africa) are considered to be refugees, USCR believes these 200,000 Mozambicans in South Africa should be considered refugees as well.

For Mozambican refugees, getting into South Africa has been no easy feat. Along sections of the border, South Africa erected a fence that since 1986 was electrified. Following repeated complaints from the international community (including, on many occasions, from USCR), in 1990 South Africa finally turned off the electricity that had killed dozens if not hundreds trying to enter. Crossing the fence has only been one hurdle, however. Refugees then have had to cross a national park, risking attack by wild animals or capture by South African border guards.

Only those refugees who have reached the homelands of Gazankulu and Kangwane have found even marginal safety and assistance. The leaders of those homelands, in defiance of the South African authorities, generally have allowed the Mozambicans to stay. But these homelands are poor, and the refugees' presence has created economic and social problems. In the absence of a UNHCR presence in South Africa, they have been assisted—on a very limited basis—by a South African voluntary agency called Operation Hunger, and by international groups such as the ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontieres. Despite that assistance, the refugees generally have lived in dire poverty, with little access to services such as education and health care. Nevertheless, they have been better off than refugees in the Kwazulu homeland, whose leaders have not offered them protection, and those in "white" South Africa, who have been exploited and live in constant fear of deportation.

During 1990, South Africa deported 37,100 Mozambicans. The South African government told USCR: "No military action is taken against Mozambicans found by the South African Defense Force after having crossed the RSA border illegally. They are merely, after being given sustenance and medical attention (if necessary) returned to their own country." USCR considers these "repatriations" to be involuntary. Reports in the South African and U.S. press late in 1990 suggested that some Mozambican refugees had been caught up in a virtual "slave trade," working without pay for white farmers who have threatened to turn them over to the police for deportation if they complained. In September, USCR wrote to president F. W. de Klerk, "There is a great need for . . . UNHCR to establish a presence in South Africa to carry out its humanitarian mandate" of protection and assistance to Mozambican refugees. USCR also urged UNHCR participation in the repatriation of South African refugees. Both the government and the ANC have at times opposed UNHCR involvement, and the November repatriation agreement reached by the government and the ANC did not include UNHCR involvement. *[In February 1991, a UNHCR team visited South Africa to further discuss possible UNHCR involvement in the repatriation with the South African authorities, the ANC and others.]*

Some 1,000 refugees from Lesotho who fled their country following a coup in 1986 live a precarious existence in South Africa. Most live among the local population without any form of protection or assistance.

Sudan

Following yet another year of civil war, widespread human rights abuses, internal and external displacement of civilians, blocking of relief efforts, and devastating drought, Sudan was once again on the brink of a major humanitarian catastrophe at the end of 1990. An estimated 9 million people in Sudan (mostly Sudanese, but also including refugees from neighboring countries) were at risk due to severe food shortages, and the Sudan government, which for much of 1990 denied that there was any food emergency, consistently blocked international relief efforts aimed at assisting those in need.

Understanding the total picture regarding uprooted and at-risk civilians in Sudan is difficult because of the many different groups involved, their different locations, and the varying causes of their displacement or vulnerability. The main groups include: refugees from other countries living in Sudan; refugees from Sudan living in neighboring countries; war displaced southerners, still in the south or elsewhere in the country, including northern cities; and civilians in the north and west primarily affected by the drought.

Refugees in Sudan In late 1990, there were some 726,500 refugees in Sudan (Ethiopia: 700,000; Chad: 20,000; Uganda 2,000; Zaire: 4,500). Ethiopian refugees first arrived in 1967, when the conflict between Eritrean separatists and the Ethiopian government began. In recent years, hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled Ethiopia to escape not only the Eritrean conflict, but also conflicts between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan and Oromo liberation groups, as well as human rights abuses in Ethiopia and famines resulting from drought but exacerbated by civil war that have killed more than a million Ethiopians.

According to the Sudanese government and UNHCR, there are 700,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. Of these, UNHCR assists 370,000 in reception centers and agricultural settlements, while the remainder are self-settled in border areas or major towns and cities. It should be noted, however, that 700,000 is a "planning figure," and does not represent any actual census of the refugees. Annual births, deaths, and arrivals or departures of individuals or small groups are not taken into account. Only large movements, particularly influxes, are incorporated into the planning figure, which is—at best—rough.

The situation of the assisted refugees deteriorated during 1989-1990 as a continuing funding crisis forced UNHCR to cut back on services. Malnutrition rates among refugee children rose during that period. During 1990, thousands more Ethiopian refugees entered Sudan, while some refugees returned to Ethiopia, particularly to areas controlled by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

The security of urban Ethiopian refugees has been compromised, and the hopes of many of them for resettlement to the United States during 1991 dashed, as a result of the government of Sudan's poor human rights record and fallout from the Gulf war. Ethiopian refugees living in Khartoum have sometimes been caught up in government campaigns to clear displaced southern Sudanese from shantytowns in and around the Sudanese capital and to end the making and selling of home-made beer, one of the few sources of income available to many of the southern displaced and Ethiopian refugees in the cities. *[The Government of Sudan's sympathy for Iraq in the Gulf war, and the fueling of anti-American sentiment, led to the evacuation in January 1991 of most Americans from Sudan, including U.S. Embassy and NGO personnel connected with processing of refugees for resettlement to the United States.]*

Most of the 120,000 Chadians who sought refuge in Sudan in 1984–85 have either returned home or left UNHCR refugee camps and settled in border areas. However, an estimated 20,000 Chadian refugees remain, living in two settlements and one reception center in western Sudan. The Sudanese government says that, besides the 20,000 Chadians assisted by UNHCR, there are another 49,000 Chadians in western Sudan. But USCR believes that many of those have either repatriated, are nomads following normal migrations in and out of Chad and Sudan and other countries in the region, or are firmly settled among local people with whom they are so closely related that they could not be considered as in need of either international protection or assistance.

During 1990, there were numerous reports of members of the ethnic "Arab" groups (generally lighter-skinned, nomadic, "arabized" people) that live in western Sudan and Chad attacking villages of the Fur and other ethnic groups ("African" farmers living in that region). It is unclear to what extent any refugees—among whom there are both "Arabs" and "African" farming groups—were involved in these conflicts, which left many dead and caused others to flee their homes for more secure areas. It is also unclear if any "Arab" Chadian refugees became involved with a rebel group that ultimately overthrew the government of Chadian president Hissein Habre. The rebels, drawing much of their support from "Arab" ethnic groups said to be Libyan-backed and based in western Sudan (where on several occasions they were attacked by the Chadian army), succeeded in overthrowing Habre in December 1990. No significant move by Chadian refugees into or out of Sudan was detected following Habre's overthrow.

The drought in Sudan also affected refugees who were spontaneously settled or living in settlements and who depended on agriculture for their livelihood. That raised concern that many of them—as well as local people without other access to food aid—would move into the refugee camps in search of food, thus straining resources there. In October, the World Food Program reported that 30 refugees per day were returning to Wad Sherife camp in eastern Sudan. In areas surrounding Habila village in western Sudan, site of a settlement for Chadian refugees, crop losses were 80 percent.

More than 83,500 Ugandan refugees who once lived in Sudan repatriated ending in 1989. Only some 2,000 Ugandan refugees who are unlikely to repatriate remained in southern Sudan. They too were affected by the civil war in the region, which made assisting them difficult.

Sudanese Refugees An estimated 499,100 Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries (Ethiopia 398,000; Uganda 64,000; Zaire 32,000; Central African Republic 5,100). Virtually all of the refugees are southern Sudanese who have fled due to the war, drought, and abuses by the government of Sudan.

Internally Displaced Southern Sudanese According to U.S. government estimates, some 4.5 million Sudanese have been displaced as a result of the war. More than 4 million of these are southerners (out of an estimated total southern Sudanese population of 5 to 6 million). An estimated 1.8 million displaced persons are living in shantytowns in and around Khartoum, another 350,000 are located in the so-called "transition zone" between north and south, and 2.35 million are displaced within the south, both in rebel-held areas and in the few government-held garrison towns in southern Sudan, principally Juba.

The civil war in Sudan, which has cost hundreds of thousands of lives, pits the military forces of the Khartoum government, seen as representing the interests of the "arabized," Muslim population of the north, and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), backed primarily by African southern Sudanese who are mostly Christians or followers of traditional religions. The SPLA seeks an end to the north's economic, political, cultural, and religious domination of southern Sudan. The government has also given arms to nomadic groups that live in the transition zone who are traditionally hostile to southern Sudanese, particularly the majority Dinka ethnic group. In recent years, members of these groups have perpetrated massacres against southern Sudanese civilians.

According to an August 1990 USCR report, "Life is hell for the southern displaced in Khartoum.... [They] are a highly vulnerable group that remains very much at risk, and there are few mechanisms in place to guarantee their protection." Some of the camps in and around Khartoum where the displaced live are built atop rubbish dumps, and conditions there are squalid. There is little chance for employment, little food aid, a poor water supply, non-existent sanitation services, and limited health care. According to the World Health Organization, malnutrition rates in the camps reached alarming levels during 1990.

Since 1987, successive Sudanese governments have conducted *kashas*—campaigns to forcibly remove the displaced from Khartoum. In March 1990, according to USCR's August 1990 report, the acting Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner openly declared that the government would continue its policy of removing the displaced until Khartoum could be called the "Arab capital" of Sudan. During spring 1990, some 2,000 displaced left Khartoum and returned to southern Sudan. According to the government, this was a voluntary program. However, in mid-1990 there were reports that 23,000 displaced were forcibly relocated away from Gedaref, a major city in the east, and in late October, the Sudanese military burned the homes of 30,000 displaced people at Hillat Shook displaced camp and forcibly moved some 4,000 to 5,000 of them to a site 30 miles south of Khartoum, which a UN report described as an unsuitable place to send people. Following this incident, the Deputy Minister of Relief and Displaced Persons reportedly told western aid workers that all the displaced would be removed from Khartoum within a year.

Sudanese Affected by Drought In March 1990, after a staff visit to southern Sudan, USCR warned of early signs that Sudan was headed towards another major humanitarian crisis. In testimony before congressional committees, USCR said, "There are *no* buffer stocks of food in any of the areas we visited.... we could routinely see old women forty feet up in the tops of trees, picking leaves to eat; they had nothing else." In September, a U.S. State Department Famine Early Warning System report stated that Sudan was facing "a major, nationwide food shortage of 1984 proportions."

The 4.5 million southern Sudanese displaced by the war are mostly dependent on food aid. But because of the 1990 drought, which affected every region of the country, including the normally fertile east, another 4.5 million Sudanese will need food aid. The situation is made worse because the government of Sudan reportedly sold at least 300,000 metric tons of food, much of it to Iraq, to obtain funds for weapons with which to continue the war—a war that costs Sudan, a country $10 billion in debt, about $1 million a day. Also, much international aid to Sudan—including bilateral U.S. assistance—has been cut off, and in September, the International Monetary Fund declared Sudan—the Fund's largest debtor—a "noncooperative" state, which means that Sudan will be ineligible for most large-scale economic assistance from major donor countries.

Sudan will require 1.2 metric tons of food aid in 1991—at a cost of $500 million to $1 billion—to adequately respond to the need. However, at the end of 1990, it appeared very unlikely that goal would be met, in part because for much of the year the Sudanese government denied the otherwise universally accepted reports of the potential for widespread famine. On October 3, *The New York Times* quoted one Sudanese government official as saying, "We will produce a bit more than necessary for our consumption." On October 29, Sudanese radio reported that the leader of Sudan's ruling military junta, Lt. General Omar al Bashir, had said that Sudan was not suffering from famine and that "reports carried by the foreign news media about a famine in Sudan or an impending one are simply aimed at distorting Sudan's image." The Sudanese government not only denied the impending famine; throughout 1990 it blocked international relief efforts.

In 1989, the government and the SPLA had cooperated in allowing a UN-led effort named Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)—largely implemented by international organizations and nongovernmental organizations—that helped deliver aid to hundreds of thousands at risk. OLS arose after more than 250,000 Sudanese had died in 1988 as a result of war-induced famine. *OLS* faced many operational roadblocks. It was also criticized for its bias towards the government. Yet, a review of its work concluded that it succeeded in restraining the use of food as a weapon in the conflict in 1989. Its successor in 1990, OLS II, did not fare nearly as well. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa on October 25, 1990, USCR laid much of the blame for OLS II's failure on the government of Sudan. USCR said, "A clear pattern of government action emerged in which relief trains didn't move, relief barges remained moored . . . flights by the ICRC were increasingly curtailed. This pattern . . . culminated with the bombing of OLS relief sites in south Sudan last month."

The United States and other donors became exasperated with the Sudanese government's uncooperativeness and increasing reports of corruption affecting relief supplies. In September 1990, the government reportedly confiscated 40,000 metric tons of U.S. food. In October, the State Department reported that U.S. and other private agencies attempting to carry out relief work in Sudan faced increased administrative difficulties and that the operations of the ICRC "were virtually at a standstill." And in December, 19,000 metric tons of food delivered to Sudan by WFP had reportedly disappeared, although a small amount apparently reached civilians.

By the end of 1990, the prospects for Sudanese civilians for 1991 had become extremely grim. A report by the World Health Organization and the Sudanese Ministry of Health on nutrition status in Red Sea province indicated a total absence of children between six months and three years of age. They were all presumed dead. Relief experts estimated that, even with maximum Sudanese government cooperation in 1991, it would be too late to meet more than two-thirds of the need. On December 19, *The New York Times* reported that a senior U.S. official in Khartoum said, "It is all but certain that hundreds of thousands of people in the Sudan are going to die of starvation in 1991."

Victims of Human Rights Abuses Since it seized power from the democratically elected government of Sadik al Mahdi in June 1989, the Bashir government—a regime with a very narrow political base largely rooted in Islamic fundamentalism—has undertaken a campaign of undermining Sudan's democratic institutions. It has banned political parties, newspapers, and trade associations, has purged moderates from the

The plight of war-affected southern Sudanese worsened in 1990. More than 4.5 million are displaced in Sudan—1.8 million in northern Sudan—where they receive virtually no assistance from the Khartoum government; half a million are refugees in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zaire. USCR/R. Winter



military and universities, and has eliminated women from most public positions. Africa Watch and Amnesty International have repeatedly documented human rights abuses by the regime, including extrajudicial executions of prisoners and unarmed civilians, imprisonment of opponents, and the use of torture. The SPLA has also been accused of human rights abuses directed against civilians in areas under its control.

Swaziland

Refugees from both Mozambique and South Africa have fled to Swaziland, a small and overpopulated country. Although the total number of refugees in Swaziland is not as high as that in other southern African countries, refugees represent a significant percentage of the total population.

There are both assisted and spontaneously settled, unassisted refugees in Swaziland. The unassisted refugees are Mozambicans estimated to number 25,000 (previous estimates were higher), living primarily in border areas. The assisted refugees are some 7,000 South Africans living at Ndzevane settlement and 300 living in urban centers, and 6,500 Mozambicans at Ndzevane settlement and 8,000 at Malindza reception center. Malindza, planned as a transit camp for 100 South Africans, was expanded and upgraded in 1990 so that more of the Mozambican refugees could be moved away from the border. Ndzevane accommodates the remaining registered Mozambican refugee population plus some 7,000 ethnic Swazi refugees from South Africa who fled that country when their home area was put under Zulu administration. The South African refugees at Ndzevane are largely self-sufficient.

Conditions at both centers are poor, particularly in sanitation, but at least basic services are provided. The spontaneously settled refugees, who do not receive regular assistance, experience even greater hardship. They are also a drain on the area's resources, and local people have increasingly blamed the refugees for rising social problems, particularly the increase in thefts.

Swaziland has been reluctant to offer refuge to South African asylum seekers believed to be affiliated with the African National Congress (ANC). UNHCR transfers ANC members who have fled to Swaziland to other countries.

The Swazi authorities reportedly imprisoned two Swazi students who were forcibly returned to their country by South African authorities in November 1990. The two had fled to South Africa after being arrested for participating in anti-government demonstrations in Swaziland.

Tanzania

Beginning in 1989, Tanzania's reputation as a generous refugee-hosting country has been tarnished by its treatment of Somali refugees, Kenyan refugees who are ethnic Somalis, and ethnic Somalis who are residents or citizens of Tanzania.

Some of the Somalis who fled the civil war in their country attempted to enter Tanzania after being denied refuge in Kenya. The Tanzanian government, saying that Kenya should have been their country of first asylum, refused to recognize them as refugees. Somali Kenyans also sought to enter Tanzania as refugees after the Kenyan authorities instituted a screening system that discriminated against ethnic Somalis and resulted in deportations of ethnic Somali Kenyan citizens to Somalia. Members of both groups were forced back into Kenya or arrested in Tanzania. Also arrested were some ethnic Somalis who were long-time residents or citizens of Tanzania. Besides those turned back at the border, some 300 persons belonging to these groups were arrested, where they experienced harsh conditions.

Tanzania hosts an estimated 265,200 refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zaire, and South Africa. Of these, about 154,700 are ethnic Hutus from Burundi, who fled following a 1972 massacre in Burundi of more than 100,000 Hutus. They live mostly in settlements in western Tanzania. Some 15 Burundian refugees have been in detention since March of 1989 after being accused of plotting clandestine activities against the government of Burundi.

The 22,300 Rwandese refugees in Tanzania are also facing difficult circumstances. Many of the Rwandese who have arrived after 1986 are identified by the Tanzanian government as illegal migrants, not refugees. The governments of Tanzania and Rwanda agreed in March 1990 that some 18,000 adults and 22,000 children who arrived in Tanzania after 1986 would be repatriated to Rwanda, although those who arrived prior to 1986 would be given residence permits. UNHCR reported that some 4,000 Rwandese were forced back across the border into Rwanda in an abrupt and disorderly manner beginning in May 1990. Nearly a quarter of those expelled had entered Tanzania before 1986, and, even according to the March agreement, should not have been expelled. Since the Rwandan government was not warned in advance of the expulsions, the unwilling returnees, who were only allowed to take with them what they could carry, received little assistance immediately upon their arrival in Rwanda.

In addition, there are 72,000 refugees from Mozambique settled in the southern part of the country who receive assistance but are encouraged to become self-sufficient; 16,000 Zairean refugees; and 200 urban refugees of various nationalities, including South Africans associated with the African National Congress.

There have been reports of internal displacement among Tanzania's pastoral Barabaig people. Portions of their traditional lands have been allocated for a government wheat project, forcing the Barabaig off their land and depriving them of their livelihood.

Uganda

Once the source of one of the world's largest refugee populations, today Uganda is instead a major refugee-hosting country. In late 1990, some 154,000 refugees lived in Uganda (Rwanda 87,000; Sudan 64,000; Somalia 1,500; Zaire 1,300; other countries 200).

The most recent refugees to arrive in Uganda were 1,500 Somalis (possibly including some Kenyan citizens who are ethnic Somalis) who entered in February, 1990. The Somalis had previously entered Kenya fleeing the civil war in Somalia but were denied asylum by Kenya. The government of Uganda granted them asylum and issued them work permits.

Another 14,000 Sudanese refugees entered Uganda during 1990. They joined 50,000 Sudanese, mostly southerners, who had entered in 1989 to escape increased fighting in the Sudanese civil war. The Sudanese are living in UNHCR-assisted refugee camps. Other Sudanese have also reportedly entered Uganda but have not registered and are unassisted.

The largest and best-known refugee group in Uganda, however, is the Rwandese. From 1959 to 1964, between 50,000 and 70,000 Rwandese fled to Uganda.

This original group is now thought to have swollen to about 200,000 (Uganda considers the offspring of refugees to also be refugees). Of these, 81,000 are officially registered with UNHCR, while the remainder are self-settled.

On October 1, 1990, fighters of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), almost all of whom were Rwandese refugees living in Uganda, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The RPA was convinced that only by force would the refugees be able to go home. The invasion was an embarassment to Uganda and to President Yoweri Museveni, who was serving as chairman of the Organization of African Unity when it occurred.

Uganda has been consistently accused by the government of Rwanda of being behind the Rwandan exile invasion, a charge Uganda has denied. Numerous meetings between authorities of the two governments, including several at the Presidential level, occurred in attempts to resolve the conflict.

Before the invasion, it was generally believed that, if offered a free choice to repatriate to Rwanda or remain in Uganda and someday become citizens of that country, most of the refugees would opt to stay in Uganda. The Rwandese government, apparently hoping this to be the case, in February 1988 formed a joint ministerial commission with Uganda to look into ways to solve the refugee problem. In 1989, the two governments decided UNHCR should survey the refugees to determine the refugees' wishes. That survey was to take place in October 1990. It was that month, however, that the RPA invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The RPA scored some successes, but by late October, assisted in battle by Zairean troops and aided by French and Belgian military intervention and supplies, the Rwandese army rallied. The RPA abandoned conventional fighting and turned to guerrilla warfare, which continued at the end of 1990.

More than 16,000 new Rwandese refugees, both Tutsi and Hutu, entered Uganda to flee the fighting, but most of the Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda shortly thereafter. Most of the 6,000 refugees who remained in Uganda were Tutsis. They were moved away from the border to an already-established settlement.

In a USCR report on the background to the invasion, USCR said, "Once the two combatant parties agree to a ceasefire and the political framework for proceeding is defined, a regional conference of governments and refugee representatives should be convened by the Organization of African States, with UNHCR fulfilling a primary role.... A viable solution package for the refugees will likely involve some repatriation to Rwanda; continuing residence, hopefully legally secured, for some in neighboring countries; limited resettlement outside the region; and careful attention to legal and physical protection of all."

Most of the 100,000 Ugandans from the Gulu area who became internally displaced in 1989 returned to their homes during 1990. In February 1990, the Ugandan army precipitously displaced and interned 155,000 civilians in Kumin district eastern Uganda, removing them from their home villages with just 24 hours notice and forcing them to move into guarded, make-shift camps. The camps were squalid, overcrowded, and lacking in basic amenities. A significant, undetermined number died in March and April. By May, conditions were much improved. According to the government, the forced moves were carried out in an attempt to isolate rebel forces that continue to operate in the Kumi and Soroti districts and neighboring areas. After screening, most of those displaced returned to their home areas. Subsequently, President Museveni visited the camps, remaining for an extended period. This appeared to trigger an improvement in conditions at the camps. Private agencies were also brought in to assist with nutrition and sanitation.

USCR conducted a site visit in August to seven camps throughout Kumi district. By that time, the population in the camps had been reduced to about 54,000, the others having returned home after screening. Those who were, after screening, suspected of being rebel sympathizers were being relocated into a single camp, and the other camps were being phased out. Despite some continuing security problems in the east, most of the country was secure throughout 1990. The major problem continued to be the economy, though human rights problems, including some incidents of civilian abuse by the army, occurred.

Zaire

There were two influxes of Sudanese refugees into northeastern Zaire, an area known as Haut Zaire, during 1990. In January, some 15,000 Sudanese, primarily southerners, entered Zaire fleeing fighting between the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Sudanese government troops (see Sudan). Another 17,000 southern Sudanese joined them between November and December 1990. The arrival of these 32,000 Sudanese refugees brought the total number of refugees in Zaire to 372,000.

A majority of the refugees in Zaire, some 312,700, are Angolans. Most have been in the country for more than twenty years and are, for the most part, socially and economically independent. However, some 80,000 have entered since 1985 due to the war between the Angolan government and the rebel group, UNITA, and to food shortages in Angola. Most live in the sparsely populated regions of southern Zaire, particularly the Shaba region, and in the the Bas Zaire and Bandundu regions.

Some 2,900 Zairean refugees repatriated from Angola between September and December 1989 as part of a mutual voluntary repatriation project between Zaire and Angola sponsored by UNHCR. During the same period, 4,200 Angolans left Zaire and repatriated to Angola. Another 2,200 Angolans repatriated during early 1990, but the repatriation program had to be suspended on March 29, 1990, due to continued security problems related to the war in Angola.

Besides the 312,700 Angolans and 32,000 recently arrived southern Sudanese, Zaire hosts 12,000 Rwandans, 10,000 Burundians, 4,000 Ugandans, and some 1,300 refugees of various nationalities. Most are settled in the rural areas of eastern Zaire, but some 3,000 reside in urban centers.

Zambia

An estimated 133,850 refugees live in Zambia. The largest group are Angolans (98,000), with significant numbers of Mozambicans (22,000) and Zaireans (9,000—including several dozen Zairean students who fled to Zambia in June following anti-government demonstrations by students at Zaire's Lubumbashi University). Smaller numbers of South Africans (3,500), Ugandans (1,200), and Malawians (250) also live in Zambia. Only some 55,000 currently receive UNHCR assistance.

Most of the 98,000 Angolans have lived in moderately successful settlements in western Zambia or have been spontaneously settled since the late 1970s. Their food production continues to be good, although some of the programs created by the international community

In refugee camps and centers for internally displaced people throughout Africa, malnourished, orphaned, and traumatized children attest to the level of suffering inflicted upon this most vulnerable of groups. USCR/H. Ruiz

to aid the settlements ended due to high maintenance costs when UNHCR handed over administration of the settlements to the Zambian government.

The government of Zambia prefers that refugees live in settlements and offers them land and food assistance for up to two years if they move to a settlement. Recently, the settlement for Angolan refugees at Maheba was expanded to accommodate a further 10,000 refugees. Nevertheless, more than 50 percent of Angolan refugees remain spontaneously settled in rural border areas. A UNHCR plan to assist some Angolan refugees to repatriate to Angola was cancelled in April due to security problems in the returnees' home areas and to the agency's financial constraints.

Although there was no significant new influx of refugees from Mozambique during the year, the Zambian side of the two countries' border remained tense because of numerous incursions into Zambia by the Mozambican guerrilla group, RENAMO.

Most of the 22,000 Mozambican refugees in Zambia, the majority of whom have entered the country since 1985 in flight from RENAMO, are living in a UNHCR-assisted settlement at Ukwimi. UNHCR considers Ukwimi a model refugee settlement, and Zambia's policy of making land available to the refugees there and at Angolan refugee settlements has been widely praised. Although UNHCR had anticipated that Ukwimi's residents would be self-sufficient by late 1990, the agency's own funding problems have postponed that goal. UNHCR assistance to Ukwimi is scheduled to end in 1992.

Of the 3,500 South African refugees in Zambia, 400 were new arrivals in September and October 1990. They fled inter-ethnic violence in South Africa's Natal homeland. Other South Africans who arrived in Zambia in May were transferred to Tanzania in keeping with the Zambian government's policy of not allowing South African exiles to remain permanently in Zambia.

Zimbabwe

The number of refugees living in UNHCR-assisted camps in Zimbabwe increased in 1990, a result of more refugees fleeing Mozambique and a high birth rate within the camps. A fifth refugee camp was opened during the year to accommodate the increasing number of refugees. The total population in the five refugee camps grew to more than 85,000, though an estimated 100,000 other Mozambican refugees resided outside the camps.

Due to its severe financial crisis, UNHCR reduced assistance to Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe by almost 30 percent in 1990. The expansion of a clinic designed to meet the needs of 5,000 refugees but serving 40,000 was postponed; education and skills training programs were cut; construction of additional toilets halted; and hiring of new health workers cancelled.

On some levels, the refugee camps in Zimbabwe are well run. They are administered by social workers sensitive to the need for social services such as day care and supervised foster care (even if funds for these services are not always available). But the camps are also overcrowded, and the refugees do not have land that they can cultivate. The refugees are forbidden to work (Zimbabwean security forces round up refugees attempting to work as low-paid contract laborers on large farms). Also, the camps are surrounded by high fences that the government asserts were built to protect the refugees, though others say that the security argument is not justified. School age children find it difficult to attend classes due to the limited facilities. According to a Zimbabwean newspaper, in one camp there are 500 students for each of the 14 elementary school classrooms available.

There were few reports during 1990 of forced repatriations of Mozambican refugees or pushbacks of asylum seekers at the border, but these are known to have taken place repeatedly in recent years, often well out of public view. In 1987, following numerous cross-border attacks by Mozambican RENAMO guerrillas, Zimbabwe vented its anger by forcing more than 10,000 Mozambicans back across the border. Following a wave of international protest, Zimbabwe agreed to end the pushbacks and, in November of that year, granted Mozambicans refugee status. Since then, despite government denials, the *refoulements* have continued. Some observers believe that the pushbacks are not official government policy, but that they are carried out by local officials or military units that resent the refugees or who suspect them of sympathizing with RENAMO.

In 1990, RENAMO continued its cross-border attacks on Zimbabwean villages—81 Zimbabweans were killed and another 158 wounded or abducted by RENAMO. At least once during the year, refugees living in a camp were arrested after reportedly carrying out a RENAMO-style attack on a Zimbabwean village.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia

Taking what Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called a "more robust" attitude toward economic migrants, in late 1989 Australia implemented regulations to the new Migration Act, with stricter criteria for asylum seekers. Under previous rules, applicants who failed to meet normal refugee criteria still could be offered residence on humanitarian grounds. It is estimated that, in recent years, between 2,000 and 3,000 people annually were accorded permanent residence on humanitarian grounds.

The new regulations remove much of the discretionary authority that was available to the Determination of Refugee Status (DORS) Committee, which reviews asylum applications.

Asylum seekers now are required to meet three new conditions: first, their country must be listed by the government as having a human rights problem; second, the problems preventing their return home must have occurred or worsened since they arrived in Australia; and third, applicants must show that there is a "substantial probability" that they would be persecuted upon return.

In addition, applicants who are granted refugee status or allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds are now offered only a temporary entry permit and must wait four years to apply for permanent residence.

On June 6, 1990, Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced that the estimated 20,000 Chinese students who were in Australia prior to the June 1989 killings in Tiananmen Square would be offered a special temporary residence permit valid until June 1994.

As of October 1990, about 6,900 Chinese had arrived in Australia since the June 20, 1989 cut-off date, of whom 20 had been deported back to China because of breaches of visa requirements.

Also in June, the government announced that Australia's migration ceilings for the 1990–91 year would drop from 140,000 to 126,000, with the biggest numerical cuts coming in the family categories.

Burma (Myanmar)

In nationwide elections on May 27, 1990, the opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD) won an overwhelming victory over the ruling National Unity Party. Following the elections, Burma's military regime conceded defeat and promised to hand over power to the new civilian government, but spent the rest of the year backsliding.

In its continuing crackdown on internal dissent, and prosecution of the civil war with ethnic minority groups on the borders, the military regime has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and arrested thousands more.

On August 8, Burmese security forces opened fire on a crowd of 5,000 demonstrators in Mandalay, killing at least four people, including two Buddhist monks and two students. In October, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) raided at least six monasteries in Mandalay and arrested dozens of monks.

According to Asia Watch, SLORC has detained an estimated 500 NLD officials. NLD chairman Tin U is in prison, and general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest since July 1989.

In a particularly crude form of gerrymandering prior to the elections, the government forcibly evicted as many as 500,000 people from their homes in Rangoon and other cities and relocated them to desolate, outlying shanty towns.

Although SLORC insisted that the relocations were part of a beautification program, the pattern of evictions indicated that neighborhoods were being targeted primarily for political reasons.

Burma's long-running civil war with ethnic insurgents has displaced substantial numbers of minority peoples, including at least 32,000 Karen, 20,000 Karenni, and 6,000 Mon. Farther to the north, tens of thousands of Kachin have been internally displaced and about 5,000 are refugees in China.

Following the government's brutal repression of a pro-democracy movement in September 1988, in which several thousand people were killed, an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 Burmese dissidents fled to the Thai border. About 2,000 student activists crossed into Thailand, joining some 20,000 Karen refugees who had been living along the border since 1984.

In January and February 1990, about 20,000 new refugees from Burma crossed into Thailand, in the wake of a major dry-season offensive against ethnic minorities and student activists along the border. Burmese refugees in Thailand numbered at least 44,000 at the end of the year.

Following a visit in April to the new Burmese refugee camps along the Thai border, USCR published a report, "The War is Growing Worse and Worse: Refugees and Displaced Persons on the Thai-Burmese Border." In the report, as well as in testimony before Congress, USCR called for diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Burmese military regime until it transfers power to the new, legitimate government. The report also urged Thailand to permit temporary asylum as well as international aid and protection for Burmese refugees.

Cambodia (Kampuchea)

More than 170,000 Cambodians were displaced from their homes by civil war, hunger, and disease in 1990. An estimated 140,000 Cambodians have been displaced internally and about 30,000 have fled west and entered refugee camps in Thailand.

Since Vietnam withdrew its last major contingent of troops from Cambodia in September 1989, the civil war has intensified. According to the United Nations, about 140,000 internally displaced civilians are in need of humanitarian assistance. They are living in some 30 camps in nine different provinces, with only limited aid coming from the Cambodian Red Cross, the World Food Program, and nongovernmental organizations. In most of these settlements, food, water, and medical supplies are inadequate.

In November, the United Nations issued a special appeal for $2.7 million to cover immediate needs for food and transportation for a period of six months.

The refugee experience is new for many Karen civilians who have fled to the Thai side of the Burma border, but persecution is decades long. USCR/C. Robinson

The U.S. Congress earmarked $5 million in 1990–91 to be spent on humanitarian assistance for Cambodian children.

The majority of displaced people have moved spontaneously to avoid conflict, but an estimated 20 percent have been relocated by the Phnom Penh government to deprive the resistance forces of food, porters, and potential recruits.

Every month, between 600 and 1,000 people become casualties of landmines that have been planted liberally by all the factions. Most of the victims are young men ranging in age from 17 to 35, but an increasing number of women and children have been victimized as well.

On August 28, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France—announced that they had reached agreement on a plan for a comprehensive political settlement to the war in Cambodia. Key aspects to the accord included arrangements for the administration of Cambodia during a pre-election period; factional disarmament and deployment of UN peacekeeping troops; elections under UN auspices; human rights protection; and international guarantees on the neutrality of a restructured Cambodia.

Less than two weeks later at a meeting in Jakarta, the four Cambodian factions endorsed the UN plan, but in the months of meetings and deliberations that followed, they were unable to agree on the composition of a Supreme National Council to govern Cambodia until elections could be held.

China (Including Tibet)

Despite efforts by the Chinese government to refurbish its international image, an internal crackdown on political and religious dissent continued in 1990, driving some Chinese underground and compelling many others to flee the country. Two special targets of the Chinese security apparatus were pro-democracy activists and Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns.

In the weeks following the Tiananmen Square massacre on June 4, 1989, in which perhaps 1,000 pro- democracy demonstrators and bystanders were killed by Chinese troops, Chinese security forces detained or arrested an estimated 10,000 people.

In early January 1990, authorities lifted martial law which had been imposed during the height of the demonstrations, but by then, more than 800 people had been convicted and imprisoned for "counter-revolutionary crimes."

On January 18, China released a group of 573 political prisoners and freed additional numbers throughout the year, but exiled Chinese astrophysicist Fang Lizhi estimated in June that at least 1,000 dissidents were still in jail and that only a few student leaders were among those released.

While accurate figures are hard to come by, small numbers of Chinese dissidents have sought asylum in such far-flung places as Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, France, Nepal, and the United States.

In May 1990, China also lifted martial law in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa; it had been imposed on March 8, 1989 following three days of violent clashes between Chinese security forces and unarmed Tibetan demonstrators calling for independence for Tibet.

In a September 1990 report on religious repression in Tibet, the International Campaign for Tibet accused Chinese authorities of imposing "crippling constraints" on the practice of Buddhism, including the expulsion from monasteries and nunneries of hundreds of monks and nuns suspected of involvement in anti-government activities. In June alone, 487 monks and nuns in the Lhasa area were expelled.

USCR visited Tibet and Nepal in August 1990 and later issued a report, "Tibetan Refugees: Still at Risk," which noted the surge in Tibetan refugee arrivals in Nepal in the last half of 1990. From August to December, a total of 1,375 Tibetan refugees arrived in Nepal, more than half of whom were monks and nuns.

During that same period, Nepalese authorities forcibly returned 167 Tibetans, including 43 people on August 7 who subsequently were imprisoned by Chinese authorities at Gutsa prison in Lhasa.

About 280,000 Vietnamese have been living in southern China since 1979, more than half of whom are being assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) local integration projects. In 1990, UNHCR allocated $4 million to cover such things as school construction, skills training, animal husbandry, and water system development for 160,000 refugees.

Hong Kong

Vietnamese boat flows to Hong Kong declined dramatically in 1990 compared to the previous year when more than 34,000 boat people poured in. This past year, about 6,500 Vietnamese sought asylum in Hong Kong. Government officials credited the decline to new outreach efforts by UNHCR in Vietnam, particularly in the north, and to the hard-line message sent by the forced repatriation of 51 boat people in December 1989. It was also reported that Vietnam and China had taken steps to curb the clandestine exodus.

A majority of the new arrivals were ethnic Chinese from southern Vietnam, who travelled overland through China most of the way. About 200 Vietnamese who had originally resettled in China sought asylum in Hong Kong in 1990 but were repatriated to China.

The number of arrivals in 1990 was more than offset by the 13,400 departures for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, but at the end of the year, there were still more than 52,000 Vietnamese crowded into a dozen detention centers and camps throughout the British colony. About 65 percent of the boat people in Hong Kong are women and children under the age of 16.

Following a visit to the boat people camps, a delegation of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children denounced the living conditions as "inhumane." Their report noted, "Surrounded by barbed wire and towering fences, the facilities are overcrowded, dangerous, and unsanitary. Women are subject to violence and sexual harassment. Children suffer such effects of incarceration in subhuman conditions as malnutrition and recurrent nightmares."

Among the most vulnerable populations in the camps and detention centers are more than 2,500 unaccompanied minors. Although the regional Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) established special procedures to expedite processing of these cases—either for resettlement or repatriation depending upon "the best interest of the child"—the reality is that most unaccompanied minors must wait two to three years in the camps before a decision is made on their case.

Hong Kong immigration officers have been screening all Vietnamese boat arrivals since June 1988 to determine whether they qualify for refugee status. As of December 1990, about 3,800 people had been screened in as refugees and were allowed to seek resettlement elsewhere. Another 14,100 had been screened out and faced eventual return to Vietnam.

The Hong Kong government pointed to several procedural improvements and a 20 percent approval rate after appeal (up from about 10 percent the previous year) as signs that the screening program is credible and fair. In a July 1990 report, Amnesty International acknowledged the efforts to improve screening, but said the process "still lacks some of the safeguards . . . essential to ensure a fair refugee determination procedure. As such, it cannot be relied on to identify all those who would be at risk of human rights violations if returned to Vietnam."

Nine screened-out boat people were involved in a legal challenge to the government's refugee status determination procedures. If successful, the suit could force Hong Kong authorities to reopen thousands of denied cases for re-interview. The suit was still pending at the end of December.

At a January 1990 meeting in Geneva on the CPA, the United States and Britain continued to disagree on the question of mandatory return of screened-out Vietnamese asylum seekers. At a regional meeting in July, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker 3rd reiterated U.S. opposition to forced repatriation but indicated willingness to support UNHCR's suggestion for a new category of returnee—"those who do not object."

In late September—following two days of talks involving Britain, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and UNHCR—the British government announced that all parties had agreed to the return of "non-objectors."

On December 1, after months of planning, a last-minute postponement, and a substantial number of drop-outs, 23 Vietnamese "non-objectors" departed Hong Kong on a Dragon Air charter flight to Hanoi.

Every day, as many as 100 Chinese are deported from Hong Kong. Those from neighboring provinces with no criminal records are freed and released upon return. However, during 1990, there were cases of student activists who had played prominent roles in the pro-democracy movement being forcibly repatriated from Hong Kong. One student leader, Liu Xiang, was imprisoned after being *refouled* in April 1990. He escaped in June, and slipped out of the country in December, after which he told his story to the *New York Times*.

Indonesia

As 1990 drew to a close, the population of Vietnamese boat people on Galang Island stood at 20,500, three times its size at the beginning of the year. In May alone, 3,787 Vietnamese arrived on Galang, one of the highest figures in the history of refugee boat flows to Indonesia.

The primary reason for this substantial increase was the continuing practice by Malaysian authorities of pushing back Vietnamese asylum seekers and redirecting them towards Indonesian waters.



In 1990, more than 52,000 Vietnamese boat peop
children. UNHCR

By mid-1990, the Galang camp population had grown to 16,000 and government officials were describing the situation as critical. Poor sanitation, inadequate drinking water, minimal health services, and overcrowded living quarters plagued the facility, which had been built to hold about 5,000 people.

The situation grew even more tense and complicated with the arrival of about

1,800 Cambodian boat people seeking temporary asylum and eventual resettlement in another country. Indonesian officials say they assisted about 200 more Cambodians to sail on to Australia. Alarmed at the prospect of once again becoming a first-asylum country for Indochinese boat people, the Australian government gave $1.5 million to Indonesia for expansion of facilities on Galang. As of November, a total of 1,200 Vietnamese in Indonesia were offered resettlement overseas in 1990 and 218 voluntarily returned home.

were crowded into a dozen detention centers in Hong Kong. About 65 percent are women and

Ever since 1976, when Indonesia forcibly annexed the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, the army has been fighting to suppress an independence movement led by FRETILIN, the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor. Amnesty International has alleged that Indonesian security forces killed at least 20 people in late 1989 and early 1990 in extrajudicial executions.

In October, Indonesia agreed to an observation visit to East Timor by a UN delegation in tandem with Portuguese parliamentarians. The United Nations still recognizes Portugal as the administering power in East Timor.

Japan

Between May 1989 and March 1990, 2,844 boat people arrived in Japan seeking asylum, many of them claiming to be Vietnamese refugees. A few hundred of them actually were Vietnamese, but most proved to be Chinese nationals, farmers from the southern province of Fujian.

The influx attracted significant attention—refugee arrivals in Japan had averaged only a few hundred per year in the last decade—and prompted a review and revision of asylum agreements.

Prior to October 1989, all Vietnamese boat people were given automatic right of temporary residence by the government. Some sought resettlement in other countries; others settled locally.

On October 6, 1989, Japan signed a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR to the effect that all Vietnamese boat people who arrived on or after September 13, 1989 would be screened in accordance with the terms of the international Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Vietnamese asylum seekers that was endorsed by more than 50 countries in Geneva in June 1989.

At the end of September 1990, there were 862 Vietnamese boat people in 10 government facilities awaiting a durable solution. Since 1979, Japan has offered permanent resettlement to a total of 6,957 Indochinese refugees, including Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese.

Non-Vietnamese asylum seekers, however, were not covered in the understanding, and most of the Chinese arrivals—1,520 as of late September—have been determined by Japanese immigration officials to be economic migrants and deported back to China.

In October, three Japanese attorneys with the Japan Civil Liberties Union urged the government to extend the visas of 23 Chinese students who said they had been involved in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and feared persecution upon return to China. As of December, their visas were still pending processing.

An estimated 15,000 Chinese attend colleges and universities in Japan, and another 48,000 are enrolled in language schools. In 1989, about 6,500 Chinese students applied for visa extensions. But from January through May 1990, according to Asia Watch, the rate of rejections for visa extension requests by Chinese students "rose markedly."

These rejections came in the face of an agreement Japan reached with six other nations on July 15, 1989 to extend the visas of those Chinese students who wished to remain. The other nations were the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Canada.

Unlike most of the other industrialized countries, Japan did not offer broad or blanket extensions to its Chinese students, but instead adopted a case-by-case approach with decisions made by the Immigration Bureau. Japan is signatory to the UN Convention and Protocols on refugees, and a number of Chinese students have applied for refugee status, but none has been granted political asylum.

Senior government officials repeatedly have expressed the view that the situation in China is back to normal and that few Chinese students should fear persecution.

Chinese embassy officials in Japan also have subjected overseas Chinese students to harassment and intimidation, according to Asia Watch, including use of videotaping and computer monitoring of activities, passport revocation, monitoring and censoring of mail and telephone calls, and harassment of family back home.

Laos

More than 1,400 Laotians voluntarily repatriated from Thailand in 1990, one of the largest annual totals since the UNHCR-sponsored repatriation program began in 1980. In the last ten years, about 6,700 Laotians, including 4,800 lowland Lao and 1,900 highlanders, have returned home voluntarily from Thai refugee camps through UNHCR auspices. Another 20,000 are estimated to have returned home spontaneously during that same period.

In addition to voluntary repatriation, from 1987 to the end of 1990, 368 screened-out Laotians were involuntarily repatriated under a Thai-Lao agreement monitored by UNHCR. All but five of the Laotians were lowlanders.

A UNHCR-funded reintegration program in Laos has provided all returnees (voluntary and screened-out) with a 10–12 month supply of rice, household utensils, and farming or other work tools. In early 1990, eight reintegration projects were operating in the provinces of Champassak, Saravane, Savannakhet, Khammouane, Oudomxay, and Bokeo.

According to UNHCR reports, returnees to rural areas "encounter few serious problems . . . and in most cases regain possession of their former land holdings and resume their traditional activities." Returnees to urban areas have experienced problems with employment and housing.

U.S.-Lao relations continued to improve in 1990, as a result of Laotian cooperation in the search for MIA remains and in drug eradication efforts. In early October, Secretary of State James Baker met in New York with his Laotian counterpart, Phoun Sipaseut, the highest level contact between the two countries in 15 years.

Despite continued economic liberalization in 1990, Laos resisted domestic and international pressures for serious political reform. The new constitution, which was scheduled for ratification in 1991, would establish a market economy but maintain the one-party socialist state. On October 8, several former high-ranking Lao officials were arrested for openly criticizing what they termed the "communist monarchy" and calling for change to a multi- party political system.

The great majority of the estimated 30,000–40,000 political prisoners who were incarcerated in "seminar" camps following the communist victory in 1975 have been released. Amnesty International estimates that at least 37 "prisoners of conscience" are still imprisoned in Houa Phanh province and perhaps 185 more in Attopeu.

Malaysia

It was Visit Malaysia Year in 1990, and government-sponsored television spots urged Malaysians to "welcome the country's guests as you would visitors to your own home." The government, however, had other plans for Vietnamese asylum seekers.

Since May 1989, Malaysian authorities have been pushing boatloads of Vietnamese asylum seekers back out to sea. By the end of 1990, more than 9,000 boat people had been pushed back. Most of them made their way to neighboring Indonesia. At least six deaths were known to have resulted, and more were feared.

Pushbacks had seemed somewhat hit-or-miss in 1989: on average, about 30 percent of total arrivals were forced back to sea. But the practice intensified in 1990. In January, only 309 Vietnamese arrivals were counted in Malaysia, the smallest monthly total in almost three years. Arrivals in Indonesia, meanwhile, jumped above 1,000. Malaysian navy and marine police, as it turned out, had pushed back more than 65 percent of all would-be asylum seekers.

In February, pushbacks climbed to 77 percent, and in March, 90 percent of all arrivals were towed back to sea. According to refugee program sources, the last safe boat arrival in Malaysia in 1990 was on June 21. From July to December, not one Vietnamese asylum seeker was allowed to land.

USCR visited Malaysia in April, travelling to Pulau Bidong and Sungei Besi camps, and interviewing dozens of Vietnamese boat people—including several pushback victims—as well as officials with UNHCR, the Malaysian government, and the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

USCR testified before Congressional committees twice in 1990 on the subject of Malaysian pushbacks. At a hearing called by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, USCR called the pushbacks a "systematic, deliberate, and dangerous abuse of the right to seek and enjoy asylum."

As of November 1990, there were 15,130 Vietnamese in Malaysia, all but 1,400 of whom had arrived after a regional cut-off date of March 14, 1989 and were required to submit to local screening for refugee status. Only those who are screened in are allowed to seek resettlement in another country. The screened-out are expected to returned to Vietnam.

For those who have managed to evade interdiction, the Malaysian screening process has yielded one of the higher approval rates in the region. As of November, 5,139 people had been interviewed, and approvals were running about 35 percent.

Since 1979, Malaysia has played temporary host to more than 250,000 Vietnamese but has not offered permanent status to any. It has, however, resettled more than 8,000 Cambodian Muslims in that same period. In early 1990, Malaysia accepted a group of 1,040 Cambodian Muslim refugees who had been living in Thailand.

Nepal

Most of the estimated 10,000 to 14,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal fled their homeland in 1959, following the suppression by Chinese authorities of a massive nationalist uprising, in which more than 87,000 Tibetans are thought to have been killed. During the past decade, only a few hundred Tibetans have crossed the border each year into Nepal and neighboring India. Some who tried never made it, having been intercepted by Chinese border guards, while others have been forcibly returned. In September 1988, Nepalese border guards handed over 26 Tibetan asylum seekers to the Chinese authorities.

In 1990, there was a significant increase in the number of refugees fleeing Tibet. In the last five months of the year, 1,463 Tibetan refugees arrived in Nepal, more than half of whom were Buddhist monks and nuns. Some remained in Nepal, while others proceeded to India.

Two events contributed to this new influx. When China lifted martial law on May 1, 1990, it became easier for Tibetans to move within the country. At about the same time, the Chinese authorities expelled from monasteries and convents

These men were among 1,400 Tibetan refugees—half of them Buddhist monks and nuns—who reached Nepal safely in 1990; 167 others were forcibly handed over to the Chinese authorities by Nepal. USCR/H. Ruiz

a number of monks and nuns who were suspected of being pro-independence.

On August 7, Nepalese border guards forcibly returned 43 Tibetan refugees—including 27 monks and 6 nuns—who had recently fled from Tibet into Nepal. The refugees subsequently were jailed by the Chinese authorities in Gutsa prison, Lhasa, Tibet. USCR learned of this repatriation following a site visit to Nepal and Tibet in August and, after confirming the report, expressed to the Nepalese government "profound concern" about the incident and called on the government to "move decisively to prevent further forced returns of refugees to a country where their lives or freedom could be threatened."

Forcible repatriations did not end, however. From August to December, Nepalese authorities forcibly returned 167 Tibetans. One reportedly committed suicide before he could be handed over to Chinese authorities.

In a November 1990 report, "Tibetan Refugees: Still at Risk," USCR urged the government of Nepal to enact legislation that provides a framework for granting status and protection to refugees.

Following months of political demonstrations and violence that left an estimated 50 people dead, on April 8, Nepal's King Birendra lifted the ban on political parties, called for the release of the country's 2,000 political prisoners, and handed over power to an interim government pending nationwide, multiparty elections. A new constitution providing new human rights guarantees was promulgated in November.

In addition to Tibetan refugees, Nepal is also host to about 70 Afghans and Iranians.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea was host to about 8,000 refugees from Irian Jaya in 1990, of whom 4,500 were assisted by UNHCR and 3,500 were living in closed camps along the border with Indonesia. The refugees are ethnic Melanesians, most of whom fled their homeland in 1984 when heavy fighting broke out between the Indonesian military and guerrillas of the separatist Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), or Free Papua Movement.

As relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia continued to improve and attitudes in Port Moresby seemed to chill toward the OPM, the Indonesian army grew bolder. Several times during the year, Indonesian troops pursued OPM guerrillas across the Papua New Guinea border.

In mid-August, Indonesian troops reportedly torched a refugee camp at Ok Bago, capturing 11 suspected OPM guerrillas, killing five people (including a woman and a child), and forcing 640 refugees to flee for safety.

Papua New Guinea occasionally protested these border incursions but reserved its strongest criticism for the Irian Jayan rebels. Following the August attack on Ok Bago, Foreign Minister Sir Michael Somare threatened to destroy all OPM camps on Papua New Guinea soil and to arrest, prosecute, and deport all OPM activists and leaders.

In October, a group of 20 Irian Jaya refugees entered the French embassy asking for political asylum. France refused their request, and the refugees were returned to their camp at East Awin.

In November, the PNG defense minister returned from a visit to Indonesia and announced that the OPM will no longer be able to use PNG territory as a sanctuary.

That same month, 602 refugees repatriated from Papua New Guinea to Indonesia, bringing the total number of returnees since 1984 to 2,400. The International Committee of the Red Cross monitored the return and reintegration process.

Despite the tough talk about the OPM, Papua New Guinea continued to offer local settlement for Irian Jayan refugees. The UNHCR-administered camp at East Awin housing 3,300 people is a settlement site, as are five open camps in West Sepik province. Thirteen refugee students were offered post-secondary education in 1990, two of whom were admitted to the University of Papua New Guinea.

Philippines

More than 19,000 Vietnamese boat people were in the Philippines at the end of 1990, including 8,600 in the first-asylum camp at Palawan. Although the government publicly reaffirmed its commitment to provide temporary haven to Indochinese asylum seekers, it adopted new restrictive measures in the treatment of rescue-at-sea cases.

For more than two weeks in June, the Philippine government refused to allow 307 Vietnamese boat people rescued at sea to disembark unless the United States would guarantee their resettlement within six months. A government official acknowledged that the move was meant to signal displeasure at the U.S. position on involuntary return of screened-out Vietnamese.

The Philippines, along with other first-asylum countries in Southeast Asia, had pushed for involuntary repatriation of screened-out Vietnamese asylum seekers, but the United States and Vietnam continued to oppose any return involving force or coercion.

The immediate crisis was resolved when the UNHCR representative in the Philippines assured the government that the rescue cases would either be resettled or repatriated by the end of 1992. But for several months following the standoff, the number of boat rescues dropped precipitously throughout the region, most likely because ship captains became unwilling to risk the long and costly delays that could result from rescuing people at sea.

As of June 27, government policy required a written guarantee from a rescue vessel's country of registration that the cases to be disembarked would be transferred or resettled before December 31, 1992. But the Philippines occasionally blocked disembarkations later in the year, even when such assurances were provided.

In late 1989, President Corazon Aquino gave her approval for construction of a Regional Refugee Transit Center (RRTC) to provide temporary accommodations for about 4,000 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong who had been assured of resettlement but were awaiting processing. The first group of 32 Vietnamese arrived at the transit center in July. By the end of the year, the RRTC held about 1,300 people.

Fighting between the Philippine armed forces and the insurgent New Peoples Army (NPA) has displaced more than 900,000 people since 1986. President Corazon Aquino's controversial "total war policy" against NPA rebels has led to bombings and massive forced relocations of civilians in contested areas.

About 5,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes near the southern city of Dipolog in February when the army began shelling as part of an offensive against NPA strongholds in the area.

An international and ecumenical fact-finding mission that visited the Philippines in late 1989 to investigate the conditions of internally displaced people concluded that the deaths of more than 300 children as a result of measles and gastroenteritis epidemics at makeshift reception centers in Negros could have been prevented by government authorities.

Thailand

Thailand played reluctant host to more than 450,000 refugees and asylum seekers from four neighboring countries: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Where it once looked to resettlement for answers, Thailand looked increasingly to repatriation.

Of the more than 50,000 Cambodians and Burmese who entered Thailand in 1990, resettlement was neither available to, nor sought by, most of them. Overseas resettlement was certainly a hope for most of the 19,000 Vietnamese and Laotians who sought asylum in Thailand in 1990, but it was less and less a possibility.

Under the terms of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), both groups were required to undergo local screening before they would be offered refugee status and the opportunity to seek resettlement elsewhere. Most applicants were screened out and their only real prospect was to go home.

But while repatriation was clearly a solution from the Thai government's perspective, it appeared problematic at best for most of Thailand's refugees.

More than 150,000 Cambodians were displaced from their homes by civil war, hunger, and disease in 1990, of whom about 30,000 fled west and entered refugee camps in Thailand. At the end of December, the population in the six border camps administered by the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) stood at 311,000, and new arrivals were entering at a rate of 500 per week.

Most of the new arrivals in Thailand went to Site 2, a sprawling camp of 180,000 people run by the noncommunist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The KPNLF has been joined in a tripartite political and military alliance with the communist Khmer Rouge and noncommunist forces loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk in an effort to oust the Vietnamese-backed government from Phnom Penh.

Since Vietnam withdrew its last major contingent of troops from Cambodia in September 1989, the civil war has intensified. In an effort to secure new "liberated zones," the Khmer Rouge removed between 60,000 and 100,000 people from satellite camps along the so-called "hidden border" and sent them farther into the Cambodian interior.

Relief officials speculated that some of the new arrivals in the UN-administered camps were in fact originally from these hidden border sites, but had returned to Thailand seeking food and medical assistance.

Following a UN inter-agency mission to Thailand and Cambodia in May and June 1990, UNHCR estimated that it would cost $109 million to repatriate the Cambodian population in Thailand. Although the operational phase must await the signing of a peace agreement, the UN mission concluded that some preparations must be made prior to a final political settlement, including the establishment of two transit centers in Thailand at Khao I Dang and Kap Cherng; construction of six reception centers in Cambodia; and the pre-positioning of at least 25 percent of food needs.

In the first two months of 1990, an estimated 17,000 refugees from Burma crossed into Thailand, fleeing Burmese army attacks along the border. About 2,000 were student activists, most of whom made their way to Bangkok. The rest were ethnic minority civilians—including 8,000 Mon and 7,000 Karen—who entered makeshift camps close to the Thai-Burmese border.

In April 1990, USCR visited these new camps, as well as the students in Bangkok. In a report published in May, "The War is Growing Worse and Worse: Refugees and Displaced Persons on the Thai-Burmese Border," USCR called for enhanced international aid and protection for Burmese asylum seekers in Thailand.

In the report, in Congressional testimony, and in letters to Thai officials, USCR repeatedly urged Thailand to declare a moratorium on the repatriation of Burmese asylum seekers. Since a Burmese military crackdown in September 1988, Thailand has repatriated more than 5,200 Burmese, either to unsafe border camps or to areas controlled by the Burmese army.

On June 7, Thai border police and army units rounded up more than 1,100 Burmese living in the vicinity of Mae Sot and forced them across the Moei River to Myawaddy. A Burmese officer later confirmed that 766 returnees had been detained for interrogation. About 300 fled back into Thailand where some reported that at least four Karen women had been raped, twelve people had been imprisoned, and dozens of men had been forced into porterage for the Burmese army.

On July 8, Thai authorities repatriated a group of 34 Burmese students at the Suan Phung checkpoint in Ratburi province. Twenty-nine of the students had been on a hunger strike in the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center in Bangkok, protesting jail conditions and indefinite detention. When several human rights groups, including USCR, joined in the appeal for the students' release, Thai officials complied, but then closed off all international access to Suan Phlu.

Late in the year, another 5,000 Burmese were reported to cross the border, bringing the total number of Burmese refugees in Thailand to about 44,000.

Vietnamese arrivals in Thailand numbered 9,400 in 1990, which was offset by 8,190 departures for overseas resettlement. In addition, 173 Vietnamese voluntarily returned home in 1990, leaving a camp population of 15,673 in Thailand at the end of the year.

Under the terms of the CPA, the Thai Ministry of Interior is responsible for screening all Vietnamese who arrived after March 14, 1989 to determine who is a refugee and who is not. Monitored by UNHCR, MOI teams interviewed applicants in Phanat Nikhom camp.

As of November, MOI had screened in 133 people, screened out 756, and 1,543 more were awaiting final decisions. According to a report from the Joint Voluntary Agency in Thailand, "The 15 percent acceptance rate reflects the Ministry of Interior's strict, but on the whole correct application of the UNHCR's guidelines for refugee status determination."

At the end of the year, the Thai government announced that it would be reopening Sikhiu camp to hold three groups of Vietnamese expected to return home: those who have volunteered to repatriate, those who have been screened out, and unaccompanied minors who a special committee has decided should be reunited with their parents rather than resettled in a third country.

As of December, there were about 300 voluntary returnees, 900 screened-out, and 30 unaccompanied minors facing repatriation to Vietnam.

For lowland and highland Lao in Thailand, camp openings, not camp closings were the preoccupying issue in 1990.

The Thai government announced that, as of September 30,1990, Na Pho camp was officially closed to third-country resettlement, except on a case-by-case basis. After that date, newly arriving lowland Lao were sent to Nong Saeng detention center for screening. Those approved as refugees were sent to Phanat Nikhom for resettlement processing, while the screened-out went to Na Pho to await repatriation.

In response, resettlement countries accepted more than 4,700 lowland Lao refugees in 1990, with the United States taking about 3,500 of the total.

Fewer than 1,300 lowland Lao sought asylum in Thailand in 1990, the smallest annual total in 15 years of Lao refugee movements. At the end of the year, there were only about 10,000 lowland Lao asylum seekers in Thailand.

A total of 641 lowland Lao returned home in 1990. Of these, 530 returned voluntarily and 111 were screened out and returned involuntarily. Since 1987, 363 screened-out lowland Lao have been repatriated, apparently without incident. UNHCR provides monitoring and reintegration assistance to all Lao returnees, whether they have come back voluntarily or not.

Highland Lao arrivals in 1990 numbered about 7,300 for the year, although this included the registration of about 3,000 previously unregistered Hmong living in Ban Vinai.

More than 940 highland Lao voluntarily returned home under UNHCR auspices in 1990, by far the highest number to do so since the program began in 1980.

Despite the modest new interest in repatriation shown by the Hmong and other highland Lao groups, the Thai government sought to hasten their decision in favor of resettlement or return by announcing that Ban Vinai would be closed by 1992, leaving only Chiang Kham camp for the screened-out and Phanat Nikhom for the screened-in.

Vietnam

In January 1990, two events foreshadowed the momentous year it would prove to be for the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), which has provided a safe, legal, and direct route to the United States for more than 130,000 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in the last decade.

On January 5, a group of 156 former reeducation camp prisoners and their families arrived in Bangkok, under the provisions of a U.S.-Vietnamese agreement signed in July 1989. By the end of the year, more than 7,000 former prisoners and family members had been resettled in the United States, and departures were averaging nearly 2,000 per month.

On January 10, U.S. and Vietnamese officials inaugurated a transit center for Amerasian emigrants in Ho Chi Minh City awaiting departure for the United States. More than 15,000 Amerasians and accompanying relatives came to America as special immigrants in 1990, by far the largest annual total in the history of the program.

Overall, 26,700 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants entered the United States via ODP in 1990, and double that number were expected in 1991.

The year was a record-setting one not only for departures but for returns as well. A total of 4,300 Vietnamese who had fled their country and sought asylum in the region returned home voluntarily in 1990. Most of those repatriated from camps in Hong Kong. On December 1, a group of 23 Vietnamese returned under a new UNHCR category of "those who do not volunteer to return but who do not object."

In the last decade, Vietnam had sent approximately 300,000 workers to Eastern Europe and another 90,000 to the Soviet Union as contract laborers. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the political and economic disarray in the Soviet Union, the workers have been told they must go home within three to five years.

Although several thousand Vietnamese workers sought asylum in Western Europe, thousands more headed home to face bleak employment prospects. With the withdrawal of most of its troops from Cambodia in September 1989, Vietnam's army—once 1.3 million strong—has been cut to half that size, putting hundreds of thousands of soldiers out of work. The unemployment rate was 20 percent in 1990 and rising.

In late 1990, 16,000 Vietnamese working in Iraq were evacuated and sent home.

In April 1990, the government publicly admitted its intentions to quell internal dissent. Amnesty International reported the arrest of several hundred people in June for alleged violations of national security. The International League for Human Rights accused the government of sending between 10,000 and 16,000 people to reeducation camps in the first seven months of 1990, a charge Vietnam denied.

EUROPE

Austria

Austria underwent a major shift in its role with respect to refugees and asylum seekers in 1990 by ceasing to operate essentially as a transit country for the onward movement of Soviet and East European refugees, and to consider permanently settling refugees within Austria itself. The immediate effect of this change, however, was to close what had been one of the most open doors in Europe with respect to migration from the east.

As demands for more restrictive approaches increased among various sectors of the population, the slogan, "The boat is full," was picked up by key officials of the governing Socialist Party, as they became increasingly aware of electoral gains by the anti-immigrant Freedom Party.

The lack of resettlement opportunities, combined with continuing numbers of new arrivals, led to serious overcrowding at Traiskirchen, which for years has served as Austria's camp for refugees in transit. Traiskirchen has a capacity for 1,500, which was usually exceeded in 1990. When the authorities attempted to move about 800 single Romanian asylum seekers to an unused barracks in the village of Kaisersteinbruch, local residents blocked the roads, forcing most of the men to be settled elsewhere.

As the March 15 deadline approached for imposing visa requirements on Romanians, Bulgarians, and Turks, and a major influx of Romanians was expected before that date, Austrian citizens blocked the road leading to Traiskirchen.

Beginning September 5, visas were also required for Poles. Austria had been the only West European country that Poles could enter without a visa. More ominous to refugee rights groups was the stationing of army troops on Austria's border with Hungary. In the first ten days after the stationing of troops in September, some 500 undocumented aliens were apprehended and returned to Hungary.

The more restrictive approach was codified in law in April 1990, when the Parliament adopted legislative measures precluding foreigners from applying for asylum at the border and allowing officials to prevent airline passengers from disembarking on stopover flights in Austria. The new measures boosted the authority of border guards to make on-the-spot refugee determinations.

At the same time, Austria moved to formalize its own resettlement capacity and legal protection against *refoulement*. Although prohibiting the deportation of persons to places where they have a well-founded fear of persecution, the new law also also made it easier to deport aliens who entered Austria without permission.

By late 1990, Austria was initiating deportation proceedings against thousands of Romanians, many of whom had been living in government-sponsored housing. The plan was opposed by religious groups and by the state-owned Austrian airlines, which announced that it would refuse to fly Romanians home against their will.

However, restrictive measures were also accompanied by other steps on Austria's part to solidify its role as a final settlement country. It set up a quota system with its states so that asylum seekers would be dispersed throughout the country so as not to place an undue burden on the eastern region. For the first time also, asylum seekers were given the right to work, albeit under limited circumstances. The Internal Affairs Ministry also indicated that it was working on plans to admit and integrate a controlled number of immigrants and refugees.

During 1990, 22,789 persons applied for asylum in Austria, but only 864 asylum applications were decided positively. The largest number of asylum seekers in 1990 were Romanians, totaling 12,199. Some 21,882 had applied for asylum in 1989, an increase of 38 percent over the previous year.

Austria's role as a country of transit has not abruptly ended. In the first eight months of 1990, 2,446 refugees were resettled in Canada, the United States, Australia, and elsewhere. Although more than 350,000 Soviets, mostly Jews bound for the United States and Israel, had transited the country since 1958, the number fell precipitously in 1990 as the United States began processing refugees directly out of Moscow and flights to Israel used alternate routes. Since 1945, more than two million refugees have entered Austria; about 613,000 remained there, about half of whom were ethnic Germans.

Belgium

Belgium has seen a steady and dramatic growth in the number of persons seeking asylum over the past several years. The record 12,964 asylum requests filed in 1990 represented a 60 percent increase over the 8,112 applications of 1989, which, in turn was a figure 82 percent higher than the 4,458 who sought asylum in Belgium in 1988.

Most asylum seekers arrived at land borders, and Poles and Romanians came in increasing numbers. Romanians accounted for the largest number of asylum seekers in 1990, followed by applicants from Turkey, Ghana, and Poland.

The asylum procedure in Belgium involves three steps: first, an eligibility examination by the Aliens Office of the Ministry of Justice; second, a determination of refugee status by the autonomous Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRA); third, consideration of appeals of negative decisions by the Permanent Appeals Commission. Considerable delays have been noted at each stage of the process. By late August 1990, some 8,766 applicants were still awaiting decisions at the first stage, and 2,912 at the second stage.

The backlog was due largely to lack of staff. In April 1990, additional staff were hired. The Council of Ministers also approved a draft law simplifying and accelerating asylum procedures. It was not expected to be effective until mid-1991.

Of the 1,849 cases actually decided by the CGRA from February 1988 through August 1990, 58 percent were recognized as refugees.

In August, USCR wrote to the authorities about Belgian press reports that asylum seekers had been subjected to

Asylum seekers in Germany await determination of their refugee claims at the Central Reception Center in Karlsruhe. UNHCR

violence and threats during initial interviews by Ministry of Justice personnel at the Petit Chateau reception center in Brussels. USCR expressed concern that coercion could be used to force asylum seekers to abandon their refugee claims and pointed out that the percentage of applicants rejected at the first stage had increased from 54 percent in 1988 to 79 percent in 1989, and that applicants were being rejected at an even higher rate at the beginning of 1990.

Officials from both the Aliens Office of the Ministry of Justice and the CGRA responded that an inquiry into the specific allegations of abuse found them to be baseless.

Cyprus

The situation of some 203,000 Greek Cypriots and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots displaced in 1974 remained unresolved in 1990. In March, talks between Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and Cypriot President George Vassiliou ended in failure. The proposed settlement would have allowed for the return of displaced persons, but basic political differences could not be reconciled.

In response to a USCR inquiry about refugee protection in Cyprus, an official of the Republic of Cyprus replied, "In Cyprus there are no refugees from other countries." After securing an entry permit, the official said, UNHCR helped "certain persons" to immigrate to third countries.

In late 1989, UNHCR resettled seven Iranians who were threatened with repatriation.

Many Lebanese have traveled to Cyprus over the years for a temporary respite from the fighting in their homeland or as a transit point for onward movement to Western Europe or North America. The number of such "tourists" in Cyprus varies from 5,000 to 8,000 at any given time, according to government estimates. Another 2,664 Lebanese were registered as students or had residence permission for more than three months in 1989.

Czechoslovakia

In its first year of freedom from Soviet domination, Czechoslovakia nearly tore itself apart over the question of its own national identity. Slovaks, who represent about 31 percent of the population, pressed hard for greater autonomy, and the 600,000 ethnic Hungarians, most of whom are concentrated in the Slovak region, as well as smaller ethnic German and Gypsy (Romany) minorities worried about their political and cultural rights in the new Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR).

As nationality consciousness rose, tolerance of foreigners seemed to decline. Often, "skinheads" reportedly attacked Romanies and Vietnamese. In June 1990, USCR wrote to President Vaclav Havel, urging him to protect Vietnamese in Czechoslovakia. USCR also asked that the Vietnamese, who entered Czechoslovakia as foreign workers, be allowed to apply for asylum should they now fear return to their homeland. "If the Vietnamese make no claim for refugee status," USCR said, "then their return upon completion of work contracts or studies is not problematic. If, however, they do indicate a fear of persecution upon return, then it is incumbent upon your government to set up a fair and impartial mechanism for adjudicating their claims, and not to deport anyone until a thorough examination of their claims has been completed." USCR also urged Czechoslovakia to ratify the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees.

In August 1990, the government established a Commissioner for Refugees and began to transform former Soviet army barracks into refugee reception centers. Through December 13, some 1,557 persons had registered with the reception centers. Of them, 991 applied for refugee status in the CSFR and 485 traveled on to other countries. The largest number, 712, were Romanians. More than 100 Angolans also applied. A government spokesman told USCR, "The vast majority of these foreigners are heading for the states of Western Europe."

Many within the government suspected that this was the trickle before the flood. They are waiting to see what will happen when the Soviet Union eases exit restrictions, which is expected to occur in 1991. Late in 1990, Czechoslovakia began reinforcing border patrols and erecting physical barriers along its 50-mile long border with the USSR.

CSFR embassies in Cuba and Romania faced complicated negotiations over the fate of nationals of those countries who sought asylum in the diplomatic compounds. The twelve Cubans eventually left the CSFR embassy in Havana; diplomats successfully managed to fly 51 Albanians from the embassy in Tirana to Prague.

Denmark

Although some 5,300 persons sought asylum in Denmark in 1990, only about 800 of them originated in Eastern Europe. This marks a continuing decline in Polish asylum seekers. However, the number of Romanian asylum seekers continued to grow.

The largest number of asylum seekers in Denmark are stateless Palestinians. In November 1989, the Directorate of Aliens decided that this group should no longer be accorded refugee status automatically. During 1990, some Palestinian cases were rejected, and Denmark's Refugee Appeals Board ruled that Lebanon is a safe country of first asylum for stateless Palestinians. No rejected Palestinian asylum applicants had been returned to Lebanon as of December 31, however.

The movement toward the harmonization of asylum policies in Western Europe touched off serious debate within Denmark about its own asylum policies. In June, Denmark alone among the twelve European Community (EC) states that met in Dublin to sign the Intergovernmental Convention on Asylum refused to sign. Denmark was given six months to debate the Dublin Convention further and has since announced its intention to reverse its previous decision. In late 1990 it was not clear, however, what steps the Danish government planned to take to harmonize its domestic legislation with the terms set forth by the Dublin Convention, terms that would contradict several aspects of Danish asylum law and procedures. According to the Convention, one country has responsibility to examine an asylum request, and that country is obliged to keep the asylum seeker within its borders until a determination is made. Danish law, on the other hand, requires it to examine any asylum applications it receives, but also attempts to keep the applicant outside of Denmark while the determination is being made. Denmark has also accorded generally higher levels of social services to refugees than the other EC states. Both the legal and social service factors led some within Danish political circles to express fears that Denmark's more liberal policies would serve as a magnet to attract asylum seekers who, under the Dublin Convention, would only have a single chance to have their claims heard by one EC country. The debate also resulted in calls for Denmark to be more restrictive regarding both social services and asylum itself in order to harmonize its policies with the rest of the EC.

Federal Republic of Germany

Germany's epic drama of 1989 with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall continued in 1990 as the divided country was reunified. Reunification had immediate and far-reaching implications for refugee protection in Germany.

Most fundamentally, reunification brought about calls for reexamining the constitutional guarantee for asylum, Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, and of Article 116, paragraph 1, which extends citizenship to ethnic Germans arriving from the eastern bloc.

Although 20,000 east Germans per month were estimated to continue crossing into the west, they were no longer counted as "*Uebersiedler*"—immigrants from East Germany—after border controls between East and West Germany were lifted on July 1. Nevertheless, some 397,000 "*Aussiedler*"—ethnic German immigrants from other countries of the eastern bloc—entered Germany during 1990, an actual increase of about 20,000 over those who had entered in 1989.

In December, the governing coalition agreed to propose a bill that would limit the rights of *Aussiedler* to automatic German citizenship. The bill would require them to show that they were leaving their country under pressure of expulsion. As of July 1, *Aussiedler* were no longer accepted automatically at the border, and were required to present a document issued by the German embassy in the country in which they had been living attesting to their German descent. Some German politicians called for establishing a quota system for *Aussiedler*.

Despite the reasons for leaving their home countries, ethnic Germans have never been regarded as "refugees" by the Federal Republic of Germany. Under the terms of Article 116, they have been regarded as immigrants and given automatic citizenship.

The situation is altogether different for asylum seekers who are not ethnic Germans. A record number of such asylum seekers, 193,063, entered Germany in 1990, a 60 percent increase over the previous year. The recognition rate continued its downward trend of the last several years. Of the 148,000 asylum applications decided, only 4.5 percent were recognized as refugees. From 30 percent in 1985, asylum approvals fell to 16 percent in 1986, 9.4 percent in 1987, 8.6 percent in 1988, and 5 percent in 1989. Despite the low recognition rate, about 60 percent of those denied refugee status are permitted to stay on humanitarian grounds.

The largest group, more than one third of the total, came from Romania. Their numbers grew from about 3,000 applicants in 1989 to 35,345 in 1990. About 44,000 asylum seekers originated in Turkey and Yugoslavia, about equally divided between those two countries. Many of the asylum seekers from Romania and Yugoslavia were Roma and Sinti (known pejoratively as "gypsies"). The State (Land) of Saarland rounded up several thousand Roma and Sinti and placed them in an overcrowded, barbed



Photo:
Hungarian troops dismantle "Iron Curtain" fortifications on the border with Austria, May 1989. AP

The Refugee Problem and Hungary
Ambassador Kalman Kulcsar

The world strives for equilibrium—that is, one part cannot live and develop irrespective of others. If differences in any aspect of life become pronounced, then people gravitate toward the better part despite prohibitive legal measures or physical obstacles. Thus, the refugee problem after World War II became global and required a profound revision of previous international regulations. Such an agreement was established in the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, and reaffirmed by the 1967 Protocol.

These agreements also deal with at least two aspects of human rights. On one hand, their provisions provide protection for persons fearing persecution because of political opinion within their own country. On the other, they establish refugees' legal status (rights and obligations) and provide them protection even against their own countries. This international legal endeavor reaches into the relationship between the individual and the state in an attempt to decrease human defenselessness and protect the individual from his own country.

Since the refugees' route led from south to north and from east to west, it is not surprising that the developed democracies were the first to ratify these agreements and were also the desired destination of most refugees. Some of the underdeveloped states and most of the totalitarian or authoritarian states not only refused to accede to these agreements, but—particularly in the so-called socialist countries of East-Central Europe established in the wake of World War II—signed mutual pacts to return refugees from anywhere within this region to their country of origin.

Thus, for years, the burden of refugees became the problem of the admitting, developed countries, except in extreme cases of famine, natural disasters, or extremely adverse political changes prompting mass exoduses—mostly peculiar to third world countries—resulting in some kind of action by the international community.

Today, however, the refugee problem has also gained importance in East-Central Europe. The Soviet Union's worsening global and internal situation prevented external force from shoring up the weakening political regimes of the Warsaw Pact. This resulted in far-reaching political transformations in these countries. However, the differences in the transformation process have, for various reasons, made some countries more attractive than others to refugees and asylum seekers—the differences have created powerful repelling forces. The interaction of attracting and repelling political forces finally led to the movement of peoples between Warsaw Pact countries—primarily to Hungary.

It was in Hungary that the "socialist" reform ambitions and the change from authoritarian rule to democratic institutions were the most "peaceful" and spectacular—in other words, the forces of attraction were the strongest. Still, refugees only came to Hungary in flight from powerful "repelling" forces in other countries of East-Central Europe.

Flight from Romania: The First Wave

The first big refugee movement—one that continues to this day—came from Romania. Because of the Ceausescu regime's severe violation of human and minority rights, the flight of ethnic Hungarians and other groups from the region called Transylvania began in late 1987 and 1988. This region was ceded to Romania by the Trianon Peace Treaty

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wire-enclosed compound. During the Holocaust, about a half million Roma and Sinti were killed in Nazi concentration camps. In August, Saarland limited social benefits for asylum seekers to food and a subsistence allowance. On October 15, Saarland announced new accelerated asylum procedures.

Accelerated refugee determination procedures are in effect throughout Germany for nationals from Turkey, Poland, and Yugoslavia. These cases take about four weeks to complete, compared with about ten months for other nationalities. The number of Polish asylum applicants fell from 26,092 in 1989 to 9,155 in 1990. However, the German states (Laender) as well as Germany's "Schengen" partners—France, Italy, and the Benelux countries—expressed alarm at a German Parliament decision in December 1990 to lift visa requirements for Poles. It is expected that Germany and Poland will agree to take back any Poles reaching the Schengen states via Germany. Germany had already lifted visa requirements for Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, according to the July 1 agreement to abolish "inner" German border controls, because East Germany had not previously required visas for nationals of those countries.

Thousands of the estimated 40,000 Vietnamese expatriate workers in East Germany fled to West Germany prior to reunification. Following the lifting of border controls in July, West Germany announced that East Germany would henceforth be considered a safe country of first asylum for Vietnamese. In August, East Germany instituted an asylum regulation. Following reunification, the asylum laws and regulations from West Germany—in fact, the whole legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany—became binding in the eastern part of the country as well.

Thousands from Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Syria also continued to apply for asylum. Among the asylum seekers were hundreds of Soviet deserters who had been posted in East Germany prior to German reunification. The prospect of a mass migration from the Soviet Union in 1991, when the USSR is expected to drop its exit restrictions, was a cause of concern within Germany during the year. The federal government proposed to limit the number of Soviet Jewish admissions to 1,000 per year at a meeting of the Interior Ministers of the Laender in December 1990. Although the Ministers agreed in principle on a quota for Soviet Jews, they could not agree on a specific number. Prior to German reunification on October 3, about 4,000 Soviet Jews had entered East Germany, but in September, German diplomats in the Soviet Union stopped processing Soviet Jewish visa applicants. In Kiev alone, some 10,000 Jews were reported to have applied for visas at the German consulate. Germany's Jewish Council protested the decision. Only about 40,000 Jews remain in Germany, the remnant of a vibrant community of about half a million prior to the Holocaust.

A new Aliens Law was passed during 1990 and became effective on January 1, 1991. The new law supercedes many state laws regarding asylum in favor of a federal statute. Among other things, the new law abolished appeals for "manifestly unfounded" asylum applications and eased restrictions on employment for asylum seekers.

Germany has granted refugee status to about 151,000 persons, of whom about 82,000 were granted asylum within Germany, about 35,300 were resettled from abroad, about 32,700 belonged to the caseload of the International Refugee Organization, and about 1,500 were recognized as refugees in a third state but permitted to transfer to Germany. UNHCR estimates that there are more than 100,000 other persons who would be eligible for refugee status according to the refugee Convention, but who have not been granted such status due to the restrictive scope of municipal law. The German government estimates the presence of another 310,000 *de facto* refugees—persons who have not applied for asylum or who have been denied but allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds.

Finland

Finland has experienced an increase in asylum seekers in the past several years. In 1987, only 49 persons applied for asylum in Finland. The number rose to 64 in 1988 before nearly tripling to 175 in 1989. In 1990, the total number of applicants climbed to 2,725.

This increase is due largely to the influx of Somali asylum seekers; some 1,437 applied for asylum in 1990. In April and May, large numbers crossed from the Soviet Union by train in what appeared to Finnish officials as an organized smuggling operation. They unofficially called upon Soviet officials to check the travel documents of persons traveling by train to Finland and the flow virtually stopped by mid-August. About 100 Somalis were believed to be left stranded in Moscow, and were feared to be in danger of *refoulement.*

The second largest group of asylum seekers were Romanians, numbering 331, many of whom also arrived via the Soviet Union. Some 194 Soviets also sought asylum in Finland during the year. USCR inquired about Finland's stance towards the return of rejected Soviet asylum seekers to the USSR, in view of its immediate proximity to that country, making it a country of first asylum for Soviets. Finnish authorities told USCR that "asylum seekers from the Soviet Union are handled individually like those from other countries." In 1990, 53 decisions were made on Soviet asylum applications, of whom 13 were granted. Three persons were expelled. In June, two previously denied asylum seekers hijacked two airplanes from the USSR to Finland. Both were extradited to the USSR, in accordance with a 1974 agreement with the Soviet Union, which characterizes hijacking as an "aggravated nonpolitical offense."

Finland admitted 841 refugees in 1990 for resettlement, the majority, 461, from Southeast Asia. Some 365 Iranian and Iraqi refugees out of Turkey and Pakistan were also admitted, many of whom were Kurds.

France

France appeared to be preoccupied with its relations to immigrants generally during 1990 as opposed to asylum seekers and refugees in particular. During the year, leading politicians voiced xenophobic sentiments that heretofore had been the isolated province of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front, which advocate for the expulsion of France's estimated four million immigrants. Jacques Chirac, head of a neo-Gaullist RPR Party, said, "Immigration must be totally stopped," and President Francoise Mitterand said France had reached its "threshold of tolerance" for foreigners, although he later retracted the statement. Anti-immigrant sentiment was particularly directed against Muslims, which included physical assaults and vandalism against religious sites.

Due, perhaps, to the less receptive atmosphere, the number of asylum seekers declined in 1990. Although asylum claims had increased in each of the three previous years, from 27,563 in 1987 to 34,352 in 1988, to 61,422 in 1989, about 56,000 registered in 1990.

In December, the government indicated that Poles, Hungarians, and Czechoslovaks would no longer be considered following World War I in 1920 and again by the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. Before the end of World War II, Transylvania had belonged to Hungary for almost a thousand years. Because of Romania's deteriorating economic and political situation and Hungary's willingness to receive these refugees, a steady stream of people began to cross the border in 1988, a movement which increased in 1989. Between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1989, 35,584 refugees arrived in Hungary from this region.

The first wave of refugees, arriving with valid travel documents, vigorously refused to return to Romania. Then, in the second half of 1988, as Romania drastically limited its issuance of passports, unauthorized border crossings increased, and then became the common means of escape. This later wave was comprised of increased numbers of young persons and those without professional training or skills.

During the second half of 1989, the technical barrier ceased to exist at the Western borders of Hungary. In reality, the border was completely open due to the liberalized attitude of the Hungarian government toward passports, immigration, and emigration. As a result, a new form of refugee movement came into being. During this period, the number of non-Hungarian ethnics—mainly ethnic Romanians and Germans—grew among the refugees from Romania, many of them wishing to settle in Western countries. Considering their stay in Hungary temporary, they relied on government support. Only about 8.8 percent of these succeeded in reaching Western countries.

The leadership of the former German Democratic Republic so strongly resisted the developments in almost all of the "socialist" European countries that some of its citizens felt hopeless about the chance for change and took advantage of the pace of political transformation in Hungary and the opening of the Austrian-Hungarian border to reach the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the transformation of the Eastern half of Europe, it is considered a decisive event that in the spring of 1989 the Hungarian government signed the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to that Convention. With this act, and consistent with the Vienna accord on international agreements, it became legally possible for Hungary to sidestep the terms of the bilateral accord with the German Democratic Republic and to open Hungarian borders to let these refugees pass through to the Federal Republic of Germany. With this action of international significance, the Hungarian government proved that it took seriously its commitments to human rights, and that it was capable of making its own decisions of international importance independent of the Soviet Union. This action made inevitable the changes that have occurred in the former German Democratic Republic. With these, the process of transformation in East-Central Europe from the socialist political system to a democratic one became irreversible.

The signing of the Geneva Convention and its implementation into national law naturally resulted in the arrival of new refugees, namely from the Soviet Union, other neighboring countries (only a portion of whom were of Hungarian ethnicity), and from third world countries. With this, movement from Hungary into Western countries began, although at a lower rate.

In early 1990, the political situation on Europe's Eastern periphery changed significantly. The fall of the Ceausescu regime, as part of the revolutionary changes, brought closer the ethnic Hungarian and Romanian populations of Romania, and also developed a more positive public opinion in Hungary toward Romania. In fact, the events of late 1989 created the possibilities of democratization and the enjoyment of national minority rights.

In view of these possibilities, the foreign ministers and ministers of justice of the Council of Europe at their meeting in Venice in January 1990—a meeting at which they established a committee for the building of democracies using legal instruments—decided, at this author's suggestion, that one of their first tasks should be preparing and drafting the institution of a legal framework applying to national minorities, a pan-European model, and a mechanism ensuring and controlling the implementation and realization of minority rights. Such regulation seems necessary; it appears that the resolution of the rights of national minorities can only be realized in the fulfillment of European integration.

Mr. W. W. Rostow was right when he said in the June 1990 issue of *Encounter*, "The political structure of global community would require greatly strengthened regional institutions if we are to deal successfully with the agenda history set for us." In a special place on this agenda is the resolution of the problems of national and other minorities, which at the level of states has not been attempted successfully.

The need for these legal protections is also evidenced by later developments in Romania. After the initial euphoria passed—as always happens—in the transitional, insecure phase, extremist elements surfaced, and events occurred that terrorized the Hungarian minority. Even if the responsible politicians of both countries realize that the historical opportunity for improving Hungarian-Romanian relations must not be missed, such a transition gives rise to contradictory statements and actions. All of this affects the refugee problem. The refugees of Hungarian ethnicity who have found employment and homes in Hungary want to remain in Hungary and to obtain Hungarian citizenship, calling for the revocation of the earlier bilateral agreement between Hungary and Romania which had barred this possibility.

In the first two months of 1990, the influx of Hungarian refugees decreased steadily, but following the conflicts in mid-March, in the Transylvanian city of Marosvasarhely (Tirgu Mures) and in other cities of Romania, the anti-Hungarian demonstrations and violence caused a renewed mass movement of refugees. In March, April, and May, 7,848 Romanians arrived in Hungary; of these, 2,302 applied for refugee status, others came as immigrants, or sought family reunification. At that time, 96 to 98 percent of the refugees were ethnic Hungarian. Many among them, families with children who left all their material possessions behind, reported serious personal grievances, persecutions, and sometimes threats to their lives. Since then, many ethnic Hungarian families continue to arrive daily with tourist passports, issued according to the new passport decree, who refuse to return. They claim that they don't believe that the recent political changes are permanent in Romania, or that the status of ethnic minorities will be normalized; therefore, they wish to legalize their stay in Hungary according to the norms of refugee and immigration laws.

Those Romanians who have become refugees support the claim that ethnic Hungarians of Romania are living in perhaps one of the darkest periods of their history. However, the Hungarian government hopes that with the expansion of the democratic process, the validation of European norms, and the cooling of passions in this period of transition, the rights of the Hungarian minority will be guaranteed both by law and in everyday practice.

Resolving these tensions should help improve relations between the two countries, in accordance with the European integration process and development, which according to our convictions is in the interest of both nations. In this respect, Winston Churchill's 1940 statement is still timely: "If we open quarrels between past and present, we shall find that we have lost the future."

After the Romanian elections, especially in June 1990, many demonstrators in University Square in Bucharest, and Romanian nationals, who were active participants in Romanian opposition parties, escaped to Hungary. They had been persecuted for their political beliefs and activities. Furthermore, in June, even some Lithuanian refugees arrived.

By June 1, 1990, only 3,882 of the refugees had gone to a third country, and 1,797 had returned to their homeland. As a result, more than 29,000 remained in Hungary as refugees, 11,870 persons arrived for family reunification, and on the basis of earlier application of resettlement, 3,000 immigrated to Hungary, bringing the total to 35,000.

Over and above the political refugees, economic migrants in Hungary are estimated in the tens of thousands. In 1990 alone, Hungary issued more than 20,000 work permits. The ethnic composition of the refugees, the diminishing opportunities of emigration to third countries, uncertain conditions, and the often retrograde changes in the homeland indicate that we have to resettle 30,000 to 35,000 Romanian refugees permanently. Because of tightening regulations concerning immigration into Western European countries, and because of the strong wave of migration from the neighboring regions (Turkey, Bulgaria, and especially the expected numbers from the Soviet Union, etc.) it is apparent that without outside support, East-Central Europe—including Hungary—will be unable to cope alone with her limited resources.

Building a Framework for Refugees in Hungary

As mentioned above, Hungary adhered to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees in March 1989. The Government signed an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to help integrate the refugees. On October 15, 1989, Hungary's new law covering the legal status of refugees came into force.

Since then, Hungary has taken many steps towards ensuring the settlement, integration, or onward emigration of refugees. The government created a National Inter-Departmental Committee for the coordination of civic and social benefits to refugees. With Parliament's backing, it created a Settlement Fund to provide a financial basis for assisting the refugees, and approved the creation of refugee welcome centers. Today, three of these centers are operating, with a capacity of sheltering some 800 persons a day. Should the need arise, this figure could double. These centers cater to all the needs of the refugees, including counseling, health screening, and social services.

The current, massive influx of refugees from Romania has emphasized the need for arrangements that were unregulated during the past decades. Hungary must immediately begin to reckon with the task of receiving refugees over an extended period. Hungary's long-term refugee admissions policy must accord with the provisions of administration of justice for refugees as called for in our recently modified constitution.

To administer the refugees, the Department of the Interior has established the Office of Refugees, along with six other local organizations, with preliminary authority. The responsibility of the Office is to administer the Settlement Fund, review the operation of the welcome centers, and disseminate information for refugees. Any decision by this authority can be appealed through legal channels. Through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Welfare, Hungary actively assists refugees in reaching their final destination or helps in their assimilation. Of course, in either of these two ultimate solutions, the government agencies cooperate with the Hungarian churches, the Red Cross, and with other groups representing the interests and the well being of the refugees.

International public opinion follows the refugee events in Hungary closely—notwithstanding Hungarian news reporting. International solidarity is being matched with financial support, even if modest. Outstanding supporting countries include Japan, France, Germany, Finland, the United States, and Switzerland. With the increased influx of refugees, the chance to settle in a third country decreases accordingly. In the Hungarian view, the European, American, and other overseas countries do not accept the emigration requests, even from the most justified applicants for family reunification.

Hungary has intensified her international activities through government and nongovernment committees, like the European Parliament and its working groups, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, and the Pentagonal Migration Working Group, among others. But much needs to be done to improve this diplomatic cooperation, both internally and externally.

UNHCR opened an office in Budapest in October 1989. The office observes closely how Hungary applies her laws within the framework of the Geneva Convention on refugees, and provides refugees from outside Europe with its protection (Hungary signed the Convention with geographical limitations). Hungarian official institutions, as well as the general public, expect a great deal from the UNHCR office in Budapest and welcome more effective support in refugee matters.

Hungary, as well as the other former "socialist" countries in Eastern Europe, is heavily burdened with financial worries stemming from the political and economic changes it is undergoing, further aggravated by its indebtedness and the latest international crisis. The successful transformation to a stable democratic society requires in itself outside financial help. If, beyond all this, Hungary is expected to honor its international commitments, and if the international community also considers it desirable that the other countries in the region follow Hungary's lead in establishing responses to refugees that conform with international standards of behavior, then Hungary is most definitely in need of substantial financial support from the international organizations and from developed and industrialized countries.

The process occurring in the USSR has already projected before us a vision of the potential future. This vision of millions of refugees coming to the West has already aroused great concern among the Western, and particularly East-Central European countries. Unfortunately, I cannot deny the potential realities of this vision. That is why I must emphasize the vital importance of this question now, and bring it to the attention of international organizations.

as refugees, and that renewals of previously issued refugee certificates for these nationalities would be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

For 1990, the asylum approval rate stood at 15 percent, a sharp drop from the 28 percent approval rate in 1989. The actual number of people rejected was even larger than this statistic would suggest, however, because far more cases were decided, as the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) devoted additional resources to processing applications more quickly. During 1990, some 85,500 cases were decided, in contrast to 31,100 in 1989.

Greece

On December 31, 1990, the first of what became a mass influx of asylum seekers from Albania began to cross into Greece. During a five-day period spanning New Year's Day 1991, more than 4,500 Albanians crossed the border.

Their sudden arrival was of great concern to the Greek authorities, who accused their Albanian counterparts of "using various ploys and blackmail" to induce Albanians of Greek descent to flee. There are about 400,000 ethnic Greeks, out of Albania's total population of 3.3 million. As of the first week of 1991, 1,500 of the new arrivals were sleeping in the open due to a lack of accommodations. The Prime Minister of Greece declared a state of emergency in the border region and urged the Albanians to stay home.

The number of Albanian asylum seekers bucked the general trend of 1990, which saw a decrease in East European asylum seekers and an increase of those from Iran and Iraq. In the six months prior to the December exodus, only 744 Albanians had fled their country for Greece. In fact, as late as December 11, Albanian border guards reportedly had shot five Albanians attempting to cross the frontier.

The total number of asylum applicants for 1990 stood at 6,188, a sharp increase over the 2,100 asylum seekers of 1989. Some among the Iraqi applicants were Kurds who left the refugee camps in Turkey where they had been since 1988.

Greece traditionally has not viewed itself as a country of permanent refugee settlement. But opportunities for third country resettlement out of Greece have declined. In the first half of 1990, only 431 refugees were resettled, almost all to the United States and Canada. This contrasts with the 1,159 resettled out of Greece in 1989.

In early 1990, a new refugee determination procedure was instituted under the authority of the Ministry of Public Order. The asylum approval rate for the first half of the year was 15 percent. Although Greece's accession to the refugee Convention includes a reservation limiting the right to work, refugees did begin receiving permission during 1990, perhaps in recognition of the more permanent nature of their stay in Greece.

Escalating nationality tensions in the Soviet Union have caused tens of thousands of ethnic Greek "Pontians" to emigrate from the USSR to Greece in 1989 and 1990. Upon arrival, the Greek Pontians are accorded full citizenship rights, and neither Greece nor the UNHCR views this population as refugees. Their legal status in Greece is similar to that accorded by Germany and Israel to Soviet ethnic Germans and Jews respectively exiting the Soviet Union.

Italy

The number of asylum seekers in Italy declined during 1990, at least in part because of an amnesty law allowing aliens in the country prior to the beginning of the year to legalize their stay in Italy. During the year, 4,762 applicants filed for asylum in contrast to 13,900 in 1989.

Until the registration period for legalization expired on July 1, some 200,000 persons reportedly had applied for the amnesty. In the first eight months of the year, 80 asylum cases were decided, of whom 50 were rejected.

The amnesty was accompanied by strict new border procedures to prevent persons from entering without proper travel documents. On July 1, entry visas were instituted for nationals of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Mauritania, the source countries for many undocumented aliens in Italy. Within the first nine months of the year, about 59,000 persons were turned away at the borders and 6,386 were deported.

The amnesty as well as the new border restrictions appeared to be in preparation for the harmonization of European asylum practices, a trend that Italy actively promoted in European Community meetings during the year. In June, Italy signed the Dublin Convention, and in December introduced new asylum measures to bring Italy's procedures into conformity with the standards established in the Schengen Supplementary Agreement, which it signed in November.

Italy began refusing the entry of asylum seekers at airports who had valid visas for third countries. Somalis were reportedly turned away in significant numbers, and some were returned to Mogadishu, apparently without having had their asylum claims heard.

Italy lifted its geographical reservation on the 1951 refugee Convention as of January 1, 1990, with decree law number 416, which included a *nonrefoulement* provision, the appeal of negative decisions, but also legal authority to reject asylum seekers at the border if they arrive via third countries that are signatories to the refugee Convention. A decree law, number 39, was issued on March 1, incorporating the Convention refugee definition, allowing refugees previously registered by UNHCR to be accepted as refugees by Italy, and requiring asylum seekers to present their claims immediately upon arrival in Italy. In May, decree law number 135 replaced UNHCR with a government commission to determine refugee claims, and specified that UNHCR's role would be advisory only.

In July, Italy negotiated safe passage for more than seven thousand Albanians who had sought asylum in Western embassies in Tirana.

During the spring of 1990, there were several incidents involving racially motivated attacks on foreigners in Italy. In one incident, a group of at least 60 people, some of whom were armed with iron bars, attacked a group of North African street vendors. The mayor of Florence called some of the attackers who were arrested "good guys" and declared the city center off limits to black immigrants.

[As the Albanian elections scheduled for 31 March 1991 approached, political tensions increased there, causing some 22,600 Albanian asylum seekers to sail to the Italian port city of Brindisi where thousands were left without food or shelter on the docks, causing many to go hungry and become ill. About 3,000 decided to sail home.]

Netherlands

Although in June the Netherlands signed the Schengen Supplementary Agreement and the Dublin Convention on the state responsible for examining an asylum request, Dutch opinion was divided on both. Members of parliament protested the secrecy of the Schengen deliberations, and the Dublin Convention was signed under condition that it could not be introduced before the parliament until all other EC countries—meaning Denmark, the only holdout—signed. In a ruling that contradicted the main thrust of the Dublin Convention, the Dutch Supreme Court held that the Netherlands was obligated to examine all asylum requests, even if the asylum applicant's case had previously been determined by another country.

A total of 21,208 persons applied for asylum in 1990. The largest number came from Sri Lanka, followed by Romania, Iran, Somalia, and Lebanon. Some 13,898 persons had applied for asylum in 1989.

In the Netherlands, up to two years may be needed to determine a refugee claim. Efforts were under way during 1990 to shorten that process. In September, an accelerated, one-day procedure went into effect for Romanians. Those denied were detained pending appeal. The Dutch courts were split on the new procedure, though one ordered denied Romanian asylum seekers to submit their appeals from outside the country.

Refugee reception centers were overcrowded, and in some cases, asylum seekers had to be accommodated in tents. Several Dutch municipalities balked at government requests to provide additional housing.

The Netherlands resettled 596 refugees from overseas in 1989, including a number of handicapped and emergency cases. Most of the refugees originated in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. As part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Southeast Asian Refugees, the Netherlands agreed to resettle 1,000 Vietnamese over a three-year span starting in June 1989.

Soviet Union

As the centrifugal force of nationalism tugged ever stronger at the Soviet Union during 1990, Soviets became displaced from their homes, and, more often than not, found themselves returning to "homelands" whether within the USSR itself, such as Soviet Armenia, or the Azerbaijan Republic, or outside Soviet borders to Israel, Germany, or Greece, depending on the ethnic and nationality background of the emigre or displaced person.

During late 1989 and 1990, each of the Soviet Union's 15 republics declared independence, sovereignty, or elected a nationalist government.

Albanian refugees en route to Germany from Italy ask Red Cross worker in Basel, Switzerland for clothing. AP

Interethnic violence resulted in the deaths of nearly 1,000 people in a 30-month period ending in August 1990, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Deaths, injuries, and displacement resulted not only from inter-ethnic clashes, but also from the heavy-handed intervention of Soviet troops. For example, the Armenian death toll from rioting in the Azerbaijan capital of Baku early in the year—about 60—was exceeded by the numbers killed by Soviet troops after they intervened—about 140.

Persons internally displaced as a result of nationality conflict exceeded a half million. Given that an estimated 60 million persons live outside their own nationality-based republics, the prospect for even more movement grows with the escalation of nationality conflict. Of that number, Russians represent about 24 million of those outside their national republic. That nearly a quarter of the Soviet population lives as a minority group within another republic is a legacy of Stalin's dual policy of forcibly moving minority nationalities out of their traditional strongholds and "Russifying" the republics by sending Russians into the hinterlands.

Although the largest number of displaced people may, at this point, be Russians themselves who have been living—many for decades—in the outlying republics, it is difficult to assess the number of Russians forced out by threat or violence versus those who have decided to move for family and economic reasons. Some already put their numbers in the hundreds of thousands. During 1990, anti-Russian violence was recorded in a number of republics, including Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. An estimated 200,000 Russians have left Uzbekistan alone. In the remote autonomous republic of Tuva on the border with Mongolia, the Russian exodus picked up pace in 1990 as incidents of anti-Russian violence grew in number and intensity.

A migration in the other direction has been taking place among some of the ethnic groups that have been residing in remote parts of the Russian republic since the Stalin era. For example, some 100,000 Tatars, a group that had been forcibly exiled from the Crimea during the Stalin era, have now returned to the Crimea from Siberia and Central Asia, as well as Uzbekistan.

Although migration of ethnic groups such as the Tatars has been motivated more by the "pull" of national identity than by any particular "push," other groups have been subject to harassment and attack in places where they represent a minority—such as Armenians in

Azerbaijan (although those living in the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabach represent a majority Armenian enclave in the Azerbaijan republic, from which they are seeking to break away) and Azerbaijanis in Armenia.

More than 308,000 Armenians have been displaced by bloody pogroms, mostly from Azerbaijan. Nearly 173,000 Azerbaijanis, in turn, have been displaced from Armenia. Most displacements date from 1988 and 1989, though violence involving Armenians, Azerbaijanis and the Soviet army was severe in 1990.

Another half million Armenians were rendered homeless by the earthquake of December 1988.

Although it is difficult to track the movements of those persons displaced due specifically to human conflict as opposed to natural disasters, about 200,000 of the Armenians displaced as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan have gone to Armenia, more than 50,000 went to the Moscow area, and the remainder were scattered among the other republics.

Life remained precarious for displaced Armenians, however, as evidenced by rioting directed against Armenians in the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan following false rumors that internally displaced Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan were being given preferential treatment in housing allocations.

Smaller groups, such as Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan have been subjected to extremely violent pogroms, touching off mass exoduses. Some 35,000 Meskhetian Turks were airlifted out of Uzbekistan in 1989, following massacres by Uzbek mobs.

Some minority groups, such as the Gagauz, ethnic Turkish Christians in Moldavia, have no place to flee. In August, the Gagauz declared independence from the Moldavian Republic, but narrowly averted a large-scale violent clash, despite the rise of ethnic tensions with the majority Moldavians to fever pitch.

For those who were able to leave, flight out of the Soviet Union often appeared to be the best option. But, due to strict regulation of exit visas, which have yet to be made available to the general population, emigration has been limited to those groups with ties outside the Soviet Union, principally Jews, ethnic Germans, and smaller numbers of Greeks, Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians, and Armenians.

A law that would relax exit restrictions, giving all Soviet citizens—except those with knowledge of state secrets, criminal charges pending, or alimony obligations—the right to travel outside the country was expected to pass the Soviet legislature, the Supreme Soviet, in June, but was postponed without explanation.

An escalation of anti-Semitism induced hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to apply to leave, but numerous bureaucratic, logistical, and political hitches hindered the actual departure of these larger numbers. The restoration of consular relations between Israel and the Soviet Union in January 1990 held the promise of expediting future emigration.

A total of 184,493 Soviets, overwhelmingly but not exclusively Jewish, left for Israel in 1990; approximately 40,000 more Soviet Jews were accepted as refugees by the United States, out of a total of 50,716 Soviet admissions during the year. Some 4,000 Soviet Jews entered the German Democratic Republic prior to reunification of the Germanys, but German diplomats stopped processing Soviet Jewish visas in September. It appeared that Germany would set a limited quota on the numbers of Soviet Jews who will be allowed to settle in Germany.

About 6,000 Soviet Evangelicals and Pentecostals were left stranded for months due to an apparent bureaucratic glitch. Having applied for exit visas prior to a change in the U.S. resettlement operation, which switched processing from Vienna to Moscow, the Christians had listed Israel as their country of destination. With the way blocked to Vienna, this group was left without recourse, even though they had surrendered their domestic passports and given up their homes and jobs.

A group of about 1,400 Armenians from Baku were similarly stranded. Although accepted for the U.S. refugee program in 1989, the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not accept their applications for exit visas until August 1990. By the end of the year, they had still not left the Soviet Union.

Ethnic Germans, known as Volga Germans, continued to leave the Soviet Union in large numbers. A total of 147,950 left in 1990, a 59 percent increase over the 93,000 who left in 1989. As with the reception of Soviet Jews in Israel, Germany grants ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union citizenship upon arrival.

About 20,000 ethnic Greeks, known as "Pontians," were similarly welcomed by Greece with automatic Greek citizenship after arriving from the Soviet Union during the year.

Although the Soviet Union has not signed the UN refugee Convention or Protocol, a Soviet delegate addresses the UNHCR Executive Committee during the year saying that the USSR "shares the principles of these documents." The delegate spoke favorably of closer Soviet cooperation with the UNHCR on Afghanistan and Namibia.

On July 31, USCR wrote to President Mikhail Gorbachev calling upon the Soviet Union to ratify the Convention and Protocol. "For too long," said USCR, "refugee protection has been a step-child of the Cold War." USCR told the Soviet president that his country's ratification of these instruments would send an important message to the world community that refugee protection and assistance be "rendered in a more politically neutral and clearly humanitarian fashion."

Sweden

In December 1989, Sweden attempted to tighten its asylum procedure by declaring that asylum would be limited to those closely fitting the 1951 Geneva Convention refugee definition of a person with a well-founded fear of persecution who had "a specially strong need for protection" in Sweden. Although the recognition rate fell from 80 percent to less than 50 percent within six months of the December 14 announcement, significant percentages of those granted permanent residence permits still fell outside the strict Convention standard. Of the 12,839 cases granted permanent residence permits during 1990, only 15 percent were determined to be Convention refugees. Another 43 percent were allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds, 41 percent were deemed "*de facto*" refugees, generally people fleeing warfare and generalized civil strife; and 1 percent were conscientious objectors.

The total number of asylum applicants in 1990 fell to 28,890, from 30,335 the previous year. The largest number, 4,252, came from Iran. Thousands also arrived from Lebanon, Romania, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

During 1989 and 1990, Swedish border authorities stepped up measures to curtail the entry of undocumented aliens, many of whom appeared to be seeking asylum. In March 1989, Sweden began sending back asylum seekers from Lebanon, Somalia, and Ethiopia to Poland, even though Poland was not a signatory to the refugee Convention. Other cases have been reported of Somalis and Iranian Kurds returned to the Soviet Union as the country of first asylum.

Government efforts to tighten entry requirements and asylum procedures were motivated at least in part by housing shortages, and by a backlash among some elements of Swedish society against the presence of foreigners. During 1990, molotov cocktails and smoke bombs were hurled at several different refugee reception centers, and other incidents of vandalism and harassment were reported.

Since 1950, Sweden has issued approximately 190,000 permanent residence permits on political or humanitarian grounds. Sweden resettled 1,482 refugees in 1989 in cooperation with UNHCR; its annual resettlement quota averages about 1,250.

Switzerland

Although regarded as a traditional haven for refugees, Switzerland has initiated a series of restrictive measures during the past several years in response to increasing numbers of asylum seekers.

Some 35,836 persons registered for asylum in 1990, a significant jump from the 24,425 asylum applicants of 1989 and 16,726 of 1988. This increase comes despite several restrictive revisions of Switzerland's asylum law starting in 1984 when limits were placed on the rights of appeal of denied cases and automatic work authorization for asylum seekers was discontinued. In that year, 7,435 asylum requests were registered and the asylum approval rate stood at 24.4 percent. Restrictive measures were stepped up in 1988 with the Verfahren laws, according to which asylum seekers entering Switzerland without proper documents were subjected to an accelerated procedure. Verfahren further limited asylum seekers' right to work, shortened the period of appeal, and instituted a return to "first country of asylum."

Between November 1988 and November 1989, nationals of Turkey, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and India were subjected to the accelerated procedure on the basis of having "presumably chanceless" asylum claims.

Although the "presumably chanceless" designation was dropped, the most recent revision of the asylum law in June 1990 gave the federal government authority not to recognize as asylum seekers nationals of designated safe countries "where violations against human rights are legally dealt with." As a result of this provision, Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs were excluded from the asylum procedure altogether, unless they were able to show convincing evidence of a reasonable fear of persecution. Under the revised law, access to the asylum procedure could also be blocked on several other grounds, including having the option of traveling to another safe country which, according to international conventions, is responsible for making a determination.

However, the new law does afford the asylum seeker an initial interview with a cantonal official; any decision by the federal authorities not to consider a case is made after considering the record of that interview.

The revised law no longer required asylum seekers to file their asylum claims at designated border posts, a procedure introduced as part of the Verfahren laws that proved impractical. The new law also mandated a work ban for the first three months of the process. Other measures accelerated the asylum procedure, including time limits on the authorities for certain phases of the procedure and the option of admitting certain groups provisionally.

Of the cases decided in 1990, 4.2 percent received refugee status, compared with 4.9 percent in 1989 and 7 percent in 1988. About 4,200 asylum seekers who had arrived before 1986 were granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds in 1990, but the authorities indicated that fewer humanitarian exceptions would be granted in the future.

The number of ethnic Albanians from Yugoslavia requesting Swiss asylum increased sharply in 1990. In a 3-month period starting in September, 2,783 arrived. This contrasts with 510 Yugoslav asylum applicants the previous year. In 1990, 20 percent of asylum applicants were originally from Turkey; 16 percent from Yugoslavia; 15 percent from Lebanon; 13 percent from Sri Lanka; and 5 percent from Romania.

Turkey

As relations between Turkey and its own Kurdish minority deteriorated during 1990, the 28,000 Iraqi Kurds in three camps in southeastern Turkey felt increasingly isolated and vulnerable. On "security" grounds, Turkey severely limited movement of the refugees outside of the camps for most of the year; also on security grounds, Turkey forced tens of thousands of Turkish Kurds out of their villages, displacing them within their own country.

In April, the government granted the regional governor for the eleven provinces in the southeastern region extensive powers to evacuate villages and send people into internal exile. Because he was also given wide-ranging power to censor the press and because access to the region by outside observers was virtually barred, reliable information about conditions in the southeast became hard to come by. However, reports have filtered out that Turkish authorities emptied hundreds of villages near the Iraqi border and throughout Van province. Even before the veil of censorship and the official decree granting the regional governor authority to relocate villages, an estimated 30,000 Kurdish villagers had been forced out. The authorities allegedly carried out the evacuations with threats and brutality; many villagers were given as little as 24-hours notice before being ordered to leave.

During this time, the Iraqi Kurdish refugees endured worsening conditions. Turkish officials had all three camps surrounded by barbed wire, strictly limited movement to and from them, and denied international visitors access. Children in all three camps were denied education, and employment was either barred altogether or severely limited. Residents of all three camps have alleged mass food poisonings in 1989 and 1990, causing hundreds to fall ill.

In the smallest and most isolated camp at Mus, only a few people were permitted to leave the camp for a couple of hours per day. Observers have reported that the camp is operated like a prison. The residence structures are reported to be unsafe and overcrowded.

Conditions are considered better at the larger camp near Diyarbakir. Still, its 11,300 residents were crammed into 11 apartment buildings, with intermittent electricity and unclean water.

The Kiziltepe camp at Mardin has been the center of international controversy, as its residents were still kept in tents more than two years after arriving in Turkey. In winter, the temperature drops well below freezing, and Kurdish sources claim that hundreds of children have died of cold, malnutrition, and disease. But perhaps worse are the hot summer months when the dilapidated tents have absorbed the terrific heat and sanitation has broken down. By April 1990, international donors had pledged $14 million to relocate these refugees out of Kiziltepe and into permanent shelters in Yozgat province east of Ankara. But the Turkish government cancelled the plan without official explanation. Reports cited local community opposition. To avert the most extreme consequences of inadequate shelter, the German government in December 1990

Kurdish child in refugee camp, southeastern Turkey. Physicians for Human Rights

donated funds through the German Red Cross and Turkish Red Crescent for 1,800 winter tents for the refugees in Kiziltepe.

For the first eight months of 1990, there were persistent reports that the Turkish authorities were forcing refugees to leave against their will. Allegations included delays and reductions in rations, veiled threats, beatings, and stepped up "security" measures. During this time, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein renewed amnesty calls several times; as the closing date of each amnesty period neared, coercive measures reportedly increased.

In May, USCR wrote to the Turkish government concerning an incident in the Kiziltepe camp in which a number of refugees were beaten and arrested. USCR called for an international presence in the three Kurdish refugee camps, and also warned against the forced return of refugees to Iraq. "Past experience with amnesties announced by the Iraqi regime give Iraqi exiles good reason to fear for their safety upon their return, despite the announcement of an amnesty," said USCR. "The lack of international monitoring of the refugees, combined with the continuing record of repression in Iraq and of coercive measures in the refugee camps in Turkey in the form of curfews, reduced food supplies, security restrictions, and bans on work leads the international community to be skeptical that the more than 1,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees who have returned to Iraq since the May 8 amnesty announcement have done so voluntarily." Turkey did not respond to the letter.

Many of those who did return to Iraq had been residents of the Mus camp, where coercive measures reportedly had been most intense. Although several thousand Kurds have reportedly returned to Iraq, the majority who have fled the camps, which initially held 61,000 in 1988, have moved to Iran.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Turkey opposed Saddam Hussein, finding itself in accord with the Iraqi refugees. The prospect of forced repatriation essentially ended with this new development. And, as the year progressed, Turkey eased its security restrictions on refugee movement in and out of the camps.

Although the United States had agreed to resettle about 300 Iraqi Kurdish families out of Turkey, the move toward a war footing hampered that plan. There have been few efforts to resettle the Kurdish refugees elsewhere, though 350 have reportedly been resettled in France and another 400 are said to have crossed into Greece without permission.

Turkey's accession to the 1951 UN refugee Convention carries a geographic limitation recognizing as refugees only those who have fled from Europe. Thus, Turkey has not officially recognized the Iraqi Kurds as refugees, complicating assistance and protection on their behalf.

The same is true for Iranian refugees in Turkey, but they are not confined to camps, making it even more difficult to assess their numbers and conditions. Although up to a million Iranians live in Turkey, only a few of them have approached UNHCR for recognition as refugees. But it is quite difficult for Iranians seeking UNHCR recognition as refugees to pass through the obstacles Turkish authorities place in their path. During the 1980s, undocumented Iranian asylum seekers who managed to present themselves to the UNHCR office in Ankara were sent back to the border area where they were screened for entry by the Turkish police. Recent reports suggest that the authorities discontinued this practice in 1990 and began to assign undocumented asylum seekers places in satellite cities where they were required to register with the local police.

Hundreds of Iranians reportedly were returned to Iran from the frontier region during the 1980s without having a chance to present their asylum claims to UNHCR. Information on alleged pushbacks and deportations of Iranians at the frontier in 1990 could not be documented because of the news blackout and lack of access to the southeastern provinces.

Iranians with passports may enter Turkey without a visa and may renew permission to stay as tourists by crossing back and forth between Bulgaria or Cyprus and Turkey. Turkey fines those who overstay their visas, but generally does not expel them. Iranians who have legal status are discouraged from applying to UNHCR for refugee recognition for fear that doing so would cancel their legal status with the Turkish authorities. Turkish police have refused to screen documented asylum seekers, claiming that the existence of documentation indicates their fears of persecution in Iran are unfounded. Nevertheless, USCR estimates that at least 15 percent of the total number of Iranians in Turkey are there because of a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran, even if they are prevented or discouraged from having their asylum claims heard.

During the Iran-Iraq war, there had been some receptivity for West European resettlement of "B-status" Iranians who were deserters from the military or evading conscription, but since that war ended, Iranians in Turkey have had fewer opportunities for third country resettlement. Although 2,540 Iranians were resettled out of Turkey from mid-1988 through mid-1989, UNHCR anticipated that this number would fall to 1,600 in 1990. At the beginning of the year, UNHCR's resettlement caseload for Iranians stood at 1,283.

In March 1990, USCR wrote to the Turkish authorities following reports of an armed attack on a politically prominent Iranian exile on the road to the Istanbul airport. USCR raised security concerns for the Iranian exile community in Turkey and suggested that the bar to according them refugee status contributed to their sense of insecurity. USCR suggested that recognition by the central authorities of the right of Iranians to seek asylum in Turkey would also enhance their protection at border outposts and while in police custody. The Turkish authorities did not respond.

[Following the collapse of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq of March 1991, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled toward Turkey, but many were barred from entering the country, causing a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions.]

United Kingdom

The Carrier's Liability Act of 1987, under which airlines that bring aliens with improper documents into the United Kingdom are fined 1,000 pounds per passenger, continued to generate controversy in 1990. Several European airlines refused to pay, and were joined by British Airways in challenging the law, contending that it forced personnel of private companies to act as immigration officers. From the time the Act came into force through mid August 1990, fines totaling 18.9 million pounds had been levied. In March, in a case involving a group of Lebanese who were denied an asylum hearing, a High Court judge noted that the Carrier's Act, combined with U.K. visa requirements, placed a substantial obstacle in the path of asylum seekers. In other cases, British Airways and Air Egypt were accused of preventing Tamil asylum seekers from gaining access to the immigration authorities at Heathrow Airport to avoid the levying of fines, which reportedly resulted in the forced return of at least one Tamil to Sri Lanka.

In all, about 25,000 persons sought asylum in the U.K. in 1990, a steady increase from the 15,500 applicants in 1989 and 5,263 in 1988. About two-thirds of the applicants came from Turkey, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. In July, the government imposed visa requirements on Somalis transiting the U.K.

In 1989, refugee status was recognized in 32 percent of the cases, 10 percent were rejected, and 58 percent were granted "exceptional leave to remain," which is granted to people for whom expulsion to their country of origin is deemed unreasonable, even though they are not found not to be refugees according to the 1951 refugee Convention. A person granted exceptional leave to remain may apply for permanent status after seven years, while persons granted refugee status have a five year wait before they may apply to naturalize.

In October, 27,170 cases were pending and the asylum process was taking an average of 13.5 months to complete. Half of the cases pending originated in Africa.

During 1989, the U.K. accepted 2,000 Southeast Asians for refugee resettlement and 640 refugees from other places.

Yugoslavia

The number of asylum seekers entering Yugoslavia dropped substantially in 1990, following an influx of over 7,000 Romanians the previous year. Of the 2,462 who applied for asylum in 1990, 1,222 were granted refugee status, two thirds of whom were from Albania. Almost all of the asylum applicants entering Yugoslavia came from eastern European countries, mostly from Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria.

For much of the post-war era, Yugoslavia has served as a country of temporary asylum for thousands of Eastern European refugees. Permanent asylum in Yugoslavia is rare, but has been granted to small numbers of Armenians, Chileans, and recently to Romanians of ethnic Serbian origin. Although Yugoslavia has signed the 1951 Convention relating to Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, there is no national mechanism for determining refugee claims. Therefore, cases are presented to UNHCR for status determination. UNHCR also attempts to find opportunities for third country resettlement for those accorded refugee status.

Persons entering Yugoslavia without valid travel papers are generally sentenced to a month in local jails before being transferred to a federal detention center, Padinska Skela, which is described by former detainees as worse than Yugoslavian jails. Refugees report overcrowding, minimal accommodations, inadequate food, and beatings by guards. In early 1990, Padinska Skela was holding about 550 asylum seekers, although it only has a capacity for 160. Consequently, four persons were assigned to each bed, and were forced to sleep in shifts.

Once at Padinska Skela, asylum seekers may present their cases to UNHCR, which seeks resettlement opportunities for those meeting the UN refugee Convention definition. The Yugoslavian government does acknowledge pre-screening asylum applicants, however. Cases involving minors, criminals, and the mentally ill are first reviewed by the government before either being rejected, and thus subject to deportation, or sent on to UNHCR for status determination.

In March 1990, the Yugoslavian government resumed its policy of deporting Romanians who had been denied refugee status. Unrest in Romania culminating in the Ceausescu regime's overthrow had led the Yugoslavian authorities to suspend deportations of Romanians late in 1989. Although many Romanians in Yugoslavia still thought it unsafe to go home, 200 were reported to have repatriated voluntarily in 1990. Also during the year, at least 69 Albanians were forcibly returned without the chance to present their asylum claims to UNHCR for review. In 1990, 838 Albanians and 772 Romanians filed applications for asylum in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia has generated increasing numbers of asylum seekers to Western Europe in recent years. From 23,200 in 1988, the number of Yugoslavs seeking asylum in Western Europe climbed to 25,000 in 1989 and 31,500 in 1990. More than 22,000 Yugoslavs, two thirds of the Europe total, sought asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany during 1990, despite the German government's attempt to curb this flow by imposing visa requirements for Yugoslavs in May 1989. Also that year, Yugoslavia itself began denying Roma and Sinti (known pejoratively as "gypsies") and ethnic Albanians passports in order to prevent them from applying for asylum in Western Europe.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

ADAPS, Asociación de Artistas Populares de Sarhua, Ayacucho, Peru. The painters of Sarhua (whose work is on the above photo) were forced to abandon their workshop in 1981, after Shining Path guerrillas burned their shop to the ground.

Belize

On June 26, 1990, Belize became the 107th country to ratify the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees. The government has also set up a Ministry of Economic Development to attract international funding for development projects to benefit both official and unofficial refugees and Belizean nationals.

Belize hosts some 6,300 officially recognized refugees, of whom 70 percent are Salvadoran and 28 percent Guatemalan. An estimated 25,000 undocumented aliens, many of whom can be considered refugees, also live in Belize. Refugees and people in refugee-like circumstances therefore account for almost 15 percent of Belize's total population of 180,000.

There are no refugee camps in Belize. However, almost half of the registered refugees live in an official refugee settlement known as the Valley of Peace. Funded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Community (EC) and geared to agricultural production on government-donated land, the government considers this a successful project that it intends to improve and expand.

The remaining registered refugees and the undocumented aliens in refugee-like circumstances are dispersed throughout the country, mainly in rural areas. Many have found work in construction and in agriculture, particularly in the large banana and sugar industries. The government also plans to create some jobs for refugees in the excavation of Mayan archeological sites. USAID and the French government have expressed an interest in funding this project.

While many of the refugees fill gaps in the labor force, the Belizean government says that their large number strains the country's financial and social resources, particularly health and educational facilities. The government has pledged to improve regional hospitals and primary health care, boost water supply and sanitation projects, and improve government coordination of refugee assistance.

While the previous Belizean government was concerned about maintaining Belize's ethnic and cultural balance in the face of a large Hispanic refugee influx (the majority of Belizeans are English-speakers, descendants of European and African migrants and slaves), the current government appears more disposed to the refugees' economic and socio-cultural integration into Belizean society.

Colombia

Although much world attention has been focused on the effects of the so-called drug wars and on guerrilla activities in Colombia, particularly the large number of civilians—including judges, journalists, government officials, and their relatives—killed as a result, virtually nothing has been said about the people uprooted by these conflicts. Two recent reports, one on internal displacement in Colombia and another on the causes of the flight of Colombian refugees to Ecuador, have shed new light on these previously unnoticed populations.

No reliable data exists on the numbers of displaced people. But a report presented at the Inter-American Conference on Refugees, Internally Displaced, and Human Rights held in Honduras in mid-1990 stated that Colombian press reports frequently refer to incidents in which hundreds or thousands of people become displaced. For example, in May 1989, 5,000 farmers were reportedly displaced from the Arboletes region. That August, 5,000 other farmers in Yondo had to abandon their lands as a result of government bombings. In January 1991, Colombia's Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights denounced the uprooting of 15,000 farmers from the Apartado region, and hundreds from the Achi and Chaparral regions.

Some of the displaced have moved into shantytowns on the periphery of urban centers, where they live in dire circumstances. Others remain in towns and villages near their home areas, seeking shelter in schools, churches, and other public places. Some receive limited assistance from the Colombian Red Cross, and one lone hostel for displaced families has been established in Barrancabermeja, in central Colombia's Magdalena Medio region. As many as two thirds of Colombia's internally displaced in that region have been uprooted by guerrilla warfare and military and paramilitary activities.

While millions of Colombians have moved to other countries over the years, primarily Venezuela and the United States, few are considered refugees. Most are said to have left seeking better economic opportunities. There are exceptions, however. A few Colombians have been granted asylum in foreign countries, and there are thousands of Colombians in Ecuador whose claim to refugee status is now being considered (see Ecuador).

Costa Rica

The February 1990 elections in Nicaragua, which ousted the Sandinista government from power, were considered significant for the future of Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, who comprise a majority of the 26,900 officially registered refugees and 160,000 undocumented aliens in Costa Rica.

Following the elections, the Costa Rican government apparently believed that Nicaraguan refugees would repatriate rapidly in large numbers. That did not happen, however. While some 35,500 Nicaraguans repatriated officially from throughout Central America during 1990, only 6,750 of them repatriated from Costa Rica.

It is difficult to obtain information on those refugees who chose to repatriate unofficially, but UNHCR in Costa Rica estimates that their number was probably just below that of official returnees. According to the agency, between 15,000 and 20,000 official Nicaraguan refugees will probably choose to remain in Costa Rica for the foreseeable future, along with about 100,000 of the undocumented Nicaraguans, many of whom are in the process of legalizing their status following recent changes in statutes affecting migrants.

Costa Rica has long enjoyed a favorable reputation for its traditional granting of asylum, but that reputation is in jeopardy. A June 1990 paper submitted to the follow-up committee of the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) by Costa Rican indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concludes that refugees in Costa Rica, particularly the undocumented, face considerable difficulties. Their lack of status and poor education result in their exploitation, primarily by multinational agricultural concerns that use them for cheap labor. Most have little access to health or educational services, the NGO paper adds, and little or no legal protection. Moreover, the Costa Rican media has been blamed for igniting anti-refugee sentiment, blaming refugees for a gamut of social ills ranging from rising crime to a high unemployment rate. Repatriated Nicaraguans have complained about having been treated as second-class citizens while in Costa Rica.

The Costa Rican government, on the other hand, argues that the presence of so many refugees in Costa Rica has created unprecedented demands in the areas of labor, health, education and housing. In June 1990, the government received international pledges of $12 million to support nine projects to benefit refugees, including a national census of undocumented aliens to determine the true extent of the refugee situation; strengthening its Ministry of Labor to assist refugees in obtaining employment; and boosting health, educational, and daycare facilities for refugees.

Cuba

In July and August 1990, some 50 Cubans forced their way into five European embassies in Havana seeking asylum. However, half were reportedly Cuban government agents posing as asylum seekers to extricate the others from the embassies. The Cuban government refused to allow the embassies concerned to arrange for the genuine asylum seekers' departure from Cuba. Following assurances that there would not be reprisals for their actions, all the asylum seekers left the embassies by September. In November, however, one of those who had sought refuge in the Spanish Embassy was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for "dangerousness".

The asylum attempts, which coincided with a number of defections by prominent Cubans abroad, strained relations between Cuba and the governments involved, particularly the new Czech government, which has been particularly critical of Cuba's human rights record, and that of Spain, which cut off economic aid and recalled its ambassador to Cuba.

Since 1959, more than a million Cubans have left their country. The majority have sought asylum in the United States, but a number also live in Europe and Latin America. During Fiscal Year 1990, 3,567 Cuban refugees, including 2,360 who had been living in Venezuela and 893 who had been in Panama, were resettled in the United States through a private sponsorship program funded and implemented by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF). A further 1,688 Cubans, including 1,390 from Panama and 279 from the Dominican Republic, were resettled between October 1990 and February 1991. CANF has resettled a total of 7,585 Cuban refugees from third countries to the United States since the program began in FY 1988.

Every year, some Cubans flee directly to the United States by raft, boat, or inner tube; 398 Cubans did so during 1989, more than four times the 1988 total. By December 1990, more than 460 Cubans had made the 90-mile trip, including one by windsurfing.

A smaller number of Cubans land in the Bahamas en route to Florida. The Bahamian authorities treat them as illegal immigrants, initially jailing them, but eventually releasing them to await third-country resettlement. A group of 43 Cubans who arrived by sea in Puerto Rico in mid-1990 were able to request U.S. political asylum.

In 1990, Cuba's human rights record was again criticized by human rights groups. The country's fledgling human rights movement, which appeared to have been tolerated during 1988 and 1989, was heavily persecuted, particularly following criticism of Cuba in March 1990 by the UN Commission on Human Rights. By the end of 1990, 30 human rights monitors were in prison; dozens more had been detained and subsequently released.

Despite continuing violence in El Salvador, most of the Salvadoran refugees who remained in Honduras repatriated in 1990. UNHCR

El Salvador

Despite the ongoing civil war between successive Salvadoran governments and the rebels of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), Salvadoran refugees continue to repatriate to their country. Some 6,400 repatriated in 1988 and 1989, and a further 8,000 repatriated during 1990, resulting in the closure of two Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras (see Honduras).

A decade of violence has left between 60,000 and 70,000 dead in El Salvador, most of them civilians. An urban offensive by FMLN rebels in November 1989 resulted in 2,000 deaths and 2,000 Salvadorans fleeing to Guatemala and Belize. A year-end offensive launched by the rebels on military and strategic targets in 1990 caused further deaths and casualties, both civilian and military. The conflict has been the prime factor in the exodus of well over a million Salvadorans (out of a total population of 5.2 million). It is estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million Salvadorans may live in the United States. More than a million live in Mexico, while thousands more are scattered throughout Central America. Some 5,000 Salvadoran refugees have been resettled in Australia and Sweden. Another 400,000 Salvadorans are internally displaced, also primarily as a result of the civil conflict.

Many of the returned refugees have settled in the areas they left a decade ago and attempted to reconstruct their communities amidst the continuing conflict. Indeed, the fighting between the government and the FMLN rebels continues to be most intense in these areas. One of the main problems confronted by Salvadoran returnees is the government's—and particularly the army's—perception that many returnees and related organizations are in some way connected to the FMLN. As a result, returnees have been subjected to intimidation, including searches, surveillance, and raids.

Following a mission to El Salvador in April 1990, Amnesty International said, "Salvadorans repatriated from Honduras or displaced within El Salvador . . . have been the target of harassment, short-term detention, and torture." The army claims that its actions result from the returnee settlements being located in areas of high conflict.

On February 11, 1990, five returnees were killed (four of them children) and at least 15 others wounded when fighting broke out between government troops and Salvadoran rebels in Corral de Piedra, a village to which more than 500 refugees had returned. Salvadoran air force helicopters reportedly strafed and rocketed the village. A North American nun who was working in the returnee villages said there was almost daily fighting and Salvadoran air force bombardment of the villages. USCR wrote to the Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States condemning the incident and requesting a government accounting of events. In a rare admission of guilt, the army accepted responsibility for the incident, promising to compensate the relatives of the dead and wounded.

Organizations such as the Christian Committee for the Displaced People of El Salvador (CRIPDES), which provides humanitarian aid to returnees and the displaced, are also perceived by some elements as supporting the rebels and, as a result, have been subject to persecution. In February 1990, USCR wrote to Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani expressing its concern about the January 19 disappearance of Marina Isabel Palacios, a member of CRIPDES. Her detention has never been acknowledged.

Human rights organizations noted an increase in death squad activity, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions in El Salvador during 1990, and criticized the government's continuing failure to investigate any human rights violations seriously, which has led to what they call "a climate of impunity" for the perpetrators. In October 1990, the U.S. government cut its military aid to El Salvador by half, to $42.5 million, to protest the government's failure to prosecute those responsible for the November 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and two others.

In July 1990, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed an accord providing for the establishment of a U.N. commission to investigate human rights abuses. Such verification would, however, only go into effect after a ceasefire, which, as of the end of 1990, had not come about.

El Salvador hosts 600 registered Nicaraguan refugees and an additional 20,000 undocumented Central Americans.

Ecuador

During 1990, large numbers of Colombians and Peruvians continued to enter Ecuador, many fleeing violence in their countries. Most have settled in remote border areas, which has contributed to the lack of attention that has been paid to their exodus and needs. UNHCR is just beginning to assess the influx.

Addressing the influx from Colombia, the Ecuador-based Latin American Human Rights Association estimated that "a significant percentage ... left their country as a result of violence or direct persecution." The largest concentrations of Colombians are in the provinces of Esmeraldas, Sucumbios, Pichincha, Quito, and Santo Domingo de los Colorados. In conjunction with the Ecuadoran government, in November 1990 UNHCR undertook the first of a series of fact-finding missions to assess the magnitude of the Colombian refugee problem in Ecuador. The first mission, to Sucumbios province, suggested that some 3,000 Colombians there may be of concern to UNHCR.

A group of 22 Colombians living in Quito is already under UNHCR protection and assistance. As with all other Colombians and Peruvians in Ecuador, none in this group has been officially recognized as a refugee by the Ecuadoran government. Most of the 22 were members of a Colombian political group called *Frente Popular*. They had received death threats, or had been detained without charge, or were tortured in Colombia, usually at the hands of the police or security forces.

Although UNHCR has begun to examine the large Colombian influx, it has not yet addressed the situation of the Peruvians who have entered Ecuador.

The violence in Colombia and Peru is characterized by the disintegration of the rule of law and the state's inability to protect its own citizens from—and indeed its role in exacerbating—generalized violence associated both with guerrilla movements and government counterinsurgency campaigns, and drug-related violence. In both countries, there have been human rights violations by guerrilla groups, drug cartels, government military and security forces, and paramilitary groups (See Peru, Colombia). These include summary executions, political killings, disappearances, torture, and other acts of terrorism. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been internally displaced in Colombia and Peru as a result of this violence.

Some 750 recognized refugees of various nationalities, mostly Chileans, are assisted by UNHCR in Ecuador. The implementing agency is the Ecumenical Committee for Refugees.

French Guiana

A military coup in Suriname in December 1990 made it even less likely that some 10,000 Surinamese Maroon refugees living in French Guiana would return home anytime soon. The coup, led by Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse, ousted the civilian government elected in 1987.

The Surinamese refugees, descendants of African slaves known as Maroons, fled to French Guiana, an overseas *department* of France, in 1986, following the outbreak of civil war in Suriname between Maroons and the military, led by Bouterse. The refugees' status in French Guiana is precarious. The French authorities there do not officially recognize the Surinamese as refugees, and have made it difficult for UNHCR to assist them. Some 7,000 of the refugees live in official camps administered by the French government. UNHCR continues to press the authorities to grant them refugee status.

UNHCR has signed a tripartite agreement with Suriname and France that provides a framework for repatriating the refugees. However, though some of the refugees have expressed a desire to return home, continuing disturbances in Suriname, the inability of UNHCR to gain access to the refugees' home areas (which have been sealed off by the Surinamese military, trapping some 50,000 Maroons there in difficult conditions), and the refugees' reported fear of Bouterse have precluded any significant repatriations.

[In April 1991, Maroon refugees from Suriname had further cause for disappointment when the leader of the Maroon insurgency secretly negotiated a cease fire with the Surinamese government that compromised the position of his own people. Although safety conditions for Maroons are far from certain in Suriname, the French government has seized the occasion to redouble its efforts to expel undocumented Maroons from French Guiana, calling into question future prospects for those in the camps.]

Guatemala

The decades-long civil conflict in Guatemala, Central America's oldest and most violent, drags on. It is estimated that the conflict has resulted in 100,000 deaths and 40,000 disappearances. Hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans have also fled the country or become internally displaced. Mexico hosts an official

Guatemalan refugee population of some 43,000. Most of the 1.5 million Guatemalans thought to have been internally displaced in the early 1980s have returned to their places of origin, but it is estimated that more than 100,000 still remain displaced.

During 1990, Guatemala's poor human rights record continued, as political killings, disappearances, and torture at the hands of the security forces and related groups continued. The Guatemalan government's Human Rights Ombudsman reported 276 political murders and 145 disappearances during the first nine months of the year. Shortly before elections in November, Americas Watch said that Guatemala was in the grip of its worst human rights crisis since the election of the civilian government in 1986. In December, the U.S. government suspended military aid as a means of protesting Guatemala's failure to investigate seriously or prosecute human rights abuses.

Organizations working in human rights-related fields have long been targets of official abuse in Guatemala. During 1990, eight human rights activists were murdered and two disappeared in questionable circumstances. Luis Miguel Solis, a leader of CONDEG, the National Council for the Displaced, was among those who disappeared.

The Guatemalan military's counterinsurgency campaign against Indian rebel groups beginning in the early 1980s was the primary cause of the uprooting of Guatemalan refugees and internally displaced. Although many, particularly among the displaced, have since returned to their home areas, they continue to experience difficulties. A recent report by a Guatemalan human rights organization notes that the Guatemalan government's process of reintegrating the internally displaced and repatriated refugees is "the most problematic and slowest in all of Central America." The report adds that the internally displaced, who are aided by the Catholic Church, particularly in the department of Alta Verapaz, receive even less attention and help than the repatriated refugees. The army seeks to bring these people under its control, either by offering them incentives to move into so-called model villages, or by capturing and moving them by force. The model villages have failed to become self-sufficient, but the military continues to round up people from the mountains and settle them in the villages, its goal being to isolate the guerrillas in the mountains.

Political violence and security concerns remain deterrents to the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees in neighboring countries. In June 1990, Amnesty International noted that "returning refugees . . . faced the risk of human rights violations, including 'disappearances' and extrajudicial executions." The government of President Vinicio Cerezo has repeatedly equated the returnees with guerrillas or subversives. They are considered a national security matter and so politically sensitive that it has been extremely difficult for nongovernmental organizations to assist openly those who have repatriated.

Although the Guatemalan government relies heavily on large international organizations to provide financial and humanitarian aid to the people of Guatemala, development programs, particularly small ones, are closely supervised.

Despite its lengthy record of gross human rights violations, a small number of refugees from other Central American countries have fled to Guatemala over the last decade. As of mid-1990, the official refugee population in Guatemala numbered 6,700, of whom 2,900 were Salvadoran and 3,800 Nicaraguan. However, an estimated 220,000 to 300,000 undocumented Central Americans—also mainly Salvadorans and Nicaraguans—live in Guatemala. Among these are persons summarily deported from Mexico.

In August, USCR traveled to Guatemala's northern border, observed deportations of Central Americans from Mexico, and met with local Guatemalan immigration officials. For the most part, the Guatemalan officials ignore the deportees, many of whom are destitute after being robbed or extorted while in Mexico. In other cases, Mexican police authorities have turned over suspected subversives directly to the Guatemalan military. USCR learned that during the first six months of 1990, the Mexican government had deported 80,000 Central Americans—double the previous year's figure—to Guatemala.

Haiti

Political turmoil and uncertainty, combined with widespread and unrelenting poverty, continued to make Haiti an inhospitable place to live in 1990. Despite the change to an interim civilian presidency in March, political violence escalated as elections approached in December, and Haitians continued to depart in significant numbers.

In January 1990, it looked as if the military government of Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril would maintain control after he declared a state of siege that suspended four articles of the constitution, including one that bars the government from sending Haitian citizens into exile. Government forces began arresting—and deporting—opposition politicians, but, in March, Avril himself was forced into exile. The new president, Ertha Pascal-Troillot, faced the daunting task of bringing order to a country that had undergone a series of wrenching changes in government since the ouster of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier in 1986 ended 30 years of dictatorial family rule.

She proved unable to exercise much control over the military or to curb the violent undercurrent that kept the country on the edge of anarchy. Gunshots could be heard in the capital most nights; renegade gangs of ex-soldiers continued to terrorize the population.

The appearance of bound bodies on roadsides showing signs of torture prior to execution suggested that the violence was not entirely random. Attacks, such as one that occurred on June 21 when gunmen entered the Hotel Santos and sprayed a meeting of the Council of State with bullets, killing one of its members, showed some of the violence to be politically motivated as well.

Police stood by and watched as that attack took place. The impotence of the government was further demonstrated in June when it issued a warrant for the arrest of Roger Lafontant, the founder of the infamous Tonton Macoutes and a Duvalier crony, upon his return to the country. Army and security forces refused to carry out the order.

More than one million Haitians, about one sixth of the country's population, are estimated to live in exile. They have fled to many nations—including the United States (450,000), the Dominican Republic (500,000), Canada (45,000), France (15,000–30,000), the Bahamas (30,000), Venezuela (6,000), and other Caribbean nations (30,000). Few of the emigres are recognized as refugees, and many are exploited.

During 1990, Americas Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and Caribbean Rights reported on near-slavery conditions for Haitian sugar cane workers in the Dominican Republic. The report documented Dominican Republic army involvement in rounding up undocumented Haitians and transporting them to the fields at gunpoint. Undocumented Haitians reported being forced to "choose" between forced labor in the cane fields or forced repatriation to Haiti. Many of these Haitians are long-term residents of the Dominican Republic whose civil status has never been regularized.

As in previous years, hundreds of Haitians attempted to escape their country on perilous boat journeys. On July 10, 1990, at least 39 Haitians drowned at sea after their boat was interdicted by the Bahamian Defense Forces and capsized as it was being towed. USCR called upon the government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to cease its Haitian interdiction program and to limit the involvement of the Bahamian Defense Forces to rescue-at-sea operations. Haitians rescued at sea, USCR recommended, should be brought ashore for medical examination and be allowed to apply for asylum should they fear persecution in Haiti.

USCR has issued similar appeals to the U.S. government since the U.S. interdiction program began in 1981. Since that time, 22,940 Haitians had been interdicted, including 1,196 in 1990. Only eleven of the total have been permitted to enter the United States for the purpose of pursuing asylum claims. On July 19, USCR issued a press release following the Haitian drownings. "The recent tragedy off the shores of the Bahamas underscores the urgency of bringing an end to the inhumane and unjust policy of interdiction," it said. "As long as the United States gives higher priority to pushing the unwanted away from our shores than saving their lives, the international consensus to protect refugees will continue to erode, and asylum seekers will continue to drift—alone and forsaken—on unforgiving seas."

Despite the bleak outlook which persisted through much of 1990, Haiti successfully held its first free elections in December, bringing new hope to the country. The electoral victory of Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a liberal priest, marks a firm break with Haiti's past governments, characterized by corruption and repression.

Honduras

The continued repatriation of registered Salvadoran refugees, and the large-scale repatriation of registered Nicaraguan refugees during 1990, dramatically changed the refugee situation in Honduras by late 1990. In late 1989 there were 34,900 registered refugees in Honduras, but only 2,700 by the end of 1990. Of these, 2,200 are Salvadorans, 100 are Nicaraguans, and 400 are Guatemalans. The number of undocumented aliens in refugee-like circumstances in Honduras is between 237,000 and 250,000, mostly Nicaraguans.

Large numbers of refugees fleeing civil strife in El Salvador and Nicaragua entered Honduras during the 1980s, despite that country's poor human rights record.

The Salvadoran refugee camps in particular became well-known for the refugees' high level of organization and self-sufficiency, but also for clashes between the highly politicized refugee leaders—often described as confrontational and provocative—and the Honduran authorities, UNHCR, and some private aid groups over the running of the camps. The Honduran military, saying that they suspected the refugees were supporting Salvadoran guerrilla activities, sealed the camps and restricted the refugees' movements. Over the years, there were numerous reports of abuses—including killings—against the refugees by Honduran military personnel.

Although there have been large-scale repatriations of Salvadorans from Honduras since 1987, the most recent wave began in October 1989, when 1,127 refugees from Mesa Grande camp repatriated. That repatriation, like those in 1987 and 1988, was characterized by disagreements between the refugees, the Salvadoran government, and UNHCR, and further repatriations were temporarily suspended. In November 1989, with these problems still unresolved, 1,700 refugees from Colomoncagua camp decided to repatriate without the Salvadoran government's approval or UNHCR assistance. UNHCR-organized repatriations resumed in January 1990 and concluded on March 3, 1990. A total of 10,900 Salvadorans repatriated between October 1989 and March 1990. Colomoncagua and San Antonio refugee camps were closed on February 27 and March 4, 1990 respectively, but some 2,200 Salvadorans who were unwilling to repatriate remain in Mesa Grande camp. The returnees, who have mostly returned to areas where there is still conflict, have faced security problems in El Salvador.

Nicaraguan Miskito and Sumo Indian refugees began entering Honduras in 1981, fleeing the Sandinista government's attempts to relocate them away from their traditional Coco river villages. Many returned between 1987 and 1989 when the Sandinista government agreed to measures giving greater autonomy to the Indian populations. Nicaraguan refugees of Spanish descent, or Ladinos, entered Honduras beginning 1987, fleeing increased political turmoil, economic problems, and the conflict between the government and the contra (Nicaraguan Resistance) forces.

Following the Sandinista government's defeat in the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections, registered Nicaraguan refugees began returning from Honduras in large numbers. During 1990, all but 100 of the more than 23,600 Nicaraguan refugees who had been living in Honduras at the end of 1989 repatriated.

Most of the Nicaraguan contras and their dependents that Honduras—sometimes reluctantly—hosted also returned home by late 1990 under the auspices of the International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV), a joint venture of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, which oversaw the return and disarmament of the contras.

The human rights situation in Honduras did not improve in 1990. Political killings and torture by the police and security forces continued. An estimated 22,000 Hondurans are internally displaced.

Mexico

In 1990, for the first time, Mexico introduced the term "refugee" into its law. Prior to that, refugees *per se* were not recognized. A very few persons who had applied for asylum from outside the country had been granted status as political asylees. But refugees and would-be asylum seekers within Mexico—including hundreds of thousands of Central Americans—had to seek other grounds for legal status if they decided to come forward at all.

The new legal definition protects from *refoulement* persons who have been threatened by general violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive human rights violations, or other circumstances that have greatly upset public order in their nation of origin.

Rather than relying on a standard of individualized persecution set by the UN refugee Convention definition of a "well-founded fear of persecution,"—a Convention which Mexico has yet to ratify—the new definition recognizes as refugees victims displaced from their homelands by generalized violence.

Mexico does have at least a *de facto* precedent for making group determinations based on a standard that defines refugees as those fleeing general violence. Between 1981 and 1984, tens of thousands of Guatemalan peasants, fleeing the Guatemalan army, crossed from their homeland into the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Mexico initially deported many of the new arrivals en masse, causing an outcry both within Mexico and internationally. The situation was exacerbated by repeated cross-border Guatemalan military incursions, in which refugees were killed, and in which Mexico appeared unable or unwilling to protect refugees in Mexican territory. In fact, after a hiatus of several years, such incursions were reported again in August of 1990.

Guatemalan children at San Vicente Agua Bendita refugee camp in Chiapas, Mexico await word about their fathers, arrested a month earlier by the Mexican authorities and threatened with refoulement. USCR/B. Frelick

In 1984, Mexico relocated nearly 18,000 refugees to the states of Campèche and Quintana Roo, hundreds of miles from the border. Although the move itself was criticized, it effectively created a *de facto* recognition by Mexico of its responsibility to protect these refugees.

The Guatemalan refugees in the camps of Campeche and Quintana Roo were never individually determined to be refugees, but were given one-year renewable residence visas with permission to work. The 23,000 Guatemalan refugees who refused to move out of Chiapas were recognized, too, in a sense, as long as they remained in camps. However, their residence permits had to be renewed monthly and they were denied work authorization.

This group determination, while offering temporary safe haven, did not provide permanent protection. The refugees were expected to return when the situation in Guatemala improved, and their repatriation was actively encouraged. A total of 2,090 refugees repatriated voluntarily in 1988, but only 971 in 1989. Some 784 Guatemalans repatriated in 1990.

From 1985 to 1989, refugees in Chiapas were not permitted to register the births of their children, making it difficult to avail themselves of their children's constitutional right to Mexican citizenship.

The 43,000 UNHCR-registered Guatemalans in refugee settlements in Mexico assisted by the government agency COMAR (the Mexican Commission for Assistance to Refugees) were expected to be the first beneficiaries of the new refugee law.

Another 60,000 undocumented Guatemalans are estimated to live outside the camps in Chiapas, including about 40,000 along the Chiapas coast and about 20,000 in the Tierras Altas. Unlike their compatriots in the camps, these people are not recognized as refugees, receiving neither assistance nor protection.

Nongovernmental sources estimate about 300,000 undocumented Central Americans in Mexico City, about two-thirds of whom are Salvadoran. Only 10,000 urban refugees are assisted in Mexico City.

During a site visit to Mexico in August, USCR interviewed Salvadorans who had been apprehended by the Mexican authorities. Some described abuses, including robbery and rape, at the hands of the authorities.

In the first six months of 1990, 80,000 Central Americans were deported, put on buses, and dumped at the Guatemalan border. This nearly doubles the rate of deportations of the previous year—85,000. In 1988, 14,000 were deported.

USCR raised this issue in direct discussions with government officials in Mexico City, and recommended that strict limits be placed on Mexican law enforcement agencies other than Migratory Services to apprehend and deport aliens for violation of immigration laws. USCR also asked that Central Americans be given access to the courts to seek redress for violations of their human rights. USCR called upon the authorities to prosecute any law enforcement officials who abuse their authority by extorting or mistreating aliens.

Nicaragua

The February 25, 1990 United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) electoral defeat of the Sandinista government, and the subsequent demobilization of the contras (the Nicaraguan Resistance), apparently ended nearly nine years of civil war in Nicaragua. The human cost of the last decade was 28,500 dead, 25,000 wounded, 16,500 orphaned, 354,000 internally displaced, and perhaps half a million Nicaraguan refugees fleeing the country, mainly to the United States, Honduras, and Costa Rica (a number of whom repatriated during 1990).

Although the Sandinista government had actively encouraged Nicaraguan repatriation, its efforts were largely unsuccessful. During 1989, for example, only 3,600 Nicaraguans repatriated from all countries. The refugees' uncertainty about returning to a country still involved in civil strife and distrust of the parties to the conflict contributed to the low level of repatriation during the 1980s.

Following the inauguration of UNO candidate Violeta Chamorro as president on April 25, 1990, Nicaraguan refugees began returning home in large numbers. By late 1990, 31,500 Nicaraguan refugees had officially repatriated from other countries, primarily Honduras (23,500) and Costa Rica (6,600). By the end of 1990, only 100 registered Nicaraguan Miskito refugees remained in Honduras. It is not known how many Nicaraguans who were living in refugee-like circumstances but without documentation in other countries may have repatriated, though it is thought very few returned from the United States. Many Nicaraguans in the United States were adopting a 'wait-and-see' approach before making any decisions. Returning to Nicaragua, even temporarily, could put at risk the legal status of Nicaraguan asylees and asylum seekers in the United States and hinder their return to the United States.

Prior to demobilization of the contras, who were based in Honduras, it was widely thought that they numbered about 12,000. However, closer to 20,000 eventually laid down their arms and repatriated, along with tens of thousands of dependents. Under the Toncontin Agreement signed by the Nicaraguan government and the contras in Honduras on March 23, upon successful demobilization and disarmament, the contras were to retreat into a number of "security zones," or resettlement colonies, in rural areas of Nicaragua specified by the International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV), a joint venture of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. However, the contras subsequently rejected the Toncontin Agreement demanding the simultaneous disarmament of the Sandinista-controlled armed forces as terms for laying down their own arms. After many negotiations, which included a promise by the new government to reduce substantially the size of the army, full contra disarmament was achieved by August.

The rapid return of large numbers of people to Nicaragua, especially given the country's shattered economy, contributed to growing social conflict. For example, there were squabbles and sporadic outbreaks of violence between returning contras and Sandinista supporters over land allocation and the return of confiscated property. International financial assistance, including $47 million provided by the U.S. government for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the contras, has reportedly been insufficient.

In addition to its returnees, internally displaced population, and demobilized contras and dependents, Nicaragua hosts some 500 registered refugees, mainly Salvadorans, who receive UNHCR assistance, and an estimated 16,000 undocumented Central American refugees. The vast majority of these are also Salvadorans. They began entering Nicaragua in the early 1980s, fleeing political violence in their country.

Peru

While Peru's civil war and human rights violations continue to receive at least some international attention (the U.N. Working Group on Forced and Involuntary Disappearance, for example, recently stated that Peru had led the world in "disappearances" for three years in a row), the plight of Peru's 200,000 internally displaced persons, or *desplazados*, receives little or no consideration. For the past decade, the *desplazados* have been forced to flee their homes in Peru's "Emergency Zones" in fear for their lives. Whole communities have abandoned their lands, leaving ghost towns throughout much of the southern Andes.

The decade of political violence in Peru that claimed the lives of over 20,000 and resulted in 3,000 to 3,600 disappearances continued unabated during 1990: conflict between the government and the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) guerrillas resulted in 3,100 deaths during the first 11 months of the year. The past year also saw government forces involved in further disappearances, the continued use of torture, and increased intimidation of human rights workers. Although newly elected President Alberto Fujimori promised to usher in a new respect for human rights, by the end of 1990 no concrete measures had been taken to curb military abuses or to investigate human rights violations. Furthermore, the security forces—and particularly the army—were given a central role in the new government.

In turn, the Shining Path regularly uses force. The Shining Path stands out alone among Latin American guerrilla groups for its ferocity against the population it claims to lead. Out of the 14 massacres of peasants carried out in 1989 in the department (state) of Ayacucho, 13 were the work of the Shining Path, according to church sources. Cadres make special targets of communities that refuse to take sides, or that are forced by the military to form civil defense committees. These villages are burned to the ground, and the inhabitants, including women and children, brutally massacred.

As part of its counterinsurgency tactics, beginning in late 1982, the government began placing regions where the guerrilla conflict was most intense under states of emergency and military control. By 1990, three-quarters of the Peruvian territory and over half of the population were effectively controlled in this way. Access to the most conflictive zones is severely restricted and entry is often denied to aid organizations. Amnesty International has stated that most human rights violations occur in zones under states of emergency.

The *desplazados* are for the most part Quechua-speaking peasants caught in the middle of the brutal conflict between the Shining Path guerrillas and government security forces. Significantly, of the estimated 20,000 who have died in political violence over the past decade, it is believed that nine out of every 10 were noncombatant, Quechua-speaking peasants.

In their search for suspected subversives, the security forces have bombed or burned to the ground whole villages and raped, tortured, and killed the inhabitants. The inhabitants of emergency zones are expected to provide members of the security forces with free food, shelter and labor. The Shining Path guerrillas also forcibly recruit peasants into their ranks and force others to take part in their activities. A Peruvian press report detailed the case of a Shining Path guerrilla who forced his wife to take part in an assassination squad by threatening to kill their infant son. The guerrillas regularly assassinate local government officials and community leaders. Also targeted are religious groups that might stir opposition. Evangelicals, especially Pentecostals, are particularly targeted. According to the National Evangelical Council of Peru, more than 300 evangelical pastors have been killed by the Shining Path since 1980.

Internally displaced people fleeing the brutality and economic destitution in areas of civil conflict converge on the sprawling shantytowns that surround most Peruvian cities; an estimated 60 percent live in Lima alone. Often they arrive with only the clothes on their backs, speaking little or no Spanish. More than 50 percent of the *desplazados* are children under 18, suffering from unprecedented levels of malnutrition, disease, and experiencing grave psychological trauma from the atrocities they have witnessed. The majority of the displaced are unable to find employment. The few that do, work as street vendors, day laborers or brickmakers. Harsh austerity measures passed by the new government have exacerbated the refugees' already desperate situation.

In addition to confronting living conditions considered extreme even for Peru, the *desplazados* must face long-standing prejudices against highland migrants and ever-present suspicions of being linked to the Shining Path guerrillas. Many of the displaced are undocumented, their national identity cards having been lost, destroyed, or perhaps confiscated by either the military or the guerrillas. One expert notes that the loss of one's identity card in Peru is akin to "civil death," severely restricting the *desplazados*' already precarious and marginal existence and putting them at increased risk of police arrest for failure to provide personal documentation.

More than 200,000 Peruvians, mostly Quechua-speaking peasants, have been internally displaced as a result of inhumane policies targeting civilians by both government forces and Shining Path guerrillas in Peru. Vera Lentz

The government has never formally recognized, or attempted to count, the internally displaced: the problem is simply not acknowledged as being an integral part of Peru's 10 years of violence. Peru's two civilian governments have consistently downplayed the war's social costs.

Political violence combined with already desperate poverty has literally wiped out the agricultural economy in some places, meaning that economically there is nothing left for the refugees to return to: Ayacucho has been described as an "agricultural disaster area." Development projects, health clinics, schools, government offices and markets have been closed or destroyed. Guerrilla damage over the last 10 years has cost the Peruvian government $12 billion, a sum roughly equivalent to its foreign debt.

The number of internally displaced persons continues to increase, and the locations to which they flee are covering a much broader area. As a result of the new wave of displaced and Peru's deteriorating economic crisis, the need for international assistance has increased significantly.

Although most Peruvians seeking to escape the violence in their home areas have become internally displaced, thousands have also fled to neighboring Ecuador. Little is known about their current conditions. UNHCR is aware of the presence of Peruvians in the border regions but has so far not carried out an assessment regarding their potential status as refugees or their need for assistance.

Peru hosts 600 refugees from other countries, of whom approximately 400 are Cuban and 200 are elderly Europeans or Latin Americans of other nationalities. They receive assistance from UNHCR through the Peruvian Catholic Migration Commission.

[In May 1991, USCR issued a report on the situation of uprooted Peruvians, "The Decade of Chaqwa: Peru's Internal Refugees."]

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

While the eleven-year conflict in Afghanistan has caused more than five million refugees to flee to Pakistan and Iran, another two million Afghans have been displaced within the country. Despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops almost two years ago and a concerted international effort to find solutions to the war, fighting had not ended in 1990, nor had significant numbers of refugees returned to their homes.

With increased pressure for results in order to avert a cut in U.S. military aid, factions of the *mujahedin* stepped up attacks on Kabul. As in the past, however, fighting between the government and the resistance showed little chance of producing victory for either side, and continued to impede those who tried to resume normal life in Afghanistan. Fighting around Kabul and several eastern provinces, as well as severe food shortages in the north, continued to cause displacement and to prevent repatriation.

Since the Afghan war broke out in 1978, the population of Kabul has been used to gauge the extent of internal displacement, since displaced persons generally migrated from the countryside to the cities. Even so, this has been an impressionistic method, as accurate censuses of Kabul's population have not been undertaken. Although the capital's population had doubled, swelling to over two million at the height of the war, its size appears to have diminished, with up to 500,000 leaving the city and returning to their rural homes. Many returned to the Panjsher valley north of Kabul, where the local commander encouraged their return. The incentive to leave Kabul was boosted by astronomical increases in food prices there. Despite the return of large numbers from Kabul, new displacements in the north and east, combined with those who have been internally displaced for years, leaves a rough estimate of about two million still displaced within Afghanistan. The existence of such a large, dependent population has devastated a society whose population was 85 percent rural before 1978.

Insect infestations in the northern provinces of Afghanistan caused severe shortfalls in harvests, leading to near-famine conditions in parts of the country in 1990. This in turn triggered new migrations of people in search of food. Food shortages have been exacerbated by the concentration in urban centers of most of those displaced by the fighting, by war damage to irrigation, devastated farms and livestock, abandoned fields, and continued fighting.

Precarious safety conditions inside Afghanistan made shipping food and other humanitarian aid a difficult and often dangerous task. The task of delivering food aid across international borders was complicated by rivalries among the Pakistan- and Iran-based resistance factions. Movement of such aid inside Afghanistan was often stymied by those same rivalries playing out among their local supporters within Afghanistan; the activities of Kabul government-paid militias; and simple banditry. Often, aid could not move across the lines of one local leader's area of control to assist a more remote and more needy area because the leader insisted that the aid be devoted to his own people. Harassment of UN food distribution teams and hijackings of U.S. food convoys called into question whether such programs could continue without significant risk to those involved. Responding to such incidents and to reports that food aid frequently did not reach its intended recipients, the United States temporarily discontinued food shipments to Afghanistan early in 1990.

Some *mujahedin* members, particularly from fundamentalist groups such as the Hezb-e-Islami, and the "Wahabi" Arabs and their Afghan supporters, became increasingly suspicious and resentful towards western humanitarian agencies operating inside Afghanistan. In May 1990, four armed men killed a French nurse as he slept in his Medecin Sans Frontieres (MSF) clinic in Badakhshan province, leading MSF to halt its Afghan operations. Although that attack may have been the work of common criminals, or the result of a dispute between local commanders, UN and western aid workers were clearly the objects of threats, prompting other western agencies periodically to suspend projects inside the country.

Despite unfavorable working conditions inside Afghanistan, UN agencies and related organizations worked to improve conditions inside the country. The formidable task of rehabilitation and reconstruction involved setting up agriculture and food assistance programs, rebuilding the physical infrastructure, and offering vocational and health programs to prepare the refugees for eventual repatriation.

The UN repatriation program that began in July 1990 was a pilot project designed to assist and provide incentives for up to 250,000 refugees to return home. With the opposition of most *mujahedin* factions and the poor security inside Afghanistan, however, the plan had only limited success. Other impediments included the country's devastated infrastructure and widespread landmines.

Despite dangers in many parts of the country, sources in the UN's Operation Salaam estimated that more than 200,000 would return home during 1990. As of December 20, 1990, however, only 13,070 ration cards had been surrendered, corresponding to about 78,420 persons.

In fact, most refugees who did return repatriated spontaneously, especially from Pakistan's Baluchistan Province to southern parts of Afghanistan, rather than through the planned UN repatriation effort. To what extent the returnees intended to repatriate permanently was unclear. Some local observers suggested that the movement back into Afghanistan may have been seasonal, or provisional, in nature.

On Afghanistan's border with Iran, it appeared that at least another 36,000 to 60,000 refugees had repatriated. Here again, most returned spontaneously, though some 20,000 returnees registered at a reception center in Herat in 1990. An airlift in September and October relieved pressure on the city of Herat caused by returnees. More than 4,000 people were flown between Herat, Maza-e-Sharif, and Kabul, returning them from the west to the northern regions of the country.

Relatively few Afghan refugee girls are given the opportunity to study. Women teachers in Peshawar and Quetta have been physically threatened, and at least one girls' school was closed during the year. UNHCR

Bangladesh

Before Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, an estimated 75,000 Bangladeshis were employed in Kuwait and another 25,000 in Iraq. In the months following the Iraqi invasion, most returned home. As of October 9, 1990, 60,436 Bangladeshis had returned to Dhaka on 210 special flights. One returnee from Iraq reported that 1,500 Bangladeshis were dead or missing as a result of the invasion.

For 18 years, the largely Buddhist Chakmas and other tribal groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have fought a guerrilla war with the Bangladesh government, seeking autonomy and the removal of Muslim Bengali settlers in the CHT. In 1986, about 50,000 refugees from the CHT crossed into India and have been living in refugee camps in India's Tripura state. According to Bangladeshi officials, more than 21,000 people have returned in the last three years. But the Indian government insists that large numbers have been crossing into Tripura state, and say that the CHT refugees totalled 85,000 in May 1990.

Reliable sources suggest that there were 75,000 Chakma, Larma, and other tribal peoples (sometimes collectively known as the Jumma) in the Tripura camps as of December 1990. The net increase of about 15,000 was due to widespread human rights violations in the CHT, which accelerated following an incident in May 1989 in which 36 tribal people were killed in reprisal for the murder of a Bengali settler by the Shanti Bahini, the armed faction of the tribal separatist movement.

On May 10–11, 1990, the Bangladeshi government sent a 16-member team to Tripura to persuade the Jumma refugees to return to the CHT. The refugees demanded that eleven conditions be met before their return, including the withdrawal of Bangladeshi security forces and the removal of the Bangladeshi settlers from the CHT. Bangladesh rejected these conditions.

Despite once-promising prospects of repatriation to Pakistan, about 250,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis, or "stranded Pakistanis," languish in 66 camps in Bangladesh, their home for the last 19 years. Having sided with Pakistan when Bangladesh seceded in 1971, the Biharis hope to be transferred to Pakistan. Such an agreement was signed in July 1988, and the Saudi-based World Muslim League pledged about $300 million for their resettlement. But the Pakistani government imposed delays on the repatriation, citing concerns about social tensions in Sind province, and the financial commitments from the World Muslim League have not materialized.

And so the Biharis wait. On the wall in the office of the Stranded Pakistanis General Repatriation Committee in Dhaka hangs a verse from the Koran—"God is with the patient."

Bangladesh is also home to about 15,000 families of Muslim refugees from Burma, known as Rohingas. As many as 300,000 Rohingas fled the Burmese state of Arakan in 1978. Most reportedly repatriated in 1979.

India

The cyclone that ripped into India's southern coastline in May 1990, killing several hundred people and leaving three million homeless, seemed to embody the furious winds of ethnic, religious, and political conflict that blew destruction and upheaval in virtually every corner of the country and ultimately toppled the government. Militant separatist movements by Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir prompted violent crackdowns by the Indian army; Hindus and Muslims fought bloody battles over a holy site in Ayodhya, refugees poured from Sri Lanka into Tamil Nadu, and from Bangladesh into Tripura state; and in the far northeastern province of Assam, ethnic guerrilla groups agitated for Bodoland and the expulsion of immigrant Bengalis.

The number of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India more than doubled in 1990, following the withdrawal of Indian Peace-Keeping Forces from Sri Lanka and an escalation of the civil conflict between the Sri Lankan army and Tamil militants. From June to December 1990, about 125,000 Sri Lankan Tamils arrived in India's southernmost state of Tamil Nadu. In early 1990, the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee population in India was estimated at 103,000.

To cope with the new influx, the Tamil Nadu state government was forced to re-open camps that had been closed since 1987 and to enlist the use of cyclone shelters, temple rest houses, and marriage halls. India has refused UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) offers of protection and assistance for the refugees.

In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an accord to end Tamil separatism and promote a negotiated settlement to Tamil-Sinhalese disagreements. Since then, Tamil Nadu, home to about 50 million Tamils with close links to the Sri Lankan Tamil minority, has come under increasing pressure from the central government in New Delhi to maintain a stricter neutrality toward the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

On March 7, 1990, authorities in Tamil Nadu turned away two boats carrying about 1,600 Sri Lankan Tamils. The boats were allowed to land in Orissa state to the north. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuvel Karunanidhi was quoted as saying, "Except for real refugees, the government will not allow any militant groups in."

USCR protested that action, writing to Prime Minister Singh, "Our concern is that a fair and impartial refugee determination procedure does not appear to have been set up prior to the decision to push away asylum seekers."

Several times during 1990, Tamil Nadu authorities arrested or detained groups of Sri Lankan refugees suspected of being Tamil militants. In late December, police rounded up more than 1,000 Sri Lankan Tamils who reportedly were supporters of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front.

From 1987 through 1989, more than 25,000 Sri Lankan Tamils repatriated under UNHCR auspices, and another 17,000 returned without UNHCR assistance. Only about 140 repatriations occurred under UNHCR auspices in 1990.

The number of refugees from Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) also increased from about 50,000 in 1989 to 75,000 by December 1990. Living in seven camps in Tripura state, the CHT refugees are Buddhist Chakmas and other ethnic hill people. For seven years, the Chakma and other tribal groups have clashed with the Bangladeshi government, seeking autonomy and removal of the estimated 400,000 Muslim Bengali settlers in the CHT.

In a May 8 letter to Prime Minister Singh, USCR expressed concern about reports that Indian Border Security Forces were turning back as many as 200 people per day, and were planning to build a barbed wire fence along the Bangladesh border.

The Indian embassy responded that "there has been no attempt on our part to forcibly repatriate these refugees." The reply added that "between 100,000 to 200,000 Bangladeshis illegally migrate into India each year—most of them for economic reasons. . . . You will agree that it is perfectly legitimate for our forces to try and prevent such movements."

Although the Indian government's response to the CHT refugee influx has been relatively accommodating, local tensions are reportedly growing as a result of competition for firewood and jobs. New Delhi spends about $4.7 million per year on the refugee camps in Tripura and has rejected UNHCR and other international offers of support.

About 100,000 Tibetan refugees remain in India, having followed their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, into exile when the Chinese violently annexed their country in 1959. Up to 10,000 Tibetans were expected to enter India through Nepal in 1990 to attend a religious teaching by the Dalai Lama. Chinese visa and travel restrictions, however, limited the numbers to about 1,000.

Legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in November 1990 provided 1,000 special immigrant visas to admit Tibetans who have been living in India or Nepal.

As of May 1990, UNHCR was assisting more than 12,000 people in India, including 11,100 Afghans, 800 Iranians, and 130 other refugees. Since 1984, India has granted Afghan and Iranian refugees annually renewable residence permits.

About 800 Burmese refugees remain in India's Manipur and Mizoram states, having fled there after a Burmese army crackdown on the country's pro-democracy movement left thousands of people—mostly students—dead.

More than 2,000 people died, at least 80,000 were internally displaced, and 5,000 more crossed the mountains into Pakistan-controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir in 1990 as Indian soldiers battled Muslim militants in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Bomb explosions rocked Srinigar on New Year's day, and violence increased throughout 1990.

About 30 militant Muslim groups—some seeking independence for Indian-held Kashmir and others union with Pakistan—fought almost daily skirmishes with Indian army and paramilitary troops.

By May, the civilian death toll stood at 350, and large numbers of Hindu families had left their homes in the Kashmir valley and fled south for safety. An estimated 8,000 Muslims went north across the Line of Control and into Pakistani-held territory.

Both India and Pakistan claim Kashmir and have fought wars over the territory in 1947, 1965, and 1971.

Of India's 850 million people, Hindus form the majority in all but two of its 25 states, numbering 650 million nationwide. Muslims, numbering 100 million, are a majority only in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Sikhs, who total 100 million, comprise a majority only in Punjab.

South of Kashmir, in the state of Punjab, militant Sikh separatists campaigning for an independent Sikh homeland called Khalistan, fought Indian paramilitary troops and Hindu fundamentalists, leaving 3,560 dead and thousands uprooted.

Citing security concerns, the Indian government forced thousands of people living on the perimeter of the 400-year-old Golden Temple—the holiest shrine of the Sikh religion—to leave their homes and shops. The temple grounds were the site of fierce fighting between Indian troops and Sikh militants in 1984 and 1988.

In late November, about 3,000 Hindus fled across the Punjab state border into Amritsar, following ultimatums by Sikh militants to "vacate the town."

In the city of Ayodhya, about 300 miles southeast of New Delhi, Hindus and Muslims clashed over plans by militant Hindus to construct a temple on the site of a Muslim mosque. In late October 1990, the fragile coalition government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh lost its parliamentary majority and collapsed when he refused to back the Hindus and the Bharatiya Janata Party, a fundamentalist Hindu group, withdrew its support for him.

Soon after, fighting between Hindus and Muslims erupted nationwide, injuring 4,000 and claiming 890 lives by late December.

Ethnic agitation and violent separatist movements continued to plague India's northeast region, particularly Assam. In the mid-1980s, New Delhi sought to co-opt some of the ethnic separatists by creating new states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura, giving the Nagas, Mizos, Manipuri, and Tripura groups a degree of autonomy within the Indian Union.

But separatist groups in Assam have been battling the Indian army and occasionally each other, some seeking new

Troubled Waters in the Middle East: 1990–91

Bill Frelick

Refugee movements lend themselves to water analogies. We speak of refugee "flows", "floods", "influxes". The analogy is particularly compelling in describing the human tide tossed up by the Gulf War. In fact, the metaphor of the crest and trough of ocean waves best captures the ebb and flow of refugees and displaced persons during the course of the war and its aftermath.

As in a tidal wave generated by an earthquake on the ocean floor, the first wave that came in the days immediately following the Iraqi invasion, too, had its epicenter—Iraq and Kuwait. From there, more than a million people were thrown in all directions—750,000 to Jordan, 300,000 to Saudi Arabia, about 70,000 to Syria, another 60,000 to Iran, and 40,000 each to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. This tidal wave of humanity initially swamped the network of international agencies expected to respond to emergencies; in the first week of September 1990, about 75,000 persons, mostly Asian expatriate workers, remained trapped in a barren and desolate stretch of desert along the Iraq-Jordanian border.

Fortunately, the overwhelming bulk of the displaced people in the first wave had no fear of persecution in their home countries, meaning that there was no essential political obstacle to their repatriation. The costs, indeed, were enormous, and the logistics of rapidly moving hundreds of thousands of people, a nightmare. But it was doable. The displaced persons wanted to go home, their home countries were willing to accept them, and no one—least of all the temporary host countries, particularly Jordan—wanted them to remain. The international community, therefore, was able to right itself and respond well to the crisis.

In the wake of this first wave, Saudi Arabia forced between 500,000 and 750,000 Yemeni workers out of the country in apparent retribution for their government's support of Iraq. The flood of returnees disrupted an already struggling economy, raising the prospect that Yemen, in turn, would expel tens of thousands of foreign workers to make room for their own returning citizens.

Palestinians were particularly buffeted by the wave. Many had lived their entire lives in Kuwait, but without permanent status that would ensure their right to return. Most who had been living in Iraq and Kuwait crossed directly into Jordan, where they were left to fend for themselves, often joining relatives in overcrowded refugee camps. The influx of an estimated 25,000 Palestinians into the West Bank and Gaza Strip exacerbated an already high unemployment rate caused by three years of curfews, strikes, and disruption.

When the U.S.-led coalition entered the fighting in January, the situation took a further downward turn for the Palestinians, not only in the occupied territories, which were put under curfew for 37 days, but also in Egypt and Syria, and, by extension, Lebanon, where they found themselves subject to hostility and suspicion. In Egypt, the resident Palestinians were thrust into direct competition with about 250,000 Egyptians who had been forced home from Iraq and Kuwait.

The ripple effects of returning migrants and the loss of revenues rocked local economies not only in countries close to the epicenter, such as Jordan and Egypt, but on distant shores, as well. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Sudan, and the Philippines all had to cope with the sudden entry of tens of thousands of job seekers and the loss of their remittances.

After the wave crested and crashed, however, the trough afforded the international aid community a brief respite. By late November 1990, the movement had slowed considerably. From that time, until the air war began on January 16, 1991, the number of third country nationals crossing into Jordan had fallen to 10,000. After the air war began, few refugees managed to exit Iraq or Kuwait. Transportation out of Iraq was dangerous and uncertain; the borders with Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were virtually closed. Even after President Bush declared the ceasefire on February 28, the waters were relatively still. By the first week of March, less than a thousand people were housed in Jordanian transit camps, fewer than 300 in Syria, and a total of 4,455 in Turkey.

The slowdown, ironically, produced a certain level of anxiety for international assistance agencies. There was plenty of discussion about preparedness and "early warning"—in fact, a much-lauded UN "Regional Humanitarian Plan of Action" was developed to meet the contingencies arising from the conflict. But attention remained focused on the immediate past, on Jordan, which had preoccupied everyone's attention during the first [illegible]. Jordan raised the fear that prepositioned stocks would sit idle and go to waste. At the time, the director of a leading U.S. voluntary agency told this writer, "The best minds of the refugee world were convinced that Jordan would be inundated. At last count, there were 600 refugees in the Jordanian camp. What do you do when you raise money specifically for evacuees in Jordan, and then are not able to spend it?"

The best minds of the refugee community did indeed meet in Geneva on March 5 and, according to the UNDRO account of the meeting, decided to "undertake no new activities to increase capacity and make no new purchases/stockpiling. Preparedness arrangements should go ahead in Turkey for target of 20,000 persons. . . For Iran, state of preparedness for target of 35,000 will continue."

Confessing to have the advantage of hindsight, we still must ask: Could we have prepared better for the second wave? Could a powerful undertow have been detected that would have warned us of the impending force of the deluge?

Iran might have provided the warning. Elsewhere, the numbers of new arrivals were modest and mostly represented third country nationals. In that first week of March, however, significant numbers of Iraqis were fleeing their country for the first time. Within a few days that week, 8,000 Iraqi Shi'as had entered Iran's Khuzestan province. Another 5,000 crossed into Ilam province.

Did Iran's isolation from the West create a blind spot in the eyes of the international refugee community, dominated as it is by Western agencies and donors? While Iran itself can be faulted for a lack of openness, the movement of thousands of Shi'a refugees was known to the outside world by mid-March. Did we discount the warning these refugees provided because of who they were—Shi'a, stigmatized by the West as fanatics and terrorists? Did we care less about their plight, assuming them to be Iran's problem? The crushing of the Shi'a revolt in the south preceded that of the Kurdish revolt in the north by two weeks. Saddam's helicopter gunships laid waste to Iraq's holiest Shi'a shrines of Najaf and Karbala 12 days before they were turned on the Kurdish civilians of Kirkuk. Should these actions—and the refugee flows they created—have commanded our attention and mobilized our response?

By the time the full force of the second wave knocked us off our feet in the first week of April, when, in the course of a few days more than 700,000 refugees poured into Iran and about half that number to the Turkish border, it was as though there had been no preparation whatsoever. Desperate refugees struggled to cling to life in the bitter cold, rain, and mud without food, water, medicine, or shelter.

The disproportion of the response—when it finally did come—suggests that there might well have been a blind spot with respect to Iran. Although the total number of "second wave" refugees in Iran swelled to 1.3 million by mid-May, the number in Turkey and northern Iraq stood at about 340,000, and was rapidly subsiding. Despite hosting three times as many refugees, however, less than half as much international assistance money went to Iran. For every dollar spent on a refugee in Iran, $7.60 was spent for a refugee on the Turkish border. This imbalance was caused by the heavy weighting of the U.S. contribution. Of more than $200 million contributed by the United States for this phase of the crisis, less than $20 million went to assist the refugees in Iran. At the time, Iran itself was spending $10 million per day to sustain the refugees in her territory.

In effect, the refugees for whom Iran was the nearest border were penalized for their host government's poor relations with the United States. The foreign policy bias that drives U.S. refugee policy not only resulted in less food and dirtier water for refugees in Iran, but perhaps accounts for the inability of "the best minds of the refugee world" to see the approach of the most monumental refugee wave in memory.

ethnic subdivisions of Assam, others seeking outright secession. In November 1990, New Delhi declared all of Assam to be under direct rule, and the Indian army launched "Operation Bajrang" against the newly resurgent United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a Maoist group formed in 1979 to free Assam from Indian rule.

Fighting between the ULFA and Indian security forces in early December forced 1,900 villagers to flee their homes in the Dibrugarh district and enter relief camps.

Largely composed of ethnic Assamese, the ULFA seeks to expel many of the estimated 200,000 Bangladeshis believed to have entered Assam illegally since 1971 and to impose tighter controls on "outsiders" in general. The ULFA is allied with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which is seeking full independence for the state of Nagaland, but is opposed to the movement led by the All-Bodo Students Union for an autonomous tribal state carved out of northern Assam.

In the months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, tens of thousands of Indians streamed out of the Gulf on their way home. By late November, the Indian government reported that 130,000 Indians had left Iraq and Kuwait via Amman, and that 20,000 Indians remained in Kuwait, while 5,000 were still in Iraq.

Iran

With Afghanistan on one side and Iraq on the other, the Islamic Republic of Iran is host to nearly three million refugees, one of the largest combined refugee populations in the world.

Two-thirds of that total are Afghans, many of whom have resided in Iran's eastern provinces for up to a decade. Although the government revised its count of refugees late in the year, substantially increasing its refugee census to nearly three million Afghans and one million Iraqis, USCR did not have an opportunity to assess the basis for the census, but did not note substantial new influxes into Iran during 1990.

Until the new census figures can be analyzed, USCR will continue to cite the previous census figures of 2.35 Afghans and 500,000 Iraqis, figures that date to January 1988.

In April 1991, USCR traveled to Iran to assess first-hand the conditions of more than one million Iraqis who fled to Iran following the crushing of the Kurdish Shi'a uprisings in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm.

In early 1990, the Islamic Republic signed a memorandum of understanding with Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the coordinator of UN aid to Afghan refugees (UNOCA), to open an office in Tehran and involve the Iranian government more directly in international efforts to assist Afghan refugees and pave the way for their voluntary repatriation.

In March 1990, Tehran invited representatives of UNOCA, UNHCR, the World Food Program and the United Nations Development Program to tour Afghan refugee camps in the east in a bid to increase international humanitarian involvement there. In September, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani told the visiting UN High Commissioner for Refugees Thorvald Stoltenberg that, because of political considerations, international organizations had failed to discharge their duties on behalf of refugees in Iran.

UNHCR has provided the Iranian government with modest levels of assistance for Afghan refugees since 1983. In 1986, UNHCR funded a government project to improve living conditions for about 200,000 rural refugees in Khorasan province. A major land rehabilitation project for south Khorasan that was planned in conjunction with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) stalled for lack of donors. It was intended to generate income for refugees as well as the local population. UNHCR's worldwide funding crisis resulted in a 20 percent cut in the assistance program for Afghan refugees in Iran in 1990.

Early in 1990, there was discussion in the Iranian press and parliament about confining Afghan refugees in camps due to strains on the local economy, but no concrete steps were taken. Only 3 percent of the refugees reside in camps.

The Afghan refugees have generally been permitted to move around Iran, and about 1.3 million have settled in cities. Although scattered throughout Iran, most of the remainder are concentrated in the eastern provinces of Khorasan (more than 700,000) and Sistan-Baluchistan (more than 300,000).

The refugees are largely self-sufficient, though impoverished. They are integrated into the Iranian economy, providing a reservoir of unskilled labor, and, in some areas, dominating the construction industry.

Although the repatriation rate has been slow, at least 36,000, and perhaps as many as 60,000, are believed to have returned to Afghanistan from Iran in 1990. In September, international agencies attempted to expedite repatriation from Iran by organizing flights for returnees between Herat, Mazar-e-sharif, and Kabul.

Another 410,000 Arab, Persian, and Kurdish refugees from Iraq live mainly in the western provinces, many of whom were expelled from Iraq prior to the outbreak of war between the two countries because they were believed to be of Iranian ancestry. Little is known about this population; they receive no international assistance, and estimates of their numbers vary widely.

UNHCR assists another 90,000 Iraqi Kurds who arrived since 1987. The first 10,000 of this group crossed the border following Iraq's first use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population. Although tens of thousands have repatriated since then in response to various Iraqi amnesty declarations, including 45,000 after Saddam Hussein's first declaration in September 1988, and several thousand in 1990, new arrivals have replaced them. Some 70,000 fled Iraq in the spring of 1988, following the gas bombing of Halabja; another 22,000 arrived in the fall of 1988 following renewed gas attacks after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Many of the newer arrivals have transited via Turkey, including 8,000 of those who entered in the fall of 1988.

The Kurdish refugees have concentrated primarily in 23 camps in the western provinces of West Azerbaijan, Bakhtaran, and Kurdistan. Located in a harsh, mountainous region, the adequacy of camp shelters to withstand the wind and cold has been a principal concern.

Kuwaitis represented the most recent refugee influx in 1990. As of October 10, 1990, the Iranian press agency reported that some 10,000 Kuwaiti citizens had crossed into Iran through the Shalamcheh border post, near Khorramshahr, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Many were believed to be Shi'ites, some of whom had been political prisoners in Kuwait prior to the invasion. Their needs for assistance have not, as yet, been determined.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait also resulted in the return of about 50,000 Iranian nationals from Kuwait in August 1990 alone. Thousands of Pakistanis transited to their country through Iran. The Islamic Republic set up a large tent camp in Bazargan, on the Turkish border, to accommodate new arrivals. Nationals from India, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Egypt, and Uganda also crossed into Iran following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The exodus of nearly two million Iraqis, mostly Kurds, in late March and early May 1991, and the refusal of Turkey to open its border, quickly overwhelmed the capacity of humanitarian agencies to assist. Babies and small children were the first victims. The Washington Post

One positive result of the Iraqi invasion was an agreement to return an estimated 100,000 prisoners of war from the Iran-Iraq War following the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October. The exchange of the first 78,000 POWs, split evenly between the two countries, went smoothly, with the ICRC interviewing each to ensure that their return was voluntary. With most Iranian POWs returned, however, further repatriations of Iraqi POWs stalled, reportedly over several political issues, including reported Iranian demands that Iraq sever its support of exiled Iranian opposition groups in Iraq. Disputes continued about the number of "unregistered" POWs on both sides, with both Iraq and Iran claiming that the other was still holding thousands of prisoners.

An undisclosed number of Iraqi POWs refused to return to Iraq; many, particularly among the Shi'a, were known to have collaborated actively with the Iranian authorities, and, it is believed, would fear persecution upon return. There were also unconfirmed reports that some Iranian POWs were arrested upon repatriation and sent to the Evin Prison in Tehran.

In January 1990, following the spontaneous tearing down of the border fence separating Iran and the USSR, some 20,000 Soviet Azerbaijanis crossed into Iran in two days. Iran did not consider them to be refugees. In fact, most returned to the Soviet Union after visiting relatives on the Iranian side. In November, the two countries implemented a border protocol allowing a set number of families from each country to cross to the other every week.

Hundreds of thousands of Iranians are estimated to remain in exile for political and religious reasons. Assassinations of prominent Iranian exiles were reported in Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey during 1990, with evidence pointing to complicity of Iranian government authorities in some of the attacks. Similar attacks occurred in 1989 in Austria, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates. In March 1990, USCR wrote to the Turkish authorities urging them to bolster security for Iranian refugees in that country in the aftermath of an armed attack by four gunmen on a former Tehran university professor with ties to a political opposition group.

Iraq

Iraq was the focal point of worldwide attention following its invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990. Public attention was drawn to the hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers fleeing Iraq and Kuwait. Although this mass exodus presented a clear humanitarian emergency, most of the displaced people were not "refugees" as defined in international law.

But there were, indeed, refugees—persons outside their homelands with a well-founded fear of persecution upon return—among the exodus. Citizens of Kuwait itself who fled their homeland were refugees, as were a number of Iraqi Shi'a who had resided in Kuwait and who were opponents of Saddam Hussein's regime. Among the third-country expatriate workers, a relative few, including Liberians, Somalis, and Lebanese, were believed to fear persecution in their home countries.

Iraq itself hosted a refugee population comprised of Iranians who fled during its war with that country. Some 30,000 to 40,000 Iranians, mainly Kurds, live in the Al-Tash camp west of Baghdad, although Iraq does not officially classify them as refugees. Another 30,000 Iranians who fled during the Iran-Iraq War continue to live in camp-like conditions, according to the Iraqi government. One of the few such camps known to international agencies is the Shomeli camp where about 800 Iranian refugees, mostly Kurds who had been politically active, are housed. It is a closed camp, and its inhabitants, some of whom have been there for up to six years, are not allowed to work.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Iran, there were reports that Iran was calling for the return of exiled leaders and members of the *Mojahedin-e Khalq* Iranian opposition group residing in Iraq. On October 18, USCR wrote to President Hussein asking that Iranian opposition members not be forcibly repatriated to Iran and be permitted to resettle in third countries.

USCR also asked Iraq to provide asylum to any Iranian prisoners of war who expressed a fear of persecution in Iran. Following the resumption of diplomatic relations, Iran and Iraq quickly exchanged about 78,000 POWs under the supervision of the ICRC. The exchange stalled, however, in October due to disputes over the remaining "unregistered" refugees on each side and reported Iranian demands that Iraq sever its support of the *Mojahedin.*

Up to 500,000 Iraqi Kurds have been displaced by the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages during the past several years.

In order to create an 18-mile *cordon sanitaire* on its borders with Iran and Turkey in 1989, Iraq forced out up to 100,000 Kurds in the frontier regions and relocated them in housing units near northern urban centers.

In July 1990, Amnesty International charged that hundreds of Kurds had "disappeared" in Iraq after repatriating from Turkey and surrendering to Iraqi authorities after announced amnesties. Iraq denied the charges.

Other Iraqi minority groups, including Assyrians and Turcomans, have also been executed or "disappeared" after returning to Iraq from exile. Amnesty International reportedly learned in 1989 that a group of 33 Assyrian Christians and their families who had returned from Turkey and Iran had disappeared. Assyrians have also been forcibly removed from their villages as part of the campaign to depopulate the border areas.

In January 1990, four Turcoman refugees returning to Iraq from Turkey under terms of the announced amnesty were executed, along with 26 other Turcomans, according to AI.

UNHCR estimates that 4,500 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, repatriated from Iran in 1990 and that 2,500 repatriated from Turkey. The returnees have not been allowed to resume village life in the depopulated border region.

In addition to noting the displacement of Kurds in northern Iraq, the UN Subcommission on Human Rights in August 1990 expressed concern about attacks on and forced displacement of a part of the Shi'a population in the south. More than half of Iraq's population of 17 million is Shi'a; hundreds of thousands suspected of being of Iranian origin were expelled to Iran before and during the outbreak of hostilities with that country in 1980. Iraqi citizens still in Iraq who are believed to be of Iranian origin have distinct identity cards and have suffered discrimination.

[The aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991 resulted in massive homelessness and displacement within Iraq, the full dimensions of which were being assessed by a USCR site visit in May 1991.]

Israel

In 1990, 181,759 Soviets immigrated to Israel, the largest influx to that country in decades. Israeli officials estimate that the number of Soviet immigrants will double in 1991.

The numbers were smaller earlier in the year due to problems in arranging flights out of the Soviet Union. Negotiations for direct flights out of the USSR faltered over questions about the settlement of Soviet Jews in the Israeli occupied territories. The quasi-governmental Jewish Agency reported in November that 1,075 of the new immigrants had settled in the occupied territories in the first ten months of the year, about 0.8 percent of the total. However, the Agency did not count those settled in areas of Jerusalem annexed by Israel after 1967. In the first half of 1990, 7 percent of the immigrants (5,375) settled in Jerusalem, most in areas outside the pre-1967 boundaries. The *Jerusalem Post* reported that the government planned to settle about 30 percent of the Soviets in Jerusalem, most in areas outside the pre-1967 boundaries. Of the 17,000 housing units planned for Jerusalem, 15,000 were slated for the annexed areas.

In January 1990, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said that big immigration requires a big Israel as well. The statement created a storm of protest in the Arab world, and placed in doubt a $400 million housing loan from the United States and direct flights out of Moscow, which had not been finally approved at year's end. On May 29, he wrote to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev saying that Israel does not have a policy of "directing" Soviet Jews to the occupied territories. However, in a speech in November, Shamir said that Israel needed to control "the Land of Israel from the sea to the Jordan [river] for the generations to come, for the mass immigration, and for the Jewish people."

Within Israel, the Soviet influx caused disruption as well as hope. Generally, the Soviet Jews were highly skilled, boosting the number of professionals in fields such as medicine and engineering, as well as the arts. Although Israel was able to house the new arrivals, using trailers, hotels, and prefabricated housing, the numbers of newcomers severely strained an already tight housing market. Native Israeli homeless activists protesting the housing shortage and government preferences for new immigrants set up tent encampments in several Israeli cities; their spokespersons estimated 70,000 homeless families in the country, some of whom expressed resentment at government housing subsidies for the new immigrants.

The large numbers strained other social service systems, especially since an estimated 15 percent of the new arrivals were senior citizens. As of November, 45,000 of the 1990 arrivals were unemployed or in full-time Hebrew language classes.

In August 1990, the Israeli Absorption Minister said that 30 percent of the Soviet arrivals were not Jewish. He urged that religious credentials should be examined more carefully. Some orthodox Jews criticized the "grandparent rule" whereby a person with one Jewish grandparent is entitled to Israeli citizenship as inconsistent with Jewish law, which specifies that Jewish identity stems from being born to a Jewish mother. Shamir accused the Absorption Minister of exaggerating the number of non-Jews, saying it was closer to 4 percent of the total.

Although the number of Ethiopian Jews who immigrated in 1990 looked small by comparison to the Soviet influx, it represented a breakthrough in what had been a very slow-moving migratory stream. About 15,000 Ethiopian Jews had arrived in Israel until their movement was abruptly halted in 1985. Following renewed relations between Israel and Ethiopia in November 1989, Ethiopian Jewish immigration resumed. Although hundreds of Ethiopians arrived monthly early in 1990, immigration halted midway through the year in what Ethiopian officials called an effort to determine Jewish religious status of intending emigrants. Some outside observers said, however, that the impasse was due to Ethiopian demands to exchange arms for immigrants. By late July, the problems were resolved and Ethiopian immigration returned to previous levels. By the end of 1990, some 3,673 Ethiopian Jews had arrived. The Jewish Agency estimated the total population of Ethiopian Jews in Israel as about 20,000; they live in 55 locations, nearly half in the north of the country.

[Following the ouster of Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam, the remaining 15,000 Ethiopian Jews were flown to Israel on May 24–25, 1991.]

Occupied Territories

The third year of the uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip saw continued violence and repression both inside and outside the territories' 28 refugee camps.

For much of 1990, violence between the Israeli Defense Forces and the Palestinian Arab population had ebbed, as Israeli troops gave wider latitude to refugee camps and other hot spots. However, the failure of any movement toward a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, combined with other events, led to increased tensions as the year progressed. In addition to the political stalemate, and other tensions stemming from the Gulf crisis, several major flashpoints resulted in escalating violence from the Palestinian side—for example, graduating from stones to knives—and increased repression by Israeli army and security forces—for example, by moving aggressively into hostile areas, such as refugee camps, where earlier in the year, such places had been avoided. The year's watershed events included the May 20 massacre by a lone gunman of a group of Palestinian workers in Israel; a mob attack on an Israeli reserve officer who was murdered after he took a wrong turn into the Bureij refugee camp on September 20; and the October 8 Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif bloodbath, in which at least 17 Palestinians were killed and more than 300 injured, the deadliest single day in the 23-year occupation. By year's end, the *intifada*, the Palestinian name for the uprising, had returned to mass rioting, violent confrontations, and large-scale casualties.

As the *intifada* began its fourth year, some 765 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were reported as having been killed by Israeli soldiers or civilians since it began on December 9, 1987, and 311 Arabs as having been killed by other Arabs as suspected collaborators, although sources differ in the numbers reported. The death toll of Israeli Jews in *intifada*-related violence stood at 57 for the three-year period, although here again sources varied. For Israelis, the *intifada* came closer to home in the last quarter of the year, as stabbings and other attacks increased dramatically in Jerusalem and other Israeli cities.

A major trend in 1990 was a significant increase in the number of Arabs killed by other Arabs as suspected collaborators with Israel. In contrast to the first year of the *intifada* when 21 suspected collaborators were killed, and the second year, in which 134 were killed, in 1990, the Israeli human rights group Betzelem reported that 156 suspected collaborators were killed, exceeding the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers, totaling 124.

Although the *intifada* originated in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, it grew to include city and town populations. Distinguishing the refugee casualties from the Palestinian population became difficult, and UNRWA, whose mandate covers 414,298 registered refugees in the West Bank and 496,339 in the Gaza Strip, began providing temporary emergency assistance to nonrefugees in the territories. This included emergency medical services for the injured. During its July 89-June 90 reporting year, UNRWA noted that more than 20,000 had sought emergency medical attention in local hospitals and UNRWA clinics. Injuries resulted from beatings, tear-gas inhalation, and rubber bullet or live ammunition wounds. Of the 249 Palestinians killed during UNRWA's reporting year, 24 were children under 15 years of age. Children under age 15 represented 1,640 of the beating casualties during the year.

On several occasions, Israeli forces prevented or delayed UNRWA ambulances from evacuating the wounded, including in the aftermath of the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif violence. In early November, UNRWA charged that during a serious confrontation in the Jabalia camp in the Gaza Strip in which more than 300 people were injured, Israeli army patrols positioned themselves in front of the UNRWA health center, making it difficult for ambulances to evacuate the wounded.

Other violations of UNRWA premises occurred, including a June 12 incident in which an Israeli officer hurled a tear gas cannister into the waiting room of UNRWA's mother-and-child health center in Rimal, Gaza, affecting more than 100 women and 57 infants.

UNRWA also protested attacks on its personnel, including the firing on UNRWA vehicles, beatings, and arrests. On December 6, at the Khan Younis camp in the Gaza Strip, Israeli border police physically abused three international staff members; on other occasions, such as November 8, UNRWA international staff at the 'Ayn Bayt al-Ma camp were arrested while trying to perform their duties. UNRWA reported that staff members were arrested 149 times during the year; 49 UNRWA staff members were still in detention, as of June 1990.

UNRWA staff were also subjected to attack as suspected collaborators. In March, the UNRWA head of the Nur al-Shams camp near Tulkarm was set upon with knives and axes; in November, masked men shot and killed a teacher at an UNRWA school in Rafah in the presence of his 8-year-old pupils.

Education in the occupied territories was severely disrupted for another year, despite the reopening of formerly closed schools. In the West Bank, 90 UNRWA schools that had been closed by military order since the beginning of 1989 reopened in the summer of 1989, but were unable to complete the 88–89 academic year. Schools were scheduled to complete the 88–89 curriculum in the first six months of 1990, but again were subject to disruptions resulting in the loss of 15 to 20 percent of school time in addition to a school-year that had already been reduced by one-third. By mid-May, UNRWA had reported that 40 percent of teaching time had been lost in schools in the Gaza Strip. Several UNRWA training centers were reopened after prolonged closure, as well as Bethlehem University. Five other universities in the occupied territories remained closed.

In its annual report, UNRWA noted that Agency premises had been violated 550 times in the Gaza Strip and 200 times in the West Bank. Military observation posts were established on the roofs of some UNRWA schools. Other UNRWA facilities were surrounded with barbed wire fences—

such as at the UNRWA women's activities' center in the Jabalia camp.

The Israeli military continued to construct barricades at the entrances to refugee camps and to build high chain-link fences blocking access to roads. The authorities reinforced barricades and fences at the Dheisheh camp and constructed new fences and barricades at the Askar and Arroub camps.

Economic conditions deteriorated markedly in the territories during the year. The combination of the losses incurred as a result of the Gulf War—resulting in the suspension of remittances from the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians working in Kuwait, as well as direct aid from the Kuwaiti government, and the return of 25,000 Palestinians to the occupied territories from the Gulf—combined with the *intifada*-related destruction and disruption—led to a rise in unemployment to about 30 percent, 5 percent higher than the rate before the Gulf crisis began. The influx of Soviet Jews to Israel, as well as heightened fears of knife attacks by Palestinian workers in Israel, led to calls within Israel to curtail the entry of some 110,000 migrant day-laborers. About 10,000 Palestinians were issued "green cards" during the year, banning their entry into Israel on security grounds.

On December 17, USCR contacted Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir expressing concern about the decision to deport four Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. USCR pointed out that the deportations were in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The four were deported to Lebanon on January 7, 1991, the first deportation orders to have been carried out since August 1988. A total of 58 Palestinians had been deported on political grounds since the *intifada* began; another 250 had been expelled in 1989 for having violated residency regulations. In June 1990, the authorities announced that those regulations would be liberalized and that the previous year's expulsions would be reviewed. In announcing the review, the government noted that 88,000 family reunification requests had been made since the Israeli occupation began in 1967. Of these, about 13,000 had been granted, but almost none had been granted since the *intifada*.

Jordan

Jordan became the focal point of 1990's largest mass exodus, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and a hemorrhaging of foreign workers from those two countries. By December 1990, the government said that 750,000 displaced persons had entered Jordan since the invasion. At least 220,000 additional evacuees held Jordanian citizenship; most of the remainder were able to transit to their home countries.

In the first months of the crisis, Jordan was ill-equipped to handle the emergency. Episodes of panic and rioting, piles of garbage, poor sanitation, sickness, and tension characterized life in three temporary camps set up in the desert frontier.

At one point, Jordan decided to close its border to non-Jordanians. USCR wrote to King Hussein on August 23 urgently appealing to him to reconsider that decision. On the same day, USCR also wrote to President Bush and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees calling for emergency assistance to Jordan to help it cope with the influx.

The international community did respond quickly and generously. Jordan maintained an open border, and conditions in the camps improved as arrangements were expedited for transporting third-country nationals home. Thousands of people were airlifted every day in September, reducing the camp population in Jordan to 2,255 by late November. As of November, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had arranged the return of 142,834 third country nationals on 450 flights. The largest number flown home by IOM were Sri Lankans (47,275), followed by Bangladeshis, Indians, Filipinos, Pakistanis, Vietnamese, Sudanese, and Egyptians.

More than 200,000 Egyptians, Sudanese, and Yemenis continued overland, using Jordan as little more than a transit point. Egypt sent buses to pick up its nationals from the border. Unconfirmed reports—denied by the Jordanian authorities—charged that tens of thousands of Egyptians who had been working in Jordan without work permits prior to the Gulf crisis were also rounded up and expelled.

Among the returnees with Jordanian citizenship, many were Palestinians, many of whom joined relatives in already overcrowded refugee camps, such as Baqa'a, the largest camp in Jordan. More affluent Palestinians, as well as Kuwaitis, found relatives in Jordan's cities and towns.

But the mass return created a triple threat to Jordan's economy. It was denied the lucrative remittances sent home by expatriates in Kuwait, and would have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars for social services for the new arrivals. Exacerbating the situation was the end of economic aid from Kuwait and Iraq, which had amounted to $185 million prior to the invasion.

Despite the hardships, relations between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government seemed to grow warmer in the shadow of the crisis. For the first time in 20 years, King Hussein met with leaders of Palestinian factions who had been deported in 1970. In December, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was allowed to conduct an open rally in Amman, at which the organization announced its rapprochement with King Hussein.

Subsequently, Jordan agreed on a National Charter, which will legalize political parties, most having originated in factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The National Charter recognizes the legal and political rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and Palestinians, in return, recognize the sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom.

Improved relations between King Hussein and the Palestinian community, which comprises over half of Jordan's population, date from Hussein's 1988 relinquishment of Jordan's claim to the West Bank and his affirmation of Palestinian citizenship rights in Jordan.

Palestinians enjoy full citizenship rights in Jordan, including the right to vote. The UN resolutions that define which Palestinians are refugees and what durable solutions should be sought on their behalf differ from the refugee definition and solutions in the UN Convention regarding other refugees. Palestinians are defined as persons who resided in Palestine two years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1948, who lost their homes and livelihood as a result of that war. The UNRWA mandate recognizes only repatriation or compensation as permanent solutions for the Palestinian refugee problem. Therefore, citizenship in another country, such as Jordan—which would represent the cessation of refugee status for other refugee groups covered by the UN Convention and Protocol—does not terminate a Palestinian's refugee status.

An exception to the offer of Jordanian citizenship is made for those Palestinians who originated in the Gaza Strip, which was never claimed as part of Jordan. Most of the 16,000 refugees living in the Jarash camp, for example, fled the Gaza Strip in 1967 and do not have

Jordanian citizenship. Jarash is the poorest refugee camp in Jordan with lack of clean water and parasitical illnesses among the major complaints.

Political events in the region, and most especially in the Israeli occupied territories, reverberated throughout Jordanian refugee camps during the year. Following the killing of seven Palestinian day laborers in Israel on May 20, solidarity strikes and demonstrations were held in the Jordanian camps. These grew violent in the Beqa'a and Marka camps, and four refugees were killed and about 400 injured in clashes with Jordanian security forces.

UNRWA registered 929,097 refugees in Jordan in 1990, of whom 76 percent lived outside of the ten refugee camps established for them.

Kuwait

As many as half of Kuwait's citizens fled Kuwait in the aftermath of the August 2, 1990 invasion by Iraq. More than 380,000 fled the country, of whom about 300,000 fled to Saudi Arabia.

Another 60,000 to 100,000 Palestinians fled Kuwait, many of whom have been displaced from their homes for a second or third time and forced to flee to another country. Most entered Jordan.

In addition to those who fit international definitions as refugees, hundreds of thousands of others were displaced from Kuwait by the invasion, mostly expatriate workers, primarily from Egypt, Jordan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Kuwaiti refugees reported gross violations of human rights by the Iraqi occupation forces, including torture, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, robbery, and rape. Kuwaiti sources allege that thousands of Kuwaitis and Iraqi dissidents who had been living in Kuwait prior to the invasion were arrested and transferred to prisons in Iraq. Although the numbers could not be confirmed, allegations of forced transfers out of occupied Kuwait, a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, were frequent and consistent. Other nationalties were also arrested by Iraqi forces, some held hostage exclusively based on their nationality.

Only 28 percent of Kuwait's pre-invasion population were actually Kuwaiti citizens. An estimated 320,000 Palestinians and 270,000 Bidun, stateless Arabs, comprised the largest percentages of the noncitizen population, though many among both groups had actually been born in Kuwait or lived there for decades.

Upon arrival at the Saudi border, this Kuwaiti woman weeps over the loss of her husband who was abducted by Iraqi troops as they approached the border. AP

Lebanon

Although an end to Lebanon's seemingly interminable civil war appeared closer during 1990, violence continued to wrack the country, with tens of thousands still displaced.

Since the war began in 1975, more than half of Lebanon's total population have been displaced from their homes at some point. Although accurate estimates are nearly impossible, at least 800,000 were presumed to remain internally displaced or to become newly displaced in 1990.

The heaviest fighting of 1990 pitted Christian against Christian and Shi'a Muslim against Shi'a Muslim; the Palestinians were generally on the periphery, although they too fought among themselves.

For most of 1990, the two Shi'a militias, the Syrian-backed Amal and the Iranian-backed Hizbullah, vied for power in southern Lebanon in fighting that started in April 1988. Their war cost about 2,500 lives and displaced some 100,000 people. A November ceasefire agreement stipulated that all displaced persons in the south be allowed to return home.

The large numbers of people fleeing the Iqlim al Toffah area probably reduced the number of civilian casualties in the Amal-Hizbullah fighting, but artillery and rocket exchanges considerably damaged the area. Although the Amal militia had been among the bitterest enemies of the Palestinians, waging the "camps war" in the mid-1980s and causing severe hardship and destruction for the Palestinian refugee population, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) came to Amal's rescue when the Hizbullah threatened to get the upper hand. As PLO fighters moved towards the Iqlim al Toffah region, some 12 miles away, some Lebanese saw the move as a PLO effort to re-entrench itself in the south. The Amal-Hizbullah accord said that the Lebanese Army would replace the PLO in Iqlim al Toffah and deploy troops around the Palestinian refugee camps near Sidon, but it was unclear whether the Palestinian forces would voluntarily withdraw.

The future role of the Palestinians is a key issue to be resolved if the fragile peace patched together following the Ta'if Accords is to remain stable. The Accords, endorsed by the Lebanese Parliament in August 1989 and signed by President Elias Hrawi in September 1990, call for a more equitable distribution of power and the disbanding of armed militias. But the Ta'if Accords do not directly address the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. In May 1987, the Lebanese Parliament revoked the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which had granted the PLO autonomy in running the refugee camps and had allowed the PLO to establish guerrilla bases in Lebanon. The PLO continued their military build up in the Sidon area in 1990, despite President Hrawi's insistence that Palestinian armed forces would not be tolerated.

In September, Lebanon's largest refugee camp, Ein el Hilweh, near Sidon, was ravaged by inter-Palestinian fighting. During the height of the hostilities, as many as 15,000 people, about 10 percent of the camp population, were temporarily forced to flee. The fighting took more than 75 lives and left more than 250 wounded. Like the clashes in June and July in the Rashidieh camp south of Tyre, the fighting pitted pro-Arafat forces against supporters of Abu Nidal. The conflict damaged both camps and disrupted services for the refugees.

On April 5, 1990, seven refugees, including five children, were injured in an Israeli air raid on the Rashidieh camp; an Israeli air attack on October 24 on Rashidieh wounded another five civilians, according to Palestinian sources.

UNRWA serves not only the 302,049 registered refugees in Lebanon, but, due to the extreme circumstances, the unregistered Palestinian population as well. About half of the registered refugees live outside the 13 refugee camps in Lebanon. In April, UNRWA recorded that 28,458 refugees were rendered homeless by the fighting within Lebanon. The largest number, 15,885, were displaced in the Sidon area, but thousands of others were displaced in the other regions as well.

Because fighting no longer focused on the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, some progress was made in repairing and reconstructing the thousands of shelters and infrastructure damaged and destroyed between 1986 and 1988 in the Burj el-Barajneh and Shatila camps. But refugees were slow to return to Beirut, and repair work moved slowly.

Some of 1990's most intense fighting pitted Maronite Christians against each other. About 100,000, mostly Christians, fled Lebanon entirely, and 200,000 to 400,000 were internally displaced in east Beirut and the region to the north and east of Beirut, at least temporarily. These areas (as well as much of west Beirut) were without water and electricity for months; schools and hospitals were not spared from the shelling, and tens of thousands of homes were damaged and thousands destroyed. Another 500,000 residents of Beirut and its environs were trapped in basements and bomb shelters for days without food, water, or electricity by the fighting between the Lebanese Forces militia of Samir Geagea and Army troops loyal to General Michel Aoun, who was dismissed as commander by President Hrawi. Four months of fighting left about 1,200 dead.

The inter-Christian fighting spilled over into one small Palestinian refugee camp, which had been virtually untouched by the previous 15 years of fighting. About 20 percent of the Dhayeh camp in the Christian enclave northeast of Beirut was destroyed. The camp houses about 2,000 mostly Christian Palestinians.

In October, Syrian forces tipped the balance in bringing about Aoun's defeat. The end was bloody, as hundreds were killed, including dozens of Aoun followers who were allegedly bound and shot at close range by Syrian troops. Aoun and some of his top aides found refuge in the French embassy, but by year's end had still not succeeded in leaving the country.

Pakistan

The fate of Afghan refugees in Pakistan grew more uncertain during 1990. Once hopeful of returning safely home after Soviet forces withdrew from their country, Afghan refugees became more skeptical in 1990, as both military and peaceful solutions to the eleven year old war remained elusive.

Despite some planned and spontaneous returns to Afghanistan in 1990, amounting to as many as 200,000 returnees, *mujahedin* sources claimed that 83,000 new refugees arrived during the year in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). But neither the reports of repatriation nor of new refugee flight are reliable. The *mujahedin* report of a new influx was contradicted by the government of Pakistan, which reported no new influxes during the year. Likewise, deregistration of refugees who turned in ration cards did not always mean that they were actually repatriating. In other cases, people repatriated spontaneously, without deregistering.

Reports on the numbers of refugees entering and leaving Pakistan are not noted for their accuracy. The sources for such reports often have their own motives for inflating figures; much of the cross-border movement during the year appeared to be spontaneous and, perhaps, temporary or seasonal in nature, making it difficult to draw conclusions about its lasting significance.

Some 3.26 million Afghan refugees were registered in Pakistan, living in 345 camps located mostly along the border with Afghanistan in Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. An estimated 406,000 unregistered Afghans were also living in Pakistan in 1990. The accuracy of the refugee census, both registered and unregistered, is debatable, however.

Pakistan is not a signatory to the UN refugee Convention and Protocol, but has been generous, despite social and economic costs to its own society, in providing temporary asylum for Afghan refugees. Pakistan provides about half the cost of caring for the refugees; significant contributions come from the international community as well.

Most Afghan refugees are ethnic Pushtun, mainly of rural origin. Although allowing the refugees much freedom to find work, Pakistan prevented this overwhelmingly rural population from farming during the years of exile, except for the few who could cultivate small garden plots or work as tenant farm laborers. This led to concerns that farming skills would not be passed on to a new generation.

Although conditions during 1990 did not permit the large-scale repatriation effort the UN thought possible at the time of the Soviet withdrawal, UNHCR began a three-month pilot project in late July to assist and provide incentives for up to 250,000 refugees to return to Afghanistan. Strictly voluntary, the UNHCR's program was based on sizable spontaneous returns of Afghans that had been observed out of Baluchistan to Kandahar and other provinces, primarily in southern Afghanistan.

Although the UN repatriation plan had the cooperation and support of the Pakistani government and the Office of the Co-ordinator for the United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs relating to Afghanistan, UNOCA, commonly known as Operation Salam, certain *mujahedin* leaders strongly opposed the program and thwarted efforts to implement it.

The Afghan Interim Government, a body designed to coordinate policy of the groups that make up the resistance, opposes repatriation as long as Najibullah's government remains in power; many believe it is to the *mujahedin's* strategic advantage to keep refugees in Pakistan where resistance groups control refugee administration and security. Other impediments to repatriation have included overwhelming damage to infrastructure, lawlessness, and widespread placement of landmines in the country.

Despite these obstacles, by late 1990, UN sources estimated that up to 200,000 Afghans had returned, mostly from Baluchistan province, host to 850,000 registered and 100,000 nonregistered Afghan refugees. Fewer were thought to have returned from the NWFP, where more than two-thirds of the Afghan refugee population is located. In all, only 13,070 ration cards were turned in as part of the repatriation pilot project, representing an official return out of Pakistan of about 78,420. However, nongovernmental sources in Pakistan have openly doubted the figures, suggesting that many of those deregistering had not, in fact, repatriated. The Kabul government, on the other hand, claimed that 250,000 had returned. If the Kabul figure includes repatriates from Iran and spontaneous returnees from Pakistan to *mujahedin*-controlled areas, it might represent a plausible estimate.

Factionalization of the *mujahedin*, resulting in violent confrontations between various resistance groups, led to a serious threat to the safety of many Afghan refugees in Pakistan during 1990. Fighting often spread from the battlefield in Afghanistan to camps in Pakistan, prompting lower morale and heightened cynicism about *mujahedin* leadership among many refugees.

With future U.S. funding for the Afghan resistance in question, American and other western humanitarian relief agencies became the objects of increased suspicion and resentment among some of the *mujahedin* groups in Pakistan, particularly from the hard-line faction Hezb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and by "Wahabi" Arabs and their Afghan supporters. This resulted in intimidation and occasional violent attacks during the year. In April 1990, prompted by religious incitement on the Eid-ul-Fitr holiday, a mob attacked and destroyed a school and a center for widows at the Naserbagh camp in the Peshawar area run by the nongovernmental Shelter Now International organization.

Afghan women in particular have suffered from the increased influence of fundamentalists in the resistance, who have sought to impose strict adherence to Islamic codes of conduct. Since the arrival of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many in the *mujahedin* have been suspicious of humanitarian projects designed to aid women. In the first half of 1990, projects for Afghan women drew increased fire from Muslim radicals, who harassed and threatened both Afghan and western aid workers.

Although destruction of project-related facilities belonging to humanitarian relief organizations has commonly been attributed to Muslim extremists, local sources suspect that such acts have often been the work of common criminals.

Still, there was growing concern during 1990 that Afghan women, who with children make up three quarters of the refugee population in the camps, were not receiving adequate attention, particularly in education.

The Gulf crisis heightened tensions between fundamentalists and western aid volunteers as 1990 ended.

On the other side of the country, some 8,000 Indians fled to Pakistani Azad Kashmir from Indian Kashmir, starting with a military crackdown in January 1990. Those who left reported widespread violations of human rights by the Indian army, which, in its attempt to weed out militant separatists, began a campaign of house searches, forced evictions, and arrests. Although some reports indicated that Pakistani authorities had not taken adequate steps to assist these people, many were said to have relatives in Pakistan they could turn to. Unauthorized border crossing by nationals of both countries turned violent at times, fueling tensions between India and Pakistan. The death toll from the unrest exceeded 950 for the first eight months of 1990.

UNHCR was assisting 1,701 Iraqi and 1,075 Iranian refugees at the end of 1990. Pakistan does not recognize persons from Iran or Iraq as refugees, but rather calls them illegal entrants. The authorities tolerate those whom UNHCR identifies as being of concern, pending their resettlement in third countries. The number of Iranians receiving UNHCR assistance in late 1990 was less than half the number in 1989.

Early in 1990, USCR wrote to the Pakistani authorities concerning reports that a joint Iranian-Pakistani border committee had decided to return "insurgents" attempting to flee to Pakistan back to Iran.

USCR wrote, "While the extradition of smugglers and other criminals is in the interest of the security of all neighboring states, the extradition of those who fear political persecution in the home country is another matter entirely." The government did not respond to USCR's intervention.

New Iraqi arrivals totalled 1,765 in 1989, a considerably higher caseload than in previous years.

Especially heated in 1990, ethnic clashes between Sindhis and Muhajirs in Pakistan's southern province of Sindh caused about 4,000 Sindhi families to leave for India, according to Indian press reports. There is some doubt about the accuracy of this figure.

Although undocumented Bangladeshis in Pakistan are not a refugee population, human rights groups raised concerns about their treatment in 1990. Hundreds, including children, were reportedly held in Pakistani jails, but their repatriation was delayed because they lacked documentation.

Due to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, an estimated 50,000 Pakistani citizens had returned home from Iraq and Kuwait by the end of October. The crisis was reportedly a considerable blow to Pakistan, many of whose citizens depended on money sent home by relatives working in the Gulf. In addition to the 500 to 700 Pakistanis returning daily during September by road through Iran, large numbers of Indians, Bangladeshis, and Filipinos took the same route and traveled through Pakistan to return home.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, which traditionally prefers a low profile on refugee-related matters, was pushed to the forefront in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

An estimated 300,000 Kuwaitis fled into Saudi Arabia during the remainder of the year. Some moved on to other destinations in the Arabian peninsula, but most stayed in Saudi Arabia. Although they constituted a large influx, Saudi Arabia was able to move the new arrivals quickly from transit points to safer accommodations in hotels and private homes within the interior. Only a few hundred Kuwaitis approached UNHCR for help. Overwhelmingly, the refugees were privately assisted, supported financially by the Kuwaiti government-in-exile, or had sufficient resources to fend for themselves.

The Kuwaiti refugees gave consistent accounts of atrocities committed by Iraqi occupation troops in Kuwait, including killings, robbery, and rape. On September 17, Iraqi soldiers began pulling Kuwaiti men from their cars as they waited to enter the Saudi border town of Khafji. They were apparently dragooning them into the Iraqi armed forces, since the age range of those arrested corresponded with the age limits on military conscription.

Most third country nationals crossed into Jordan or other countries rather than Saudi Arabia.

On September 19, in apparent reaction to the pro-Iraqi stance of Yemen and Palestinian elements, Saudi Arabia revoked many of the special privileges enjoyed by both nationalities working in Saudi Arabia. Until then, Palestinians and Yemenis did not need to obtain Saudi sponsors and could enter Saudi Arabia without entry visas. The loss of these privileges forced hundreds of thousands to leave the country. By November, Yemenis who had returned home numbered between 500,000 and 750,000. Amnesty International charged that hundreds of Yemenis were tortured and mistreated during the round ups for expulsion. Returnees reported having been questioned about their views on the Gulf crisis; AI researchers witnessed returnees bearing fresh marks of torture and beatings. The Saudi government denied the charges, saying that AI was "entangled with planted and wholly fabricated information."

Palestinian sources reported that Saudi Arabia expelled more than 40,000 Palestinian families or denied them permission to return to that country.

Since Saudi Arabia lacks a formal procedure for determining refugee status, many expatriate workers living there who may have legitimate grounds for fearing persecution in their home countries have not been granted asylum or recognized as refugees. Among them are about 160,000 Somalis, 100,000 Ethiopians, 40,000 Afghans, and thousands of others from Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. Because Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia are outside UNRWA's geographical mandate, it cannot assist them.

Sri Lanka

Fleeing what some have called the worst fighting ever in the centuries-old conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, more than one million Sri Lankans were internally displaced in the last six months of 1990, and 125,000 more fled across the Palk Strait to India.

Sri Lanka, which gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, has a population of 16.5 million. About 74 percent are Sinhalese, who are predominantly Buddhist. Tamils, predominantly Hindu, comprise 18 percent of the populations. Muslims, or Moors, represent 7 percent. Although most of the Muslims speak Tamil, and some have allied themselves with the Tamil separatists, relations between Muslims and Tamils, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, have become increasingly strained.

In March 1990, the last contingent of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) departed Sri Lanka, nearly three years after its arrival as part of the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which sought to end the longstanding conflict between Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan army.

The escalation of civil war in June cost more than 5,000 lives in Sri Lanka and resulted in 125,000 persons fleeing the country in the last half of 1990. A million Sri Lankans are internally displaced. Insight/B. Cabe

Brought in to enforce a ceasefire, the IPFK instead became involved in an increasingly violent confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or the Tigers), the largest and most militant of Tamil separatist groups. The LTTE repudiated the agreement and took its fight not only to the Indian forces, but to the more moderate Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), which had allied itself with the IPFK.

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, elected in December 1988, made good on his campaign promise to remove the Indian troops, then initiated his own peace talks with the LTTE. But the last hopes for peace collapsed on June 11, 1990, when LTTE guerrillas attacked 17 police stations in Batticaloa and Amparai districts on the east coast, killing more than 100 policemen. The Sri Lankan army struck back with equal ferocity, killing about 100 Tamils near Amparai Central refugee camp. Within 10 days, 1,000 people were dead and more than 100,000 had been displaced. The government announced it had set up 67 camps to house the displaced, most of whom were from the Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Amparai, and Mannar districts. By late June, the number of displaced had swelled to more than 300,000 in more than 100 camps.

Within weeks of the outbreak of new hostilities, Tamil boat people began to pour into India. By July 10, a reported 18,300 Sri Lankan Tamils had reached Rameswaram, including 3,700 in a single day, and two old camps had to be reopened and three new camps built to accommodate them.

On July 13, the Sri Lankan navy attacked and sank a boat filled with 24 refugees crossing the Palk Strait. There were no survivors. Three days later, Sri Lanka's Minister of State for Defense Ranjan Wijeratne acknowledged that the navy had turned back some 30 boatloads of refugees heading toward India. Following the attack, refugee arrivals in Rameswaram temporarily slowed to a trickle. USCR protested the attacks and interdictions to Prime Minister Premadasa. Earlier in 1990, USCR had expressed concern to Premadasa about a report that on February 5, a Sri Lankan helicopter gunship had attacked and sunk six refugee boats crossing the Palk Strait toward India. Five of six boats went down, killing 55 women, 27 children, and 13 men.

India's response to the new influx of Tamils was ambivalent. On March 7, authorities in Tamil Nadu turned away two boats, carrying some 1,600 Sri Lankan Tamils. Although the boats were allowed to disembark in Orissa farther to the north, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuvel Karunanidhi announced that Tamil militants would be barred from entering his state. On July 22, Karunanidhi called upon the Sri Lankan government to set up refugee camps in northern Sri Lanka to check the flow of Tamils to India.

Despite India's growing ambivalence, refugee flows continued, and there were no more reports of pushbacks. By late August, an estimated 95,000 Tamils had reached Rameswaram. By the end of 1990, estimates of new arrivals from Sri Lanka totalled up to 125,000. In December, Tamil Nadu authorities, under pressure from the Sri Lankan government and their own central government in New Delhi, appeared to take a tough new line on Tamil militant activity. On December 4, police arrested 11 suspected members of the LTTE in an early morning raid in Madras. Later in the month, the EPRLF accused Indian authorities of rounding up more than 1,000 of its sympathizers in Tamil Nadu.

In the four years prior to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, an estimated 135,000 Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in India. Then, from July 1987 to August 1989, there was substantial movement in the opposite direction, as about 43,000 Tamil refugees returned home, either spontaneously or through organized channels. But as the conflict escalated in late 1989, from 11,000 to 13,000 refugees crossed the water into Tamil Nadu. There was no significant repatriation from India in 1990.

At the fighting continued between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army, large numbers began to move north toward the Jaffna peninsula, seeking safety, food, and shelter. By late July 1990, an estimated 880,000 were internally displaced, of whom 355,000 were in 350 camps scattered throughout Jaffna district. By September, the internally displaced numbered more than one million in the Northeast province, half of them in Jaffna. Heavy Sri Lankan air force bombardment, combined with an alleged food and fuel embargo orchestrated by the government, generated substantial civilian casualties and propelled tens of thousands across the Palk Strait into India.

Sri Lankan forces were accused of repeatedly bombing several refugee camps on the Jaffna peninsula, including camps at Nallur Temple and St. Anthony's Church in Pasaiyur. On November 9, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a public protest to the Sri Lankan authorities that two bombs were dropped that day in a protected zone around the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, causing five injuries. The hospital had been reopened only days earlier, following months of negotiations with the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. "The repetition of such an incident," said ICRC, "could seriously call into question the continuation of ICRC activities in the northeastern provinces of Sri Lanka."

While the majority of those displaced in the Northeastern province were Tamil, significant numbers of Sinhalese and Muslims were caught in the crossfire and forced to flee. On August 3, LTTE guerrillas attacked two mosques at Kattankody in Batticaloa district, killing 120 Muslim men and boys at prayer. One week later, the Tigers launched a nighttime raid on the Muslim town of Eravur, also in Batticaloa. According to the government, 173 men, women, and children were killed in their sleep. The LTTE denied involvement in the massacres, and in turn accused Muslim Home Guard units of collaborating with the Sri Lankan army in killing Tamil civilians.

In late October, the Muslim Refugees Relief Organization claimed that 8,000 Muslims had fled from Mannar Island, after the LTTE had ordered them to leave or be shot.

Living in the lush central highlands of Sri Lanka are about 80,000 Indian or "Plantation" Tamils, who differ from the Tamils in the northeast in terms of dialect and caste origin. Following talks with India on May 1, a Sri Lankan official announced that any of the Plantation Tamils holding Indian passports must be repatriated. But Indian authorities insisted that all Sri Lankan Tamils should first leave south India before any Plantation Tamils would be resettled. Many of the Plantation Tamils resisted the idea, and launched protest strikes, arguing that the passports were negotiated nearly 30 years ago and are irrelevant to a new generation of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. In the face of mounting political tension, the Sri Lankan government gave assurances that no Plantation Tamils would be forcibly returned to India.

Although the focus of violence, abuse, and displacement shifted in 1990 from the south to the north, conflict continued between the government and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a revolutionary group espousing Marxism, Sinhalese nationalism, and militant opposition to Tamil autonomy. As many as 30,000 people may have been killed in the south in 1988 and 1989, with both sides guilty of brutal human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, torture, and disappearances. The government declared a substantial victory over the JVP in late 1989, with the capture and execution of most of the JVP's top leaders, but killings of suspected JVP insurgents and other opponents by government-backed death squads continued in 1990.

There were an estimated 100,000 Sri Lankans in Iraq and Kuwait before August 1990. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Sri Lankans joined hundreds of thousands of other South and Southeast Asian foreign workers in an exodus through Jordan and home again. At the end of October, about 60,000 Sri Lankans had returned home, and another 20,000 were expected by the end of 1990.

On December 31, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and called upon the Sri Lankan government to reciprocate. One LTTE spokesman said the truce would provide nongovernmental organizations an opportunity to get relief to the northeast. The government agreed to a temporary truce, but ten days later, Sri Lankan troops launched a major offensive against LTTE strongholds in the north. An estimated 5,250 people were killed in 1990 following renewal of the separatist conflict in June.

Syria

The 280,731 Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA in Syria tend to keep a lower profile than their counterparts in other areas of the UNRWA mandate. Only about 30 percent of the refugees reside in 10 camps, which have the appearance of Palestinian quarters, not clearly demarcated from surrounding neighborhoods.

Camp conditions deteriorated during 1990; unemployment climbed, increased numbers applied for special hardship support from UNRWA, and refugee schools were badly overcrowded and in disrepair. Government restrictions hampered UNRWA social workers assisting some of the most destitute refugees.

As the Middle East moved toward war, Syria sided with the forces arrayed against Iraq, and Palestinians in Lebanon, the occupied territories, and elsewhere generally sided with Iraq; as a result, Palestinians in Syria were in an increasingly sensitive position.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) said that Syria was holding 3,000 Palestinian supporters of Yasir Arafat in prisons during 1990. Following the announcement of the death of a senior PLO figure in the prison of the Palestinian branch of the Syrian intelligence service on December 14, the PLO denounced Syria for torturing hundreds of detainees in Syrian prisons. Efforts to improve relations between President Hafez Assad and Arafat during the year failed.

An uncertain number of Lebanese, as many as 100,000, have found temporary refuge in Syria. An undetermined number of Iraqis have also sought temporary protection in Syria. In the village of Mezgeft just across the border from Iraq, live Iraqi Kurdish refugees, spontaneously settled with no international protection or assistance.

Syrian Jews have had particular difficulty trying to leave the country. In 1990, four Syrian Jews, including two women, were arrested for attempting to cross into Turkey without permission. The two women were released in December. Two other Jews arrested in 1987 for traveling to Israel were still imprisoned in 1990.

United Arab Emirates

More than 40,000 Kuwaiti refugees entered the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1990 after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many had been vacationing at the time of the invasion, so did not actually flee Kuwait. The exiles were supported through Kuwaiti government-in-exile funds and private sources. Many stayed in luxury hotels, hoping for a quick return to their homeland.

The UAE has been reluctant to divulge its estimate of the number of resident Palestinians. In the wake of the Gulf War, Palestinian and Iraqi sources claimed that the UAE rounded up and deported thousands of Palestinians. The government was reportedly requiring entry visas for Palestinians, following the Iraqi invasion.

The UAE has signed neither the 1951 refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol and lacks any formal mechanism for determining refugee status. Like the other states of the Arabian peninsula, however, it depends heavily on an expatriate labor force, some of whom may be in refugee-like circumstances. Among them are an undertermined number of Somalis, about whom USCR has received allegations of mistreatment.

Yemen

The events of 1990 in Yemen had an epic quality. First, in May, North and South Yemen merged to become one country, the Republic of Yemen. Then, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the lifting of special resident privileges for the two million Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, between 500,000 and 750,000 Yemeni expatriates were forced to return home.

Many of the expatriates had lived their entire lives in Saudi Arabia, and their mass entry into the Yemen job and housing markets led to economic disruption for the newly unified Yemen. There were reports that hundreds of thousands of returning Yemenis might cause the further displacement of as many as 100,000 foreign workers in Yemen.

Although causing considerable difficulty for the new government, the repatriating Yemenis were not refugees.

Prior to unification, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) had hosted some 55,000 refugees from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), followers of former PDRY head of state Ali Nasir Muhammad, who was overthrown in 1986. USCR wrote to Yemen authorities both before and after unification, inquiring about security provisions for these people in the post-unification Yemen. The government did not respond.

However, in an encouraging sign, the PDRY released convicted political prisoners in February 1990, including followers of Ali Nasir Muhammad, and announced an amnesty for dissidents and exiles.

Upon unification, Yemen announced that it would abide by all conventions and treaties ratified by either the YAR or the PDRY. Although the PDRY had not been a signatory to the 1951 refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, the YAR had ratified both instruments. Yemen has not yet established its own refugee determination procedure.

Yemen is host to about 1,100 Eritrean refugees in the Al-Khaukha camp, and about half that number are believed to be scattered in other parts of the country. An undetermined number of Somali refugees also reside in Yemen.

North America

Canada

After two years of operating under a new asylum procedure, Canada has maintained one of the highest asylum approval rates for any country, 75 percent. Increasingly, however, Canadians are feeling the slowness of the adjudicatory procedure, as the number of backlogged claimants continued to grow in 1990.

The new refugee determination system involves two steps. An initial hearing determines the applicants' credibility and eligibility for refugee status in Canada. The main thrust is to determine whether the claim has a "credible basis." This is based largely on the applicant's country of origin and its human rights record.

An adjudicator from the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) and a member of the Immigration and Refugee Board's Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) must both agree that a claim has no credible basis in order for it to be rejected.

In addition to credibility, the first stage also assesses eligibility. The law's intent had been to deem as ineligible applicants who had resided in "safe third countries." However, the government has not been able to decide what countries should be designated as "safe" (largely as a result of controversy over whether or not the United States would be so designated, given its track record in denying asylum to certain nationalities).

The other grounds for ineligibility, such as resettlement in a third country, criminality, and security threats, have been used in less than 2 percent of the cases.

In 1990, 94.3 percent of claims were accepted for a second hearing. At the first hearing, an approval rate of 98 percent or more was recorded for applicants from major source countries such as China, El Salvador, Iran, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sri Lanka.

At the second stage, a full hearing on the refugee claim itself is held before two-member panels of the CRDD. A positive decision by one member of the panel is sufficient to grant refugee status.

At the annual Oromo conference in Toronto, Oromo children (most born in Ethiopia) perform traditional songs in a cultural show. USCR/H. Ruiz

Cases can be appealed to the federal courts on matters of law, but not on the merits of the claim. Nongovernmental organizations charge that allowing appeals only on matters of law is too limiting. The Canadian Council of Churches has challenged certain provisions of the refugee law as unconstitutional. The churches are especially concerned about the government's removal of denied asylum applicants from Canada after the first hearing pending the outcome of their appeals before the Federal Court.

In the first year of the new system, 88 percent of refugee claims were granted at the full hearing. This high approval rate dipped somewhat to 77 percent in 1990. The most significant decreases were for asylum claimants from Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. PRC approvals dropped from 74 percent approval in 1989 to between 35 and 40 percent in 1990, while Polish approvals dropped from 73 percent in 1989 to 21 percent in the first nine months of 1990 and Czech approvals dropped from 76 to 14 percent over the same period. The 1989 law was passed in response to a huge existing backlog, but the government seemed more intent on applying the law to new cases, not the backlog.

As a result, about 61,000 applicants who applied for asylum before 1989 had yet to have their cases heard by November 1990. The Canadian Inter-Church

Committee for Refugees (ICCR) submitted a brief in October to the UN Committee for Human Rights, charging that Canada's asylum determination system subjects asylum seekers in the backlog to "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" treatment. "Almost all of the claimants have now been in Canada for two years," said the brief, "many for four or more, and almost none have come out of the end of the tunnel ."

To address this problem, the government hired 50 additional members for the CRDD board to deal specifically with the "old" backlog (in addition to about 200 regular Board members). In September, the government also introduced a new process to expedite decisions through use of screening based on written case presentations.

Applicants from the backlog need only establish a low threshold "credible basis" of concern test; they do not need to establish that they are refugees. Those rejected may also appeal their removal on "humanitarian and compassionate" grounds to the Minister of Employment and Immigration (an option also open to more recent applicants).

In addition to the 61,000 cases in the "old" backlog, a "new" backlog numbering more than 18,000 built up from among those who arrived after January 1, 1989. At year's end, the government was also moving to streamline the process for the more recent applicants. A total of 36,559 asylum claims were filed in 1990. Canada admitted 39,410 refugees in 1990, of whom about one-third were government sponsored, and two-thirds were sponsored privately.

Canada traditionally has resettled three categories of refugees: Convention refugees able to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in their home countries; "designated class" persons in refugee-like circumstances who may not meet the strict definition of the refugee Convention; and "special measure" admissions for persons with close relatives in Canada whose countries may be experiencing emergency situations such war or natural disasters.

In September, Canada dropped the "designated class" for "self-exiles" from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since 1984, about 45,000 Soviets and East Europeans—including 16, 000 in 1989—had been admitted under the designated class category. Southeast Asians and "political prisoners and oppressed persons" from El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Poland remain as designated classes. In 1990, 28,137 "designated class" refugees were admitted and 11,273 "Convention" refugees.

United States

1990 marked the tenth anniversary of the Refugee Act, which codified in U.S. law the international definition of "refugee" as a person with a "well-founded fear of persecution" in his or her homeland. In the ten years since the Refugee Act became law, more than one million refugees (1,097,880) have been resettled in the United States.

During the fiscal year, 122,325 refugees entered the United States, the largest single nationality being Soviets, of whom 50,716 were admitted. The influx of Soviet refugees, about 80 percent of whom were Jewish, was the most dramatic new development of the year. As recently as FY 1986, less than 800 Soviet refugees had been admitted. Not only were the numbers large, but the Soviet influx also brought significant changes in the criteria used for admission and the ways in which refugees have traditionally been resettled in the United States. The closing of the "pipeline" for Soviet refugees out of Vienna and Rome in 1990 heralded a dramatic shift in the U.S. refugee program away from processing of refugees outside their home countries in favor of processing directly out of the country of origin. For FY 91, up to 50, 000 Soviets are slated to depart directly for the United States. This, combined with the Orderly Departure Program for Vietnamese refugees (up to 52,000 total admissions are allowed for the East Asia region, of which more than half are planned to be for Vietnamese exiting through the ODP) and direct departures of up to 3,000 former political prisoners from Cuba, assures that a clear majority of U.S. refugee admissions in FY 91 will be of persons departing directly to the United States from their home country.

Most of these admissions take place under a relaxed standard defining refugee status. In November, Congress extended until October 1, 1992 legislation originally passed in 1989—known as the Lautenberg Amendment—which eases the standard for admitting both Soviet and Vietnamese refugees. The Lautenberg Amendment requires the Attorney General to establish "category groups" from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "who share common characteristics that identify them as targets of persecution." It also lowers the threshold test of a well-founded fear of persecution for members of these category groups by making them eligible for admission as refugees "by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution." Domestic resettlement also underwent significant changes as a result of the new influx. Initially, up to 10,000 of the Soviet admissions were to be privately sponsored (a mid-year supplemental appropriation ended up funding the travel portion of this cost). Until 1990, only a token number of refugees had been privately sponsored for U.S. admission.

As a result of the changes in Eastern Europe, the United States discontinued conducting new interviews for refugee applicants from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and imposed limits on processing of Bulgarians and Hungarians to those who could show family or other U.S. ties. The majority of East European refugees resettled in FY 1990 were Romanians, totalling 3,650 admissions.

Vietnamese admissions increased to 40,619 in FY 1990 from 31,331 the previous year. Additional numbers of people exiting through the Orderly Departure Program account for most of the increase. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States has admitted 981,765 refugees from Southeast Asia.

A total of 73,637 persons applied for asylum from within the United States during FY 1990. The approval rate stood at 14.7 percent. In contrast, 101,679 applied in 1989 with an approval rate of 18 percent. As in previous years, the approval rates for nationals from certain refugee-producing countries—Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador, in particular, with approval rates of 0.5, 1.4, and 2.6 percent respectively—lagged far behind the worldwide average. In contrast, asylum approvals for the Soviet Union increased to 82.4 percent (from 72.6 percent in FY 1989).

The Immigration Act, signed into law at the end of November, included a provision to bar the deportation of Salvadorans for 18 months and to allow them to work during that time. It also authorized the Attorney General to grant "temporary protected status" to nationals of other countries experiencing ongoing armed conflict or other extraordinary conditions making a safe return unlikely.

On the occasion of the signing of the Act, the U.S. Committee for Refugees wrote to Attorney General Thornburgh requesting that he designate Liberians, Lebanese, and Kuwaiti nationals for temporary protected status. [*In March 1991, the Attorney General designated all three of these nationalities for temporary protected status.*]

In October, regulations came into effect that created a permanent procedure for determining asylum claims. The new system established a corps of asylum officers within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) assigned exclusively to adjudicate asylum applications.

Under the system, INS asylum officers will hold nonadversarial hearings with asylum applicants. If the claims are rejected at this stage, they can be raised again before immigration judges in the course of adversarial hearings for deportation or exclusion.

Among other provisions, the new regulations permit an asylum claimant's testimony to be accepted without corroboration if it is credible in light of general conditions in his or her homeland. The regulations create a documentation center to inform INS asylum officers about home-country human rights conditions. The regulations also state that it is not necessary for applicants to show that they would be singled out if they can establish that there is a pattern or practice of persecuting a group of persons similarly situated.

Two class action suits affecting hundreds of thousands of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers that had been in the courts for years were resolved late in the year. In November, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction arising from the *Orantes-Hernandez* suit that requires the INS to notify Salvadorans under INS detention of their right to apply for asylum and to be represented by counsel. In December, the government agreed to reach a settlement of the *American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh* suit, which had challenged bias against Guatemalans and Salvadorans in the asylum process. According to the terms of the settlement, all Salvadorans present in the United States as of September 19, 1990 and all Guatemalans in the United States as of October 1, 1990 became eligible for new hearings of their asylum claims.

The final asylum regulations creating the corps of asylum officers, the new immigration law with the provision of temporary protected status and 18 months of safe haven for Salvadorans, together with the *Orantes-Hernandez* injunction and the *ABC* settlement, suggested that Central American asylum seekers in the United States would be treated more fairly and equitably in the 1990s than they had been during the previous decade.

Following the Sandinista defeat in Nicaragua's elections in February, the INS began to reevaluate Nicaraguan asylum claims. A total of 21,693 asylum applications had not been acted on in the beginning of the year, the largest of any nationality, and thousands of others who had been denied asylum had had no further action taken on their cases. By late July, 200 to 300 denial notices per week were being sent to Nicaraguans. Asylum approval rates for Nicaraguans have fallen from 84 percent in FY 1987 to 53, 26, and 16 percent in each of the next three years. Despite the drop in asylum approvals, Nicaraguans were the second highest nationality applying for asylum in 1990. A total of 18,304 applied, second only to the 22,271 Salvadorans who sought asylum.

On the other hand, protection for Chinese nationals in the United States was enhanced in April when President Bush signed an executive order barring the deportation of all Chinese nationals present in the United States since the June 5, 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Chinese asylum approval rates leapt from 42 to 91 percent between 1989 and 1990.

In contrast, U.S. protection was virtually nonexistent for Haitians. Most Haitians never reached U.S. shores to seek asylum. In 1990, 1,196 Haitians were interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard and returned directly to Haiti. Since the interdiction program began in 1981, 22,940 Haitians have been interdicted. Only 11 Haitians in that time have been permitted ashore to pursue asylum claims. In FY 1990, 425 Haitians managed to apply for asylum (mostly people who arrived by plane). In the course of the year, only 2 Haitians received asylum in the United States.

Selected Sources

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DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONS

The following are selected international, governmental, and private U.S. organizations providing information about or assistance for refugees. Descriptions are generally provided by the agencies themselves.

International Organizations

Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR). 5–7 av. de la Paix. 202 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 739 81 11. FAX: (022) 731 95 46. E-mail address: THOOLEN @ UNICC.

Computer-based documentation center which gathers, stores, and disseminates information on all aspects of refugee protection, reception, resettlement, and integration. Part of UNHCR, but also serves outside users. Reading room and computer files available through staff. Publisher of quarterly *REFUGEE ABSTRACTS* and ad hoc bibliographies.

International Organization for Migration (IOM, formerly ICM). 17, route des Morillons, P.O. Box 71, CH- 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (022) 717-9111) FAX: (022) 798-6150. Director General: James N. Purcell, Jr. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, Room 717, 1123 Broadway, New York, NY 10010. (212) 463-8422; California—James Gildea, Suite 1225, The Adam Grant Building, 114 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104. (415) 391-9796; Washington—Frances Sullivan (Acting), 1750 K Street, NW, Suite 1110. Washington, DC 20006. (202) 862-1826.

Established in 1951 to arrange resettlement processing and transportation for refugees and migrants. Conducts related programs for medical screenings language training, and cultural orientation. Plans and implements programs for the transfer of specialized human resources through migration to developing countries. Undertakes research projects and organizes biennial international seminars on major migration themes. Represented in 44 countries worldwide.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 19 avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 734 60 01. FAX: (022) 733 20 57 Telex: 414 226. Delegations in 47 countries. In the U.S., 780 Third Avenue, 28th Floor, New York, NY 10017. (212) 371-0770. FAX: (212) 838-5397. President: Cornelio Sommaruga.

Founder of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Promotes international humanitarian law. A Swiss, independent, neutral organization with the internationally recognized role of humanitarian intermediary between belligerants during armed conflicts. Protects and assists the victims of international and civil wars and of internal disturbances and tensions by providing medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing and information agency for prisoners of war and missing persons, a service for transmission of family messages, and visits to civilian internees and prisoners of war and political detainees. Has observer status to the UN General Assembly.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 17 chemin des Crets, P.O. Box 372, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (022) 734 55 80. FAX: (022) 733 03 95. Telex 22555 LRCS-CH. Secretary-General: Par Stenback.

The League, the international federation of 149 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, contributes to the humanitarian activities of National Societies, coordinates relief operations for natural disaster victims, cares for refugees outside areas of conflict, and aims to promote peace in the world. In refugee situations, the Secretariat mobilizes the League's own financial and in-kind contributions and health and managerial staff to supplement National Societies' and UNHCR's resources.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Case Postale 2500, CH-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, Switzerland. (022) 739 81 11. High Commissioner: Sadako Ogata. UNHCR Liaison Office to the United Nations Headquarters, UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 963-6200. UNHCR Branch Office for the United States, 1718 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 387-8546.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statute and to seek durable solutions for the problems of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in over 100 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 3 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 326-7000. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO). Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. (022) 34 60 11 or 33 20 10. Telex: 28148 UNDR CH. Cable: UNDRO GENEVA.

Created in 1972 to provide a single central office within the United Nations community to coordinate and strengthen relief efforts. Since it began operations, UNDRO has helped coordinate relief and raise money for emergency aid in more than 380 major disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Vienna International Centre, PO Box 700, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. (011) 431 21131, Ext. 4530. Commissioner-General: Giorgio Giacomelli. New York Liaison Office: John Miles, UN Bldg., Rm. DC2–0550, New York, NY 10017. (212) 963-2255.

Since 1950, has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering more than two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Offers basic health and relief services to eligible refugees, and education to children, as well as vocational and teacher training. Also provides emergency relief services to Palestinian refugees displaced by war and violence, as it has been doing continuously since 1975 in Lebanon. Has provided additional emergency aid to refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip where the Palestinian uprising broke out in December 1987.

World Council of Churches, Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee & World Service, P.O. Box 2100, 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. (022) 791 61 11. FAX: (022) 791 03 61. Telex: 415 730 OIK CH. Coordinator: Melaku Kifle.

Works with local churches in about 70 countries in support of their refugee service, including both emergency and long-term assistance. Also, in cooperation with local churches, advocates on behalf of refugees; provides resettlement services; public information and training; and facilitates meetings between churches on refugee issues.

World Food Program (WFP), Via Cristoforo Colombo 426, 00145 Rome, Italy. Executive Director: James C. Ingram. 06–57971. Telex: 626675 WFP 1. Liaison Office at UN Headquarters. (212) 963-8364.

The food aid arm of the United Nations System, with offices in 80 developing countries, provides both long-term development assistance and emergency aid. A major share of the Program's resources is channelled to protracted and emergency refugee and displaced persons feeding operations, in close cooperation with UNHCR. Coordinates food aid deliveries and assists bilateral donors with procurement and transport of food; helps developing countries with logistics problems in food emergency situations.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Family Support Administration, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20447. (202) 252-4545. Director: Chris Gersten.

Assists refugees in achieving economic self-sufficiency following their arrival in the United States. Assistance primarily provided through state-administered resettlement programs. Reimburses states for some costs incurred in providing refugee cash and medical assistance to newly arrived refugees in need. Provides social service grants to states primarily for making available English language and employment training services to refugees.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20536. (202) 514-2000. Commissioner: Gene McNary.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens, including refugees and asylees.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5824, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-5822. Director: Princeton N. Lyman.

Formulates, implements, and directs U.S. refugee and migration policies and programs. The basic mission comprises international refugee protection and assistance as well as management of the U.S. admissions program.

House Judiciary Committee, 2138 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Jack Brooks; Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees. Chairman: Romano L. Mazzoli.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 6333, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-3964. U.S. Coordinator for Refugees: Jewel S. Lafontant-Mankarious.

Coordinates the development and implementation of the international and domestic refugee policies of the U.S. government.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 224 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Joseph Biden; Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 518 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-7878. Chairman: Edward M. Kennedy.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.

U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-5858. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

For 70 years assisting immigrants and refugees, since 1975 has been actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and other African countries. The U.S. Committee for Refugees is an ACNS public information program.

International Social Service (American Branch) is also affiliated with ACNS.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870- 3153. Director: Dale S. de Haan.

A part of the National Council of Churches. Provides refugee resettlement and first asylum services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works with ecumenical agencies worldwide, including the World Council of Churches.

Episcopal Migration Ministries (formerly The Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief/Refugee Migration Affairs) 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454. Executive Director: Rev. Canon Burgess Carr.

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to relief and development needs of refugees, migrants, displaced persons, and asylum seekers globally. Resettles refugees and assists immigrants and asylum seekers in the U.S. through 98 Episcopal dioceses. Assists refugees worldwide in concert with the Anglican Communion and partner agencies, in cooperation with the Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief. Advocates for legislation to respond to the protection and resettlement needs of refugees and displaced persons.

The Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc. (See U.S. Aid and Information Organizations)

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Karl D. Zukerman.

The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Robert P. DeVecchi.

Non-sectarian voluntary agency founded in 1933. Provides resettlement services to refugees from Indochina, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, Central America, Afghanistan, Iran, Ethiopia, and other countries. Maintains a domestic resettlement network of 16 offices as well as five European offices. Overseas, provides emergency relief and assistance to refugees and internally displaced victims of civil strife and conflict. Services include medical, public health, education and other related forms of assistance. Programs are presently operating in Thailand, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, Malawi, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, 390 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016-8803. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Ralston Deffenbaugh.

National agency of Lutheran churches in the U.S. for ministry with refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented persons, and immigrants. Founded in 1939 to resettle World War II refugees, now serves in advocacy for protection and humane treatment for uprooted people worldwide as well as in immigration services and resettlement. Works through 26 regional affiliate social service agency offices that support the direct assistance of church and community volunteers; 22 partner agencies to help unaccompanied minor children; more than 40 ecumenical community-based projects to help asylum seekers; and immigration training to assist service providers.

Migration and Refugee Services, United States Catholic Conference, 3211 Fourth Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20017-1194. (202) 541-3220. FAX: (202) 541-3399. Executive Director: Rev. Richard Ryscavage, S.J.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS), one of the public policy and social action agencies of the United States Catholic Conference, carries out Church policy on migration, refugee, and immigration issues. Provides program support and regional coordination for a network of more than 140 diocesan refugee resettlement offices which resettled over 30,000 refugees in FY 90. Within MRS, the Office for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees provides the pastoral foundation for all of MRS's programs and assists the Bishops in encouraging the integration of immigrants, migrants, and refugees into the life and mission of the local Church. The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) was established in 1988 to ensure that all newcomers have access to affordable immigration related services. CLINIC supports the diocesan network with technical assistance and consultation services, as well as a national immigration support network.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 200 Park Ave. South, Suite 1612, New York, NY 10003. (212) 677-7770. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Originally founded to assist Russian refugees. Scope broadened to provide services to refugees from Eastern Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Oppressed minorities such as Tibetans, Circassians, and Armenians have also received assistance. European headquarters in Munich and South-American headquarters in Buenos Aires oversee offices in these regions. Six regional offices in the U.S. provide resettlement services.

World Relief of the National Association of Evangelicals, 201 Rt 9W North, Congers, NY 10920. (914) 268- 4135. Director of United States Ministries: Donald N. Hammond.

Overseas, provides relief and development assistance in countries of first asylum. Domestically, provided refugee resettlement services to more than 7,000 individuals in FY 90. Also provides orientation and training to sponsoring churches, community groups, families, and individuals to assist the evangelical community to meet the needs of refugees. World Relief has a national network of 24 offices throughout the U.S.

Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Africare, Inc., 440 R St. NW, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 462-3164. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa through the development of water resources, increased food production, health services, and refugee assistance. Currently operates more than 220 programs in Africa and many development education programs in the United States. Refugee programs currently in East, Southern, and Francophone Africa.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. FAX: (215) 241-7026. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization founded in 1917, supports reconciliation and development worldwide especially in situations of conflict; provides relief and rehabilitation assistance to refugees in the context of community development; advocates for resolution of conflicts and refugee rights in the U.S.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. (212) 687- 6200. Executive Vice President: Michael Schneider.

Established in 1914 and funded predominantly by the campaigns of the UJA, JDC serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community, providing for rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in 35 countries include Soviet Jewish emigres, Israel's social needs, glasnost-facilitated expansions in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and nonsectarian development and disaster relief worldwide.

American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. Chairman: George F. Moody. International Social Services Unit: Mary-Lou McCutcheon (202) 639-3308.

Works in cooperation with the 149 Red Cross/Red Crescent societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its Tracing Services. Other Red Cross programs include disaster preparedness and relief, and the strengthening of programs of other national societies.

American Refugee Committee, Headquarters: 2344 Nicollet Ave., Rm. 350, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872- 7060. Chicago Office: 317 Howard St., Evanston, IL 60202. Executive Director: Jack D. Soldate.

Internationally, ARC provides medical volunteers for refugee camps in Thailand (Southeast Asia) and in Malawi (Africa), to provide direct care, medical training, and child survival programs for Indochinese and Mozambican refugees. In 1991, will initiate program activities in Cambodia. The Illinois program focuses on public/mental health training and English language/citizenship training. Minnesota program uses volunteer American mentors with traditional educational experiences to move refugee youth, women and elders towards self-reliance.

Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WCIX 8 DJ, United Kingdom. Secretary General: Ian Martin. U.S. Section: 322 8th Ave., New York, NY 10001. Executive Director: John G. Healey. Address requests for assistance to Refugee Office, 655 Sutter, Suite 402, San Francisco, CA 94102. (415) 776-2473.

International human rights organization working for the release of prisoners of conscience, for fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners, and to abolish torture and executions worldwide. Provides information for political asylum applications and opposes refoulement of persons who might reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as prisoners of conscience, tortured, or killed. Publishes annual report, newsletter, and country and special reports on worldwide human rights conditions.

Armenian Assembly of America, 122 "C" St., NW, Suite 350, Washington, DC 20001. Telephone: (202) 393- 3434. FAX: (202) 638-4904. Executive Director: Ross Vartian.

Through the Armenian Refugee Coordinating Committee (ARCC), the Assembly advocates for a humane and appropriate response to the plight of Armenian refugees, provides direct assistance, and serves as a resource for the public and private sectors and media for information about Armenian refugees and emigres. In 1988, ARCC operated direct assistance programs in Belgium, Greece, and Pakistan.

Boat People S.O.S. Committee, P.O. Box 7022, Arlington, VA 22207. (703) 522-9264. Executive Director: Thang Nguyen.

Mission is to help Vietnamese refugees in refugee camps or on open sea. Organizes rescue missions to rescue boat people on open seas. Offices throughout the United States and branches in Canada, Australia, Japan, and Europe.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. President: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization. Responds to the needs of refugees and displaced persons in emergency situations through effective delivery systems to facilitate the distribution of food and other aid. Also implements long-term development programs in health and nutrition education and natural resource management to improve living conditions and facilitate self-sufficiency among refugees, displaced persons, and repatriates. Has refugee programs in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Thailand and programs for the displaced in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

Catholic Relief Services—USCC (CRS), 209 West Fayette Street, Baltimore, MD 21201. Executive Director: Lawrence A. Pezzullo.

Overseas relief and development agency of the U.S. Catholic community. Active in 66 countries with nutrition programs, water and agricultural projects, small enterprise development and community promotion. Major refugee foci are Africa and Central America. Refugee and resettlement assistance in 1989 was valued at 15 million dollars, or 6 percent of the CRS program expenditure.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 1118 22nd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 429-9292. President: G. Richard Tucker.

Operates the Refugee Service Center in Washington, DC under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Department of State. Acts as a liaison between the State Department-funded Overseas Refugee Training Program sites in Southeast Asia and educators, social service providers, and others assisting refugees in the U.S. Produces resettlement guides for newly arrived refugees, conducts surveys to gather information on refugees' resettlement experiences, gives presentations and workshops in U.S. resettlement sites and at professional conferences, and publishes information material for staff in the Overseas Refugee Training Program.

Center for Migration Studies (CMS), 209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, NY 10304-1199. (718) 351-8800. FAX: (718) 667-4598. Executive Director: Lydio F. Tomasi.

Founded in 1964, CMS encourages the interdisciplinary study of human migration and refugee movements everywhere through scientific research projects; publication of the quarterly *International Migration Review* and the bimonthly *Migration World Magazine*, as well as books, papers, and the CMS Newsletter, the CMS Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy in Washington, DC; and a specialized library and archives on migration and refugees.

Central America Resource Center, Refugee Legal Support Service (RLSS), Box 2327, Austin, Texas 78768, (512) 476–9841. Director: Jill Gronquist.

Established in 1983, provides political asylum documentation for refugees from all Central American countries. Information is obtained from an extensive human-rights data base of computer-indexed U.S., Central American, and international human-rights reports, newsclipping services, and church and government reports. Referrals are made to direct service organizations and to attorneys with comparable cases.

Church World Service (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Examines ethnic persecution as cause of refugee flows. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, 21 N. Salsipuedes St. 93103, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (805) 687- 3694. Executive Director: Ann W. Carlos.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist needy health facilities in medically less developed areas of the world, as well as refugees and other victims of natural disaster and civil strife.

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 907, New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2727. Executive Director: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans affected by war, drought, and famine, including people displaced internally and refugees in the Sudan. U.S. partner agency of the indigenous Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), which focuses on self-help and grassroots initiatives. Emergency assistance includes food, medicine, shelter, and pest control. Development support includes an agricultural rehabilitation program, rural health care facilities, and vocational and academic education projects.

The Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc. 3213 Columbia Pike, Suite 101, Arlington, Virginia 22204. (703) 685-0510. Director: Tsehaye Teferra.

A private, nonprofit organization established in 1983. Has recently begun a refugee resettlement program. Engages in programs that promote the economic, educational, and social development of the Ethiopian community in the U.S. Provides Ethiopians and other refugees with the means to gain the knowledge and skills necessary to become self- sufficient, and to disseminate infomation concerning Ethiopia and the Ethiopian community in the United States.

Exodus World Service, P.O. Box 7000, West Chicago, IL 60185-7000. (312) 733-8433. Executive Director: Dennis Ripley.

An international humanitarian agency that provides educational services to individuals and churches to heighten their knowledge and awareness of refugees. Works through media and volunteer networks to gain material and service assistance from the private sector for refugee families resettling in the United States.

The Experiment in International Living (EIL). Projects in International Development and Training Division, Kipling Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301. (802) 257-4628. Vice-President: Barry Sidman.

In a consortium with Save the Children Federation and World Education, offers English as a Second Language (ESL), cultural orientation, work orientation, preparation for American secondary schools and native language literacy for Indochinese adults and families in Phanat Nikhom, Thailand. In a consortium with Save the Children Federation, offers elementary, secondary and vocational education, literacy and limited ESL to Indochinese refugees and asylum seekers in Galang, Indonesia. In Pakistan, conducts a curriculum development and teacher training program for Afghan teachers.

European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles. Bondway House, 3–9 Bondway, London S.W.8., U.K. Telephone (071) 582-9928. General Secretary: Philip Rudge.

International forum for 60 West European nongovernmental organizations which assist refugees or are concerned with refugee and asylum policy. Monitors national and international developments, promotes legal and information networks, and advocates progressive standards for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. The European Legal Network on Asylum; (ELENA, a forum for legal counsellors, is a project activity of ECRE.) Secretariat based in London.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance (CIPRA). P.O. Box 2298, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Provides research, training and consultation to contribute to the development of humane, reasonable and enforceable immigration and refugee policies. Sponsors lectures, seminars, public meetings on refugee policy; and educational programs offering internships in refugee assistance and medicine, dental care, and nursing, small business training and leadership development. Tutorial program offers community service to refugees in local school systems. Conducts research on migration in the Americas and U.S. immigration legislation and its effects.

Grassroots International. P.O. Box 312, Cambridge, MA 02139. (617) 497-9180

Provides humanitarian assistance to Third World peoples and social movements as a basis for building awareness and activism among North Americans in support of equity, justice, and peace. Sends funds and material aid to local partner organizations linked to broad-based movements for change in crisis areas—currently South Africa, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. All projects supported are community-based with emphasis on community organizing and empowerment.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc. 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687- 2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

An international child caring agency serving children in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Latin America. Works with affiliate agencies in providing a wide range of services to homeless children.

Human Rights Internet, ℅ Human Rights Centre, University of Ottawa, 57 Louis Pasteur, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada. (613) 564-3492. FAX: (613) 564-4054. Executive Director: Laurie S. Wiseberg.

An international communications network and clearinghouse which serves the information needs of the human rights community: scholars, activists, and policymakers concerned with the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. Publishes *Human Rights Internet Reporter*, a comprehensive reference work on humanitarian activity worldwide. Publishes directories describing the work of human rights organizations worldwide.

Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), 1628 16th St. NW, 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 667- 4690. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Assists Southeast Asians in the U.S. to make the transition from the status of refugees to a productive Asian-American minority. Major activities include public education and advocacy, leadership and citizenship development, capacity-building for Indochinese self-help organizations, and economic development.

InterAction (American Council for Voluntary International Action), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. President and CEO: Peter J. Davies. Program Officer, Refugee Affairs: Timothy M. McCully. Washington, DC office—1815 H St. NW, Washington DC 20006. (202) 822-8429.

InterAction is a broadly based membership association of 120 U.S. private and voluntary organizations working in international development, humanitarian and emergency relief, refugee relief, assistance, and resettlement, public policy and federal relations, and development education. Member agencies participate in any or all of six working committees: Development Assistance, Migration and Refugee Affairs, Disaster Response and Resources, Public Policy, Development Education, and Private Funding.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 37–39 rue de Vermont, Case postale 96, CH-1211 Geneva 20 CIC, Switzerland. (022) 733 4150. Secretary General: Dr. Andre Van Chau. President: Mr. Edward De Brandt. In the U.S., 1319 F St. NW, Suite 820, Washington, DC 20004.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency Representative in six countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program. Promotes local settlement activities through project assistance and training of refugee officers.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. Postal Address: C.P. 216, 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland. (022) 316-602 (Cable: VOLAG (Geneva), Telex: 22891 ICVA- CH. Executive Director: Delmar Blasco.

Founded in 1962 to provide a forum for voluntary agencies active in the fields of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. At present, has 87 members comprising international and national voluntary agencies.

International Rescue Committee (see U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

International Social Service—American Branch, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein. Director: Marie Mercer.

Established in 1924, liaison between social agencies in U.S. and agencies abroad to resolve on a case-by-case basis problems which derive from international migration and the separation of families by national boundaries. Special emphasis on services and protection for children in migration, inter-country adoption planning, and family reunification, including refugee families. Member of an international structure with General Secretariat in Geneva. Since 1983, affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 330 Seventh Ave., 10th Floor North, New York, NY 10001. (212) 629- 6170. Executive Director: Michael Posner. Director: Refugee Project: Arthur Helton.

Public interest law center in the fields of international human rights and refugee law. Monitors human rights in countries around the world, including those receiving U.S. foreign aid. Works to ensure that persons seeking refuge in the U.S. receive the protections they are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and international law. Legal representation is provided by volunteer attorneys for individual asylum applicants who cannot afford counsel.

Lutheran World Relief, 390 Park Ave., South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of the Lutheran World Federation.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Canadian Office—134 Plaza Dr., Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 5K9. (204) 261-6381. Executive Secretary: John A. Lapp.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and Brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Middle East. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

Minority Rights Group, 379 Brixton Road, London SW9 7DE, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Alan Phillips.

An independent, international human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide and thematic reports on issues concerning minorities and human rights. Also publishes Minority Rights Publication (from 1991), books and materials for schools, and carries out advocacy on minority rights at the UN and other international fora. Also has sister groups outside the U.K.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 220, Washington DC 20002. (202) 544-0004. Director: Frank Sharry.

A national, nonprofit, educational organization with a broad multi-institutional and multi-ethnic membership. Mission is to establish positive working relationships among the diverse communities represented by its membership, and to promote the pro-immigrant, pro-refugee philosophy embodied in its statement of principles.

Operation California/USA, Inc. 7615 1/2 Melrose Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90046. (213) 658-8876. FAX: (213) 653-7846. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. President: Richard Walden.

A nonprofit organization founded in 1979. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tibet, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador, Mexico, Lebanon, Poland, and the United States.

Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: Dr. John Hammock.

A nonprofit, international agency that funds self-help development and disaster relief projects in poor countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Also produces and distributes educational materials for people in the United States on issues of hunger and development. One of seven autonomous Oxfams worldwide, Oxfam America was founded in 1970.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 140 West 22nd St., New York, NY 10011. (212) 254- 2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 500 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11211. (718) 963- 1991. Executive Director: David Niederman.

Through its network of overseas offices, provides care and maintenance, medical assistance, visa documentation and pre-migration planning to refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, housing, medical care, language training, education, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University, Queen Elizabeth House, 21 St. Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA. (0865)-270722 FAX: (0865) 270729. Telex: 83147—attn QEH/RSP. E-mail: Bond @ UK.AC. Oxford. VAX. Director: Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond.

Center for multi-disciplinary research, teaching, and training of practitioners in the field of involuntary migration. RSP provides public information; holds weekly seminars and annual international symposia to provide a forum for dialogue between academics, refugees, host government officials and agency workers. Publishes the *Directory of Current Research on Refugees and Other Forced Migrants*, the *Journal of Refugee Studies*, the Refugee Participation Network, and *Displaced Peoples and Refugees: A Resource Guide*, and other works in this field.

Refugee Voices Inc., 713 Monroe St. NE, Washington, DC. 20017-1799. (202) 832-0020. FAX: (202) 832-5616. Director: Frank Moan, S.J.

A public education organization that, through various media, attempts to inform Americans of the plight of refugees settled in the U.S. and those in camps throughout the world.

Refugee Women in Development (RefWID), 810 First St., NE, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 289-1104. Executive Director: Sima Wali.

The only national organization established to address the needs and concerns of Third World refugee women who have settled in the U.S. Priorities include conducting training on the protection needs of refugee women, particularly in regard to domestic violence; developing practical program models for leadership development and coalition building; and carrying out education and advocacy with refugee and mainstream organizations, policymakers, and the general public.

Refugees International, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 240, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 547-3785. Executive Director: Lionel Rosenblatt.

Monitors refugee situations worldwide to ensure that refugees' basic needs for protection and care are met. Provides information to policymakers and the public. Advocates for fair refugee policy at home and abroad. Organizes letter writing campaigns and publishes a newsletter.

Relief and Development Institute, 1 Ferdinand Place, London NWI 8EE, U.K. (071) 485-0944, FAX: (071) 284- 0244. Director: Edward Clay.

Researches all aspects of disaster relief and management, including refugee communities. Runs workshops, briefing and training courses for field staff, and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports and the quarterly journal, *Disasters*.

The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 737-3330. Executive Director: Dean B. Seiler.

As a development arm of The Salvation Army, provides technical and financial assistance in support of self-help, relief, and training programs. Assistance, including aid to disaster victims, refugees, and displaced persons, is available to the 93 countries and territories in which The Salvation Army operates.

Save the Children Federation, Inc., 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 221-4000. President: James J. Bausch.

Founded in 1932, serves children through community development in 43 countries including the U.S. In its refugee programs, provides humanitarian assistance with an emphasis on making refugees self-sufficient and providing a base on which long-term development can take place. Agriculture, nutrition, health care, sanitation, education and small scale enterprise are program components in Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Pakistan. Training in literacy, language, cultural orientation, employment skills and secondary and primary education are program components in Thailand and Indonesia

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 34–3507. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein; Director: Roger P. Winter.

Public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Issues publications and provides information about refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to ensure refugee protection and assistance. Publishes the *World Refugee Survey* and *Refugee Reports*, a monthly news service on refugee issues.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 333 East 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: Lawrence E. Bruce, Jr.

Established in 1947, the oldest and largest of 32 national committees for UNICEF. The committee informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children and their mothers in the areas of nutrition, primary health care, clean water and sanitation, education, social services, and emergency relief and rehabilitation. Raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, fund-raising events, contributions, and special events.

Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law—Alien Rights Law Project (ARLP), 1400 Eye St. NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 682-5900. Acting Director: Deborah Sanders.

Begun in 1978 by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, provides legal assistance to aliens, focusing on asylum and refugee issues as well as those cases where aliens suffer employment or housing discrimination because of immigration status.

World Concern International, PO Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. Executive Director: Fred Gregory.

Provides emergency relief, but focuses primarily on long-term development to refugees and non-refugee populations in Asia, Africa and the Americas. Assistance is usually provided through indigenous agencies in the form of technical assistance, grants and commodities.

World Relief (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

World Vision Inc., 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Robert A. Seiple.

Established in 1950, an international Christian child care, relief and development agency which suppports more than 5,000 projects in 89 countries worldwide. Through emergency disaster relief, child sponsorship, primary health care, agricultural development and community leadership training projects, World Vision's work benefits approximately 13 million people, including 616,000 sponsored children.

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Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1025 Vermont Ave., NW, Suite 920, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 347-3507; or 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

AKRON
International Institute
207 East Tallmadge Avenue
Akron, OH 44310
(216) 376-5106

ALBANY
International Center of the Capital Region
8 Russell Rd.
Albany, NY 12206-1307
(518) 459-8812

AURORA
Khmer Association
1437 South Zeno Way
Aurora, CO 80017
(303) 745-5139

BINGHAMTON
American Civic Association
131 Front Street
Binghamton, NY 13905
(607) 723-9419

BOSTON
International Institute of Boston
287 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 536-1081

BOWLING GREEN
Western Kentucky Refugee Mutual Assistance, Inc.
603 E. 11th Street
Bowling Green, KY 42101
(502) 781-8336

BRIDGEPORT
International Institute of Connecticut
670 Clinton Avenue
Bridgeport, CT 06605
(203) 336-0141

BURLINGTON
Vermont Refugee Resettlement Program
103 South Main Street
Waterbury, VT 05676
(802) 885-9602

BUFFALO
International Institute of Buffalo
864 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14209
(716) 883-1900

CHICAGO
Travelers and Immigrants Aid of Chicago
327 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 435-4500

CINCINNATI
Travelers Aid-Int'l Inst. of Cincinnati
632 Vine Street, Suite 505
Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 721-7660

CLEVELAND
The Nationalities Service Center
The Price Building
1715 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115
(216) 781-4560

ERIE
International Institute of Erie, Pennsylvania
517 East 26th Street
Erie, PA 16504
(814) 452-3935

FLINT
International Institute
515 Stevens Street
Flint, MI 48502
(313) 767-0720

FRESNO
Lao Family Community of Fresno, Inc.
3121 East Olive Avenue
Fresno, CA 93702
(209) 264-4080

GARY
International Institute of Northwest Indiana, Inc.
4433 Broadway
Gary, IN 46409
(219) 980-4636

HONOLULU
Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center
720 North King Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 845-3918

HOUSTON
YMCA International Services
3635 W. Dallas Street
Houston, TX 77019
(713) 527-8690

JERSEY CITY
International Institute of New Jersey
880 Bergen Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306
(201) 653-3888

KANSAS CITY
Don Bosco Community Center
529 Campbell Street
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 421-0546

LAREDO
Associacion Pro Servicios Sociales
Centro Aztlan
406 Scott Street
Laredo, TX 78040
(512) 724-6244

LAWRENCE
International Institute of Greater Lawrence, Inc.
454 Canal St.
Lawrence, MA 01840
(508) 687-0981

LINCOLN
Khmer Association
825 "M" Street, Suite 201
Lincoln, NE 68508
(402) 474-3733

LOS ANGELES
International Institute of Los Angeles
435 South Boyle Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90033
(213) 264-6210

LOWELL
International Institute of Lowell
79 High Street
Lowell, MA 01852
(508) 459-9031

MANCHESTER
International Center
102 N. Main Street
Manchester, NH 03102
(603) 668-8602

MANCHESTER R&P
ACNS-New Hampshire
34 Gilhaven Road
Manchester, NH 03104
(603) 641-6190

MIAMI
Christian Community Service Agency
3360 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33135
(305) 442-4202

MILWAUKEE
International Institute of Wisconsin
2810 West Highland Boulevard
Milwaukee, WI 53208
(414) 933-0521

MINNEAPOLIS
YMCA Downtown Branch
30 South 9th Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612) 371-8791

NEW YORK CITY
Travelers Aid Services
2 Lafayette Street, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10007
(212) 577-7700

OAKLAND
International Institute of East Bay
297 Lee Street
Oakland, CA 94610
(415) 451-2846

PHILADELPHIA
Nationalities Service Center of Philadelphia
1300 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 893-8400

PROVIDENCE
International Institute of Rhode Island, Inc.
421 Elmwood Avenue
Providence, RI 02907
(401) 461-5940

ST. LOUIS
International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis
3800 Park Avenue
St. Louis, MO 63110
(314) 773-9090

ST. PAUL
International Institute of Minnesota
1694 Como Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55108
(612) 647-0191

SAN FRANCISCO
International Institute of San Francisco
2209 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94109
(415) 673-1720

TOLEDO
International Institute of Greater Toledo
2040 Scottwood Avenue
Toledo, OH 43620
(419) 241-9178

TWIN FALLS
ACNS-Twin Falls
℅ College of Southern Idaho
P.O. Box 1238
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1238
(208) 734-9581

WASHINGTON, DC
Travelers Aid Society of Washington, DC
512 C Street NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-3120

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